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Abstract 
This realist ethnography describes the heretofore unexamined culture of commercial 
nuclear power security officers over a one-year period from an active participant 
observer’s perspective. Data include field notes taken during observations at various 
sites and 15 interviews with security leaders working at or who had recently worked 
at 12 different commercial nuclear power plants and had previously worked at a 
dozen other commercial nuclear power plants, thus representing a broad overview of 
the commercial nuclear security culture. The data also include more than 58 
unclassified documents from these sites, industry organizations, and regulatory 
agencies. An analysis of the data reveals 16 key themes that are characteristic of the 
nuclear security officer culture.  
 
The study describes how, although safety and security are of paramount concern at a 
commercial nuclear plant, the cultures of security workers and safety workers differ 
significantly. Not only is the nuclear security officer culture different from that of the 
safety culture at the same plant, but it often conflicts with it in its attitudes, goals, 
procedures, supervision, and job satisfaction. The commercial nuclear security officer 
culture is unique in many ways, including the isolation of security officers—
institutionally, physically, and socially—from the other plant workers; their working 
conditions and benefits; their need to work oftentimes long, boring, unpredictable 
shifts and carry heavy equipment to remote sites; and their responsibility to respond 
immediately and, if necessary, with deadly force, even putting their lives on the line. 
  iii
Supplementing the data analysis, and in keeping with a realistic ethnography, are a 
series of vignettes describing the typical day in a nuclear security officer’s life.  
 
The study also points out differences between the commercial nuclear security culture 
and that of the private non-nuclear security cultures. The study concludes with 
recommendations for improving the commercial nuclear security officer culture and 
for future research into a culture we know little about but whose members are 
invested with one of the greatest responsibilities in our country—protecting us from 
potential acts of terrorism perpetrated on nuclear plants and the resultant exposure to 
the effects of nuclear waste, which can last for generations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of this research study. It describes the background 
of the commercial nuclear security industry located in the United States (U.S.), states 
the research purpose, discusses the significance of the research, describes the 
researcher’s experience, and summarizes the methodology.  A list and definitions of 
key terms used frequently throughout this paper appear at the end of this chapter so 
that the reader can easily refer to them. 
Overview 
The commercial nuclear security officer’s job was transformed as a result of the U.S. 
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York and at the Pentagon in Washington DC. For example, the numbers of 
officers that comprise the security forces at these commercial nuclear power plants 
have significantly increased (NRC, 2008) and thus nuclear security has emerged as 
one of the largest departments at each commercial nuclear power plant. Commercial 
nuclear power plant security has transformed into a highly armed and highly trained 
paramilitary force with the authority to arrest and the authority to use deadly force 
(NEI, 2001). Additionally, since 2004 each of the 64 commercial nuclear power plant 
sites in the U.S. has invested upward of $75 million in security infrastructure 
upgrades (NEI, 2013a).  
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The security officer’s mission to protect the health and safety of the public by 
defending against radiological sabotage will last longer than the 40-year life of their 
respective power plants (NEI, 2012c). It will last as long as there is concentrated 
nuclear material that can be used for radiological sabotage, which for the highly 
radioactive materials such as used nuclear fuel, will be for hundreds of generations of 
security officers and for thousands of years (NRC, 2007). These unstudied, armed, 
highly compensated, and paramilitary nuclear security officers are largely invisible to 
the public because of the veil of secrecy under which they work. All of these factors 
highlight the importance of studying the nuclear security officer culture.  
Statement of the Problem 
Despite the importance of these officers, the culture within which they work has not 
been studied. Recently, however, their role in protecting the health and safety of the 
public has been elevated, their numbers have significantly increased, and there is a 
growing awareness of their importance in protecting nuclear waste for many 
generations. These factors highlight the need for studying the human side of the 
commercial nuclear security officer culture since these officers are empowered to use 
deadly force in protecting our security and safety. Knowing more about this culture—
what characterizes it and how it can be influenced, managed, and improved—should 
be of concern to not only scholars, but also those involved in nuclear security and 
those affected by it, which means every one of us. 
  
3
Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to answer the question, “What is the culture of the 
commercial nuclear security officer?”  Or, to phrase the question a bit differently, 
“What is the culture in which the U.S. commercial nuclear security officer lives?” 
The research reported herein takes the form of a realist ethnography.  
Significance of the Study 
Scholars 
This study is significant to scholars because it is the first time that the culture of a 
unique group of paramilitary security officers has been examined, and in doing so, 
this research adds commercial nuclear security officer culture to increasingly growing 
body of research on organizational culture. In addition, the study compares two 
cultures: that of the commercial nuclear security officer and that of the larger private 
security officer cultures that have been identified in previous studies, thereby 
investigating whether these cultures share common occupational traits.  
 
In examining how espoused beliefs and values are interpreted and reflected by the 
commercial nuclear security officers in the field, this study has implications for those 
who make and regulate policies and procedures in both the commercial and private 
power industries. 
Practitioners in Nuclear Security 
Practitioners in the commercial nuclear power industry and U.S. government nuclear 
facilities can gain from this study in that it highlights the differences between the 
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commercial nuclear security culture and the commercial nuclear safety culture. It also 
provides useful insights into the best practices of how the commercial nuclear 
security industry is attempting to manage these differences in culture.  
Practitioners in Other Private Security Organizations  
Practitioners in private security organizations can also gain from this study in that it 
identifies the differences between a paramilitary security organization and a 
parapolice organization, and it illuminates some of the management controls that 
might be useful to the management of security officers in other industries.  
Summary of Methodology 
As a scholar practitioner, I collected information through my own active participation 
and observation of security officers in the field, examination of appropriate nuclear 
security related artifacts, analysis of important nuclear security related documents, 
and interviews of appropriate key commercial nuclear security leaders.  
Researcher Background 
As a practitioner for the last 30 years, I have had experience with both Department of 
Defense and commercial nuclear power plants. My involvement in nuclear power 
started in 1982 when I entered the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program with bachelor’s 
degree in engineering from Purdue University. In 1995, following multiple 
supervisory and senior management positions in both sea and shore navy nuclear 
power related assignments, I left the active duty military and entered the field of 
commercial nuclear power, where I held various mid-level and senior management 
positions in engineering, maintenance, chemistry, and operations. In 2005 I was 
  
5
provided the opportunity to be a senior leader in a nuclear security organization. My 
new assignment was as the security operations manager for a 12-site nuclear fleet 
with nuclear power plants in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. As manager, I 
was responsible for helping the sites with improving their human performance and 
industrial safety, developing common solutions to regulatory and security functional 
issues, performing oversight functions at the facilities, and promulgating common 
governance through uniform procedures and policies.  
 
It took just a short while to recognize that nuclear security was different from any 
other organization that I had been a part of, and seeing these differences spurred a 
parallel study of organization development and a detailed examination of the nuclear 
security officer culture. This immersion into the nuclear security culture began during 
the period of time—the first decade of the twenty-first century—when the industry 
was going through profound change, namely when commercial nuclear power sites 
were building security infrastructure and hiring for the post 9/11/2001 attack on the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.  
 
After about three years in this corporate role managing several private sites, I 
accepted an assignment as the site security manager for a commercial nuclear power 
plant, which afforded a more intimate and in-depth look at how nuclear security fits 
into the overall organization of a commercial nuclear power plant site and the day-to-
day life of the nuclear security officer. I held this position for about two years.   
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I was then hired as the security manager for a troubled nuclear power plant at another 
company. Human performance and industrial safety were significantly weaker than 
what I had seen in the fleet operation, and the site was operating with significant 
safety challenges to its work environment. We went through major organizational 
changes, including reorganization, downsizing, and layoffs, all the while improving 
safety consciousness within the work environment, improving human performance, 
and improving the security department’s industrial safety record.  
 
My participation in the field during this study was at times as a spectator or passive 
observer and at times as an active participant as a senior security manager. As a 
scholar and practitioner in the field of commercial nuclear security, I am uniquely 
positioned to perform participant observation of the group and have a high level of 
trust with a significant number of key commercial nuclear security actors. I also have 
been immersed in the day-to-day lives of the commercial nuclear security officers for 
about five years. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
In order to best present the information, this dissertation is divided into seven 
chapters.  As previously discussed, chapter 1 provides an overview of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a summary of the key points drawn from the research literature 
that best pertain to the culture of the commercial nuclear security officer. These 
sources include background information on culture, high reliability organizations, 
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private security officer culture, nuclear culture, commercial nuclear power safety 
culture, nuclear security culture, and the topic of power. There are also key points 
provided on how to obtain the business outcomes of productivity, profitability, 
retention, and customer satisfaction and some culture-influencing methods to sustain 
a high performing organization. 
 
Chapter 3 explains the design and methodology used for this realist ethnography, 
including the selection of subjects and the conduct of the informed-consent 
interviews, and the selection of the locations for the field observations of key social 
situations. It also describes what data were obtained from the interviews, field 
observations, and key artifacts and documents, and the security and confidentiality of 
the subjects, institutions, and data. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a realist ethnography description of the culture in which the 
commercial nuclear security officer works. The chapter consists of two sections. The 
first is a timeline of a typical 15-hour door-to-door shift-work workday. The second 
section is a series of vignettes that describe the six security post types that the 
commercial nuclear security officers are most often assigned to during a typical 
workday and the key social interactions that take place at these posts.  
Chapter 5 describes the 16 key themes that emerged as a result of the data analysis 
described in chapter 3 and how these themes affect the commercial nuclear security 
officer’s culture. These key themes include frictions between the subculture of 
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commercial nuclear security and the commercial nuclear power culture. There are 
also positive themes. 
 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the information provided in chapters 4 and 5. It 
discusses the importance of this study’s key findings and their relationship to the 
literature, including the relationship of the commercial nuclear security officer culture 
to that of the private security officer culture, and evidence of how commercial nuclear 
security organizations are seeking to achieve the highest performing cultures possible.  
 
Chapter 7 describes what obstacles may have affected this research, how I attempted 
to mitigate these obstacles, and what directions for future research this study suggests.  
Definition of Terms 
This section lists and defines key terms used frequently throughout this paper so that 
the reader can easily refer to them.  
 
Artifacts. The surface level at which culture can be studied is the artifact level, which 
includes all phenomena that one can see, hear, and feel when one encounters a new 
group with an unfamiliar culture. Artifacts include visible products of the group, such 
as documents and written procedures, language, clothing, manners of address, 
emotional displays, published lists of values, and observable rituals. Artifacts are easy 
to observe but difficult to decipher (Schein, 2004). 
 
Attentiveness aids. Attentiveness aids are authorized electronics such as computers, 
radios and IPODs and reading materials such as books or magazines that are used by 
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a security officer to reduce the chance that the boredom of the job will result in the 
officer falling asleep. 
 
Basic underlying assumptions. Basic underlying assumptions are at the deepest 
level of culture and are shared by the group but are often taken for granted (Schein, 
2004). 
 
Behavior. Behavior is an observable manner of behaving or acting. 
 
Belief. A belief is an opinion or conviction based on confidence in the truth or the 
existence of something not immediately susceptible to rigorous proof. 
 
BRE. A BRE is a bullet resistant enclosure, which is a type of security post normally 
occupied by one officer. A similar term is hardened defensive position (HDP). 
 
CFR. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the codification of U.S. general and 
permanent rules and regulations. CFR Title 10 (energy), Part 73, contains a majority 
of the commercial nuclear power plant security requirements imposed by the NRC 
(GPO, 2013). 
 
Culture. Culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions that are learned by a group 
as it solves its problems. When a group’s external adaptation and internal integration 
work well enough to be considered valid, these assumptions are taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. 
To understand a group’s culture, one must attempt to get at its shared basic 
assumptions and one must understand the learning process by which such 
assumptions came to be (Schein, 2004). 
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Espoused beliefs and values. The middle level at which culture can be studied is 
espoused beliefs and values, including those beliefs and values concerning what 
ought to be, as distinct from what is (Schein, 2004). 
 
HDP. An HDP is a hardened defensive position, a type of security post normally 
occupied by one officer. A similar term is bullet resistant enclosure (BRE). 
 
IAEA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international 
organization that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as nuclear 
security standards and their implementation (IAEA, 2013). 
 
Information power. Information power refers to the control of information. It 
involves both the access to vital information and the control over its distribution to 
others (Yukl, 2010). 
 
INPO. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is an organization that sets 
performance objectives, criteria, and guidelines industry wide for nuclear power plant 
operations. Its goals are to promote operational excellence and improve the sharing of 
operational experience among nuclear power plants, which does not include security. 
The INPO is funded entirely by the U.S. nuclear industry (INPO, 2013).  
 
NEI. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is a lobbying organization whose objectives 
include ensuring the formation of policies that promote the beneficial uses of nuclear 
energy and technologies in the U.S. and around the world. These policies include 
commercial nuclear security policies (NEI, 2013). 
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NRC. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is a U.S. governmental 
organization that regulates commercial nuclear power plants (NRC, 2013a) and other 
nuclear organizations.  
 
Outcome power. Outcome power is the ability to bring about outcomes (Dowding, 
1996). 
 
Permissibleness. Permissibleness refers to the difficulty or ease with which 
permission to conduct research may be granted. There are three types of permission 
levels for granting research access (Spradley, 1980): 
 Free-entry research can be done without seeking permission. 
Limited entry permission must be obtained from one or more people prior to 
conducting the research. 
Restricted entry has a high probability that permission to conduct research 
will be extremely difficult or impossible to obtain.   
 
Because of my role as a scholar practitioner, I was able to obtain permission that most 
people would find impossible to obtain, including permission to enter restricted entry 
areas. 
 
Post. A post is a position or station to which a person, such as a security officer, is 
assigned for duty. 
 
Proprietary security. Proprietary security refers to a security organization that is 
owned and managed by the nuclear power plant company rather than a contract 
security organization that performs security services for the nuclear power plant 
through a security contract. 
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Protected area. The protected area is an area of the commercial nuclear power plant 
encompassed by physical barriers and to which access is controlled by the 
commercial nuclear security officer. 
 
Search train. A search train is a series of machines such as x-ray, bomb detector and 
metal detector that people pass through to be screened for prohibited items and 
contraband prior to entering a nuclear power plant. The search train is similar to that 
which one experiences when being searched in an airport. 
 
SIFT meeting. A Security Improvement Focus Team (SIFT) is a meeting where 
officers meet to identify, prioritize and work on resolving security officers concerns. 
 
Skip meeting. A skip meeting is a meeting held between the security manager and a 
small group of security officers to discuss security officers’ concerns. Supervision 
and other management are not present at this meeting, that is, these levels of 
supervision or other management are skipped. 
 
Social power. Social power is the power to deliberately change the incentive 
structure of another actor to bring about or help bring about outcomes (Dowding, 
1996). 
 
Social situation. A social situation requires actors, activities, and a place (Spradley, 
1980). 
 
Theme. A theme is a distinct, recurring, and unifying idea that is drawn from one or 
more of the data sources of participant observation, field observation, artifact review, 
document review, or semi-structured interviews. 
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Value. A value is the moral principle and belief or accepted standard of a person or a 
social group. 
 
Vignette. A short literary essay or sketch. 
 
Vital areas. Vital areas are special areas within the protected area where commercial 
nuclear security officers enforce additional access controls. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the key points drawn from the research literature 
that best pertain to the culture of the commercial nuclear security officer. These 
literature sources include information on the current state of the commercial nuclear 
power industry and commercial nuclear security. This section also includes references 
on the topic of culture and power, and the macro-cultures under which the micro-
culture of nuclear security resides.  
Commercial Nuclear Security Background  
Importance of Nuclear Power 
Approximately 20 percent of the U.S. electrical power generation comes from nuclear 
power plants (EPA, 2012), which makes the U.S. reliant upon the electricity these 
plants produce. Commercial nuclear power plants are a part of the U.S. critical 
infrastructure (DHS, 2012). Commercial nuclear power plants have been reported in 
the media as targets for terrorist activity (CNN, 2002). A commercial nuclear power 
plant, if attacked by terrorists, could result in the loss of billions of dollars of 
investment in the facility itself, cripple the U.S. economy due to the loss of electrical 
power generation, and risk the health and safety of the public through the toxic 
radiation that the population could be exposed to as a result of such an attack (NEI, 
2013a). The cost of building a new nuclear power plant is in the billions of dollars 
and could take up to six years to build (Info.Net, 2012). Bickerstaffe and Pearce 
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(1980) note that nuclear power has a unique and broad range of societal concerns, 
including “. . . proliferation, terrorist abuse, routine health damage, the social 
perception of ‘low probability-high damage’ accidents, civil liberties and obligations 
to future generations. Nuclear power combines them all” (p. 320). 
 
Because of the unique and broad range of concerns related to commercial nuclear 
power, it undergoes the highest level of government and public scrutiny.  
Importance of Commercial Nuclear Security Officers 
The mission of the commercial nuclear security officer is to protect the health and 
safety of the public against radiological sabotage (GPO, 2013). The two main sources 
of radioactive materials they protect are the fuel in the nuclear reactor and the spent 
nuclear fuel contained in the spent fuel pool or in dry cask storage, both of which are 
located primarily at the site of the nuclear reactor.  
 
The nuclear security department is often the largest or one of the largest departments 
at a commercial nuclear power plant station. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI, 2012a), the nuclear energy industry has 8,000 paramilitary security 
officers at 65 sites, which is an average of 123 officers per site. Power Magazine 
(Peltier, 2010) states  that the average number of workers per site is about 1,100. 
Using these two averages, commercial nuclear power security officers (which does 
not include supervisors, staff, and managers) comprise an average of about 11 percent 
of a site’s population. With these others included (that is, supervisors, staff, and 
managers), the security personnel for an operating nuclear power plant site make up 
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about 15 percent of the site population. For the organizational structure of a typical 
commercial nuclear power plant of about 1100 workers and its average size of 
departments.  Figure 1 provides a common organizational structure for a commercial 
nuclear power plant and depicts the myriad commercial nuclear power plant 
departments. The top part of the figure depicts the departments reporting directly to 
the site vice president, the senior executive on site. The security department is one of 
these departments. In the bottom half of the figure, the departments reporting directly 
to the plant manager are depicted. In this common organizational structure, the plant 
manager is the second most senior executive on site and is directly responsible for the 
field or line functions other than security. 
  
  
17
 
 
Approximate work force sizes: 
Plant Manager >50%  Engineering >15% Others >15% 
Engineering >12%  Security >15% 
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of Typical Commercial Nuclear Power Plant 
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The organizational structure of a typical commercial nuclear security organization is 
depicted in Figure 2.  The security director or manager often is a direct report to the 
site vice president, the senior executive at the commercial nuclear power plant. The 
security department is similar to the operations department in that it has a vast 
operations branch driven by a large number of 24-hour-per-day, 7-days-per-week 
shift workers. The security department organization is unique in that it has its own 
training branch.  
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Note: Only the physical security function of the security organization is depicted. Commercial nuclear 
power security organizations can also include other functions such as fire response, cyber security, 
access programs, and others. 
Figure 2. Security Functions of a Typical Nuclear Power Plant of a Major Utility 
 
Security Officer’s Role  
Many of the significant changes with commercial nuclear security took place in the 
fall of 2004 in response to security orders issues from the NRC. Others were 
completed in 2010 as a part of changes to the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 
10, Part 73 (10CFR73) driven by the National Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPA, 
2005). These changes affect how commercial nuclear security officers guard both the 
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nuclear waste and the operating nuclear power plants. With the radioactive life of 
nuclear waste lasting possibly hundreds of years, the security officers are crucial to 
maintaining the site’s security and safety. 
Storage of Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Per the NEI (NEI, 2012b), used nuclear fuel in storage is distributed throughout the 
U.S. as depicted in Figure 3.
 
Figure 3. Used Nuclear Fuel in Storage 
 
Low-level radioactive waste consists of items that have come in contact with 
radioactive materials, such as gloves, personal protective clothing, tools, water 
purification filters and resins, plant hardware, and wastes from reactor cooling-water 
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cleanup systems. It generally has levels of radioactivity that decay to background 
radioactivity levels in less than 500 years. About 95 percent decays to background 
levels within 100 years or less (NEI, 2012c).  
 
High-level radioactive waste is uranium fuel that has been used in a nuclear power 
reactor and is “spent” or is no longer efficient in generating power to the reactor to 
produce electricity. Spent fuel is thermally hot as well as being highly radioactive, 
requiring remote handling and shielding. Radioactive isotopes will eventually decay, 
or disintegrate, to harmless materials. However, while they are decaying, they emit 
radiation. Some isotopes decay in hours or even minutes, but others decay very 
slowly. Since the only way radioactive wastes finally become harmless is through 
decay, which for some isotopes contained in high-level wastes can take hundreds of 
thousands of years, the wastes must be stored in a way that provides adequate 
protection for a very long time (NRC, 2007).  
Culture 
Schein ( 2004) defines culture as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that were 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. Culture can be examined from three different levels: artifacts, 
espoused beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions.  
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Artifacts 
Artifacts include visible portions of the organization, including the organizational 
structure, policies and procedures, newsletters, written communications, improvement 
plans, standard meeting agendas, vision statement, mission statement, and process 
documents, and the language recorded in the interviews conducted as a part of this 
study. The same artifact may have different relevance depending upon the specific 
culture being examined. For example, computer laptops found on a security post are 
primarily used as attentiveness aids, whereas computer laptops found in a business 
office are used primarily for more mainstream business purposes such as generating 
reports.  
Espoused Beliefs 
Espoused beliefs include the group’s strategies and goals, philosophies, and slogans. 
According to Schein, this second level of culture also cannot adequately describe the 
culture of the group because there are cases in which people will say what they want 
to do but, when given the opportunity to act, will behave differently than what the 
espoused belief might require of the individual. Espoused beliefs come in the form of 
policy statements, department policies and procedures, and posters visible to the 
officers. The common espoused beliefs in the commercial nuclear security industry 
include the best practices documents that are generated by the NEI, the Code of 
Federal Regulations sections that pertain to commercial nuclear security, and the 
nuclear safety culture traits promulgated by the INPO.  
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Basic Underlying Assumptions 
Basic underlying assumptions are described as being at the heart of a group’s culture, 
and the other two layers of culture, artifacts and espoused beliefs, cannot be 
completely understood without understanding these basic underlying assumptions. 
However, discovering them is exceptionally challenging because although the 
assumptions are often obvious to the group, they are not easily discovered by an 
outsider. One way of discovering them is to monitor what new persons to the group 
are taught. Nevertheless, some underlying assumptions are not revealed to new 
members until they are accepted by the group.  
Macro-culture Overlap 
The commercial nuclear security culture contains cultural elements from other strong 
macro-cultures. Although these cultures are discussed in later sections of this study, 
they are depicted in Figure 4. This graphic representation suggests how these cultures 
overlap with one another. For example, the commercial nuclear security culture 
should share some elements of culture with the private security culture, and is a sub-
culture most aligned with the commercial nuclear power plant safety culture. 
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Figure 4. Overlap of Traits in Different Safety and Security Cultures  
 
High-reliability Organization Culture 
As shown in Figure 4, the commercial nuclear power security culture is a subculture 
of the larger culture of high reliability organizations (HROs). In part, HROs are 
complex organizations with a low tolerance for failure (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
These types of organizations are characterized by the following behaviors: 
 They track small failures. That is, they are preoccupied with failure. They 
treat any lapse as a symptom that something may be wrong. 
 They resist oversimplification. Superficial similarities between the present and 
the past may mask deeper differences that could prove fatal. (The devil is in 
the details.) 
High-reliability Organization Culture 
Nuclear Culture  
Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Safety Culture  
Commercial Nuclear Security Culture  
Private Security Officer Culture 
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 They remain sensitive to operations. The organization has good situational 
awareness and is attentive to the front line workers, who are performing the 
work for the organization. 
 They maintain a commitment for resilience. This type of organization keeps 
errors minimal, can recover from errors quickly, and has an above average 
capability of learning as an organization. 
 They have deference to expertise. Decision-making is pushed down and out to 
people with the highest expertise rather than to the person with the highest 
rank. 
 
Since the authors use commercial nuclear power as an example organization in their 
high-reliability organization studies, one can expect that the subculture of nuclear 
security officers that are a part of the larger station organization would exhibit many 
or most of the behaviors of a high-reliability organization.  
Private Security Officer Culture 
Commercial nuclear security is a subset of the larger private security occupation and 
as such, should share some of the cultural traits of the private security occupational 
culture. Although police culture has been widely studied, security officer culture is 
largely unstudied (Button, 2007), and in the unique case of commercial nuclear 
security officers, there are no existing studies.  
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Private security officer culture was examined by Button (2007) in his case study of 
two sites located in the United Kingdom. His conclusions include the following 
cultural observations:  
 Many security officers desire to be something else or to be somewhere else. 
The structural factors that influence this trait often are the working 
environment and poor status of the security officers. 
 The officers’ moans and bravado stem from poor working conditions that 
seem to be the norm since they are endemic to the industry as a whole.  
 The officer culture exhibits traits of solidarity, isolation, and inferiority, 
driven by structural factors including danger, fear, isolation, and perceived 
low status of the job.  
 The officer trait of machismo is driven by a male working-class culture, 
combined with the officers’ occupational role of surveillance.  
 The officers exhibit traits of suspicion and risk-based minds, which are driven 
by their training and occupational role.  
 
This study of private security officers identifies attributes of the private security 
officer culture for security officers that were engaged in private policing in the United 
Kingdom. The similarity of these traits with those described in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this dissertation suggests that there are common occupational culture traits for private 
security officers of which commercial nuclear security officers are a subset, and that 
these traits are not unique to officers in only the U.S. Finding common cultural traits 
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broadens the potential direct applicability of this study to other nuclear and non-
nuclear private security officer groups. 
 
A study by Rigakos (2002), conducted at a large private security firm in Canada, also 
touched on private security culture. Some key elements of private security culture that 
he found include the following:  
 The officers resist the apparatuses of control. 
 They have a “wannabe” orientation from dependent uncertainty and status 
frustration. 
 The officers’ bravado and caution stem from conditions of dependent 
uncertainty, status frustration, and a fear of being swarmed by angry mobs.  
 The officers engage in constant risk taking and/ or risk aversion, resulting in a 
strong occupational ethic of interdependence in the face of immediate or 
impending dangers. 
 A heavy reliance upon fellow officers is present and as a result the officers 
internalize subcultural norms relating to emergency response and risky 
incidents. This results in frustration, isolation, and unceasing emotional 
anxiety.  
 The officers have an unbridled distain for the officer surveillance monitoring 
system and for the officers who overproduce.  
 The officers think there is some sneaking about by management, and they 
deem it to be devious and to show distrust. 
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 The officers think there is a double standard between management and 
officers with regard to punishments for poor performance. 
 Although officers accept management oversight, they are concerned that it 
may sometimes be arbitrary. 
 Officers feel isolated and think that they get little respect from the public or 
the police. 
 Officers feel akin to the French Foreign Legion insofar as they feel a need to 
look only to one another for support. 
The Rigakos study identifies cultural traits of private security officers from a security 
organization in Canada. The traits are often similar to the cultural traits of the 
commercial nuclear security officer that are identified in chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation, suggesting that there are common occupational culture traits for private 
security officers. But too, the sometimes different job functions of these Canadian 
security officers result in different job pressures, such as the risk of being swarmed by 
angry mobs, which are sometimes quite different from that of the commercial nuclear 
security officer. Thus, although this study supports the idea that there are common 
occupational cultural traits for private security officers, there are unique differences, 
too, because of the differences in the work performed by these different work groups. 
 
A study of the private security sector primarily in the United Kingdom by Gill and 
Howell (2012) contained several conclusions with relevance to the security officer 
culture: 
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 Over two-fifths of the people surveyed from the broad security industry 
conceded that security was a “grudge purchase,” meaning that clients resented 
purchasing the services. 
 Proprietary security was consistently preferred to contract security for quality, 
but more respondents thought that contract security offered better value. 
 The status of security in organizations was viewed as lower than some other 
functions, including procurement and facilities management. 
 When the suppliers were asked why people left contract security work in their 
area of security, they mentioned three crucial reasons: poor pay, limited 
opportunities for development, and a feeling among staff that they weren’t 
appreciated. 
 Security officers felt their efforts went unrecognized and unappreciated by 
both management and the wider public. 
This study provides further cultural insights for private security primarily in the 
United Kingdom, although many of the security companies that were surveyed have 
an international presence. The study also provides insights on how other, non-security 
people perceive security, including the theme that security is a “grudge” purchase— 
meaning that managers often resented purchasing security services. With the 
exception of poor pay, these cultural traits coincide with those of the commercial 
nuclear security officer culture, as identified in chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, 
thus providing further credence to the idea of common occupational private security 
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cultural traits and, by extension, applicability of this dissertation’s findings to a 
broader industry than that of the limited commercial nuclear security industry. 
Nuclear Culture  
Nuclear culture has been described in many studies. Loeb (1982) discusses de-
sensitivity to nuclear issues at the Hanford reactor sites. Cameron and Lavine (2006) 
discuss the nuclear culture and cleanup of the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant. 
Jungk (1976) discusses the events following the Three Mile Island disaster. The navy 
nuclear culture from which the post Three Mile Island commercial nuclear security 
culture was influenced is discussed by Bierly III and Spender (1995). Rees (1994) 
highlights the change in regulation in the civilian nuclear power industry as a result of 
the Three Mile Island accident. Misumi, Wilpert, and Miller (1999) focus on 
developing an effective nuclear safety culture.  
 
Nuclear power affects the average citizen because of the extremely high investment, 
production, and maintenance costs of the facilities. Jungk (1979) observed that 
although the plants have limited lives (on the order of 50 years), the waste they 
produce may last for many thousands of years and be hazardous to all human life. 
Because of the high costs and long-term effects of nuclear energy, the organizations 
who support commercial nuclear policy are represented by a very powerful pro-
nuclear lobbying contingent. With our national discourse regarding nuclear power 
being as highly charged and polarized as it is, any perceived negatives from this study 
could be met with sharp criticism.  
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While the general public still regards nuclear power with some skepticism and fear, 
this attitude seems to be changing even as those in the industry seem to have become 
inured to the dangers. For example, a study of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation 
(Loeb, 1982) found that people working with radioactive materials gradually become 
desensitized to the hazards of the technology with which they are working. However, 
the result is not just potential errors and environmental contamination. More 
significantly, people learn to live with the hazards they have created, hazards that the 
average population would not tolerate. Even having security officers guard hazardous 
waste near their hometowns, rather than transporting it to a remote and centrally 
guarded facility, does not seem to bother many people anymore. Also, a significant 
number of people have a personal stake to ensure that nuclear power succeeds 
because many states have many nuclear power plants and other nuclear-related 
infrastructures, such as laboratories, training facilities, colleges, and regulatory 
agencies that employ a significant portion of the state population in the nuclear-
related industries.  
 
Taken as a group, these authors describe the nuclear culture, of which commercial 
nuclear power and commercial nuclear security are both a part. They also help to 
highlight the need for the study of commercial nuclear security officers. Not only do 
they provide the context for the limitations of the present study and how the study 
might be perceived by some interested parties or stakeholders, but the authors also 
help to illuminate whom the stakeholders might be, such as the regulators, industry 
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lobbying groups, anti-nuclear power groups, and neighbors of the commercial nuclear 
power plants. 
Commercial Nuclear Power Safety Culture  
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was created as an industry self- 
regulatory organization as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island. Originally it 
was staffed primarily with retired navy nuclear trained officers who had their roots in 
the navy nuclear power program. The INPO initially emphasized that commercial or 
civilian nuclear power plants needed to adopt the nuclear navy’s principles, which 
emphasized excellence, as opposed to the principles of the commercial nuclear power 
plant, which tended to emphasize power production. This power production culture 
originated from the commercial fossil power plant companies and the employees who 
built and operated the first commercial nuclear power plants (INPO, 2012; Rees, 
1994).  
 
The INPO has promulgated the espoused beliefs and values for the commercial 
nuclear industry in the form of traits and attributes for the commercial nuclear power 
safety culture. Because these traits and attributes are integrated into the daily nuclear 
power plant operations and are monitored by the INPO and the NRC, they are 
expected to be observed also in the nuclear security officer culture. As noted by the 
INPO (2012), the traits, when they are embraced, will be reflected in the values, 
assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and norms of an organization and its members.  
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The INPO also identifies that, ideally, the traits will describe what it is like to work at 
a nuclear facility and how things are done there. For the commercial nuclear power 
industry, nuclear safety remains the overriding priority and although the same traits 
apply to radiological safety, industrial safety, security, and environmental safety, 
nuclear safety is the first value adopted at a nuclear station and it is never abandoned. 
See Appendix A for an abbreviated listing of the INPO safety culture traits. 
NRC Safety and Security Culture 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines nuclear safety culture as the core values 
and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to 
emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 
environment. The NRC also has promulgated a safety culture policy statement (NRC, 
2012), which states that organizations should ensure that personnel in the safety and 
security sectors have an appreciation for the importance of both, emphasizing the 
need for their integration and balance to achieve both safety and security in their 
activities.  
 
Safety and security activities are closely intertwined. While many safety and security 
activities complement each other, there may be instances in which safety and security 
interests create competing goals. It is therefore important that consideration of these 
activities be integrated so as not to diminish or adversely affect either. 
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IAEA Nuclear Security Culture 
The U.S. is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This 
organization has published the espoused beliefs and values of the nuclear security 
culture (IAEA, 2008). In the view of the IAEA, a nuclear security culture is the 
assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals, organizations, and 
institutions that serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. It further 
defines nuclear security as the prevention and detecting of, and response to, theft, 
sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving 
nuclear or other radioactive substances of their associated facilities. The IAEA goes 
on to describe the differences between a nuclear security and a nuclear safety culture.  
 
The nuclear safety culture and the nuclear security culture share the objective to limit 
the risk resulting from radioactive materials and associated facilities. They 
accomplish this goal by common principles, including a questioning attitude, rigorous 
and prudent approaches, procedure adherence, effective communication, and open, 
two-way communication.  
 
Both cultures take into account the risk of inadvertent human error, but nuclear 
security also puts emphasis on deliberate and malicious acts. Because of this 
additional focus, it requires different attitudes and behaviors including confidentially 
of information and efforts to deter deliberate and malicious acts. By contrast, the 
nuclear safety culture emphasizes the need to share information openly because of the 
need for transparency and dialogue. Another difference is that the security culture 
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requires that individuals respond immediately to confirmed or perceived threats and 
restrict communication to authorized persons with a need to know. Additionally, in 
contrast with the key organizations in the safety culture (e.g., operations department), 
many organizations involved in the nuclear security culture have little technical 
knowledge about the nuclear facilities or the radioactive materials that are contained 
within them (IAEA, 2008).  
 
The following figure (Figure 5) depicts the IAEA espoused beliefs and values of the 
nuclear security culture. Note that the nuclear security culture includes many other 
nuclear industries in addition to commercial nuclear security and that commercial 
nuclear security in the U.S. does not directly use this model. See Appendix B for an 
abbreviated listing of the IAEA nuclear security culture traits, which are also depicted 
in the following figure:  
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Figure 5. IAEA Nuclear Security Culture Traits 
 
Commercial Nuclear Security Culture  
Some common traits of the nuclear security culture can be found in all commercial 
nuclear power plants for three main reasons: a common set of regulations that are 
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enforced by the NRC; a common lobbying group, the NEI, which assists in 
developing common policies; and the adoption of the INPO nuclear safety traits by all 
commercial nuclear power plants.  
Common Regulations Enforced by the NRC 
The Code of Federal Regulations is the codification of U.S. general and permanent 
rules and regulations. CFR Title 10 (energy), Part 73, contains a majority of the 
commercial nuclear power plant security requirements imposed by the NRC. In these 
regulations is the design basis threat, the threat that all commercial nuclear power 
plants are regulated to defend against.  
Per 10 CFR 73.1, the design basis threat is a determined violent external assault, 
attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, including diversionary actions, by an adversary 
force capable of operating in each of the following modes: a single group attacking 
through one entry point, multiple groups attacking through multiple entry points, a 
combination of one or more groups and one or more individuals attacking through 
multiple entry points, or individuals attacking through separate entry points, with the 
following attributes, assistance, and equipment: 
1. Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, 
willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient knowledge to identify specific 
equipment or locations necessary for a successful attack; 
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2. Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, 
participate in violent attack) or passive (e.g., provide information), or both, 
knowledgeable inside assistance; 
3. Suitable weapons, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with 
silencers and having effective long-range accuracy; 
4. Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for 
use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, 
or container integrity or features of the safeguards system; and  
5. Land and water vehicles, which could be used for transporting personnel and 
their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas; and  
a. An internal threat; and  
b. A land vehicle bomb assault, which may be coordinated with an 
external assault; and  
c. A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, which may be coordinated with an 
external assault; and  
d. A cyber-attack. 
The nuclear regulatory commission ensures that each site can protect itself against 
such a threat in various ways, including running a triennial force-on-force mock 
attack against each nuclear power plant (NRC, 2013b).   
Nuclear Energy Institute Common Policies and Guidance Documents 
The NEI’s objectives include ensuring the formation of policies that promote the 
beneficial uses of nuclear energy and technologies in the U.S. and around the world. 
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These policies include commercial nuclear security policies. One such security policy 
is the general security plan template that has been adopted by each of the commercial 
nuclear power plants, with some plant-specific differences. The policies also enable 
the sharing of security operating experience from station to station and good practices 
guidance documents for the industry to adopt. 
Adoption of the INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Traits 
All commercial nuclear power plants have voluntarily adopted the commercial 
nuclear power safety culture traits published by the INPO. (See Appendix A for an 
abbreviated listing of the INPO nuclear safety culture traits.) 
Power 
In rational choice theory, human individuals or groups can be modeled as actors who 
choose from a choice set of possible actions in order to try to achieve desired 
outcomes. An actor's incentive structure comprises the actor’s beliefs about the costs 
associated with different actions in the choice set, and the likelihoods that different 
actions will lead to desired outcomes (Dowding, 1996).  
 
This framework can be used to model a wide range of social interactions where actors 
have the ability to exert power over others, such as in the case of an armed and 
uniformed commercial nuclear security officer. For example, a powerful actor such as 
a security officer can take options away from another's choice set, can change the 
relative costs of actions, and can change the likelihood that a given action will lead to 
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a given outcome, or might simply change the other's beliefs about the incentive 
structure. 
Outcome Power 
Outcome power is the ability to bring about outcomes. To bring about an outcome, an 
officer might use coercion, threats, weapons, and other techniques to reach a desired 
outcome, such as removing an unruly person from the nuclear power plant. Because 
of his or her physical tools, including uniform, specially marked vehicle, official 
badge, and lethal and non-lethal weapons, they possess a level of outcome power that 
is higher and more obvious than those of other persons in the nuclear power plant.  
Commercial nuclear security officers have no police powers in that they cannot detain 
people for reasonable suspicion, but they can arrest people for probable cause. Per 10 
CFR 73.1, nuclear security officers are trained to use deadly force as authorized by 
applicable state law. 
Social Power 
Social power is the power to deliberately change the incentive structure of another 
actor to bring about or help bring about outcomes. Social power is in silent 
employment by nuclear security officers who reside in the highly visible security 
towers. It also includes the fencing, walls, razor wire, and armed and unarmed 
security officers at the entry points who are conspicuous in their uniforms and who 
can be seen before entering the nuclear power plant. These highly visible structures 
and people act as a visual deterrent or a blazoned display of social power to prevent 
an attack on the commercial nuclear power plant.  
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Continuum of Force 
The security officers are taught a “continuum of force.” One artifact describes this 
continuum of force in the following order of escalation:  
 Officer presence (uniformed presence, armed presence),  
 Verbal force (choice of words, tone of voice),  
 Intermediate force (pepper spray),  
 Physical force (physical altercation),  
 Armed force (weapon contact, presentation or taking aim), and  
 Deadly force (causing death or great bodily harm).  
This continuum of force provides insight into how the commercial nuclear security 
officer perceives both outcome and social powers. 
Power Implementation Tools 
Mopas and Stenning (2001) and Button (2007) describe categories of power 
implementation as “tools of the trade.” For the commercial nuclear security officer, 
these tools of the trade include institutional tools, legal tools, physical tools, linguistic 
tools, knowledge tools, and personal tools, all of which are summarized for 
commercial nuclear security in this section. The commercial nuclear security officer’s 
power is unique due to the different tools provided to this unique group of private 
security officers.  
Institutional Tools 
The private company that employs the commercial nuclear security officer empowers 
the officer with the authority to search people upon condition of entry and to take 
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action, including deadly force to prevent radiological sabotage. Site-wide signs and 
posters reflect the legitimacy of the security officer’s power. Often the vehicles that 
the security officers drive and the uniforms that they wear contain the company’s 
name and logo, which further legitimize the institutional power given to the security 
officers.  
Legal Tools 
Nuclear security officers are what Button (2007) would refer to as “semi-empowered 
security officers” in that they can exclude an individual’s entrance to private property, 
remove an individual from private property, enforce conditions on private property, 
and search an individual on condition of entrance to private property. These legal 
tools are provided through state-specific legislation and through the Code of Federal 
Regulations, 10CFR 73. For example, in the state of California, California Penal 
Code, Code 197 identifies that homicide by any person is justified “when necessarily 
committed to apprehend any person for any felony committed.” Code 12031 
authorizes uniformed security guards to carry loaded firearms. In the California Civil 
Code, Code 847 provides that deadly force may be used when necessary to prevent 
certain enumerated felonies (such as mayhem, arson, exploding a bomb, or any felony 
in which the defendant uses a firearm). Code 50 provides that “any necessary force” 
may be used to protect from wrongful injury to one’s (including a business) person or 
property. Commercial nuclear security does not routinely use the term “legal tools;” 
rather, it focuses on the more common military term of “rules of engagement” or 
ROE. Federal guidance for commercial nuclear power plants with regard to legal 
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tools is reflected in an NRC information notice (NRC, 1989) and states that the NRC 
considers use of deadly force justifiable in protecting nuclear power reactors against 
radiological sabotage if there is reasonable belief that an act of radiological sabotage 
will be perpetrated unless deadly force is used to prevent it. The notice lists the 
following situations and circumstances that could justify the use of deadly force when 
protecting nuclear power reactors: 
 Defending against violent armed assault 
 Defending against armed attack by stealth 
 Defending against attackers employing explosives and/or incendiaries 
 Defending against perceived armed attack 
State laws vary in what they permit. In most states, civilian security forces are 
restricted in the weapons they can use and in their authority to detain and search 
intruders (NEI, 2001). 
Physical Tools 
Nuclear security officers are provided with tools that are unique to their job 
classification, most of which non-security employees are prohibited from possessing. 
They are also armed with a variety of weapons to defend against a design-basis threat. 
The weapons and ammunition may include the following (GPO, 2013): 
Weapons 
 Semiautomatic rifles  
 12-gauge shotguns  
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 Semiautomatic pistols or revolvers  
Ammunition 
 18 rounds per handgun 
 100 rounds per semiautomatic rifle 
 12 rounds each per shotgun (00 gauge and slug) 
 Ammunition available on site—two (2) times the amount for each weapon 
listed above 
Equipment 
 Helmet, combat 
 Gas mask, full face 
 Body armor (bullet-resistant vest) 
 Flashlights and batteries 
 Baton 
 Handcuffs 
 Ammunition/equipment belt 
 Binoculars 
 Night vision aids, e.g., hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent 
 Tear gas or other nonlethal gas 
 Duress alarms 
 Two-way portable radios (walkie-talkie) two channels minimum: one 
operating and one emergency 
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 Uniform(s) 
Linguistic Tools 
Linguistic tools refer to the language used to obtain an outcome. In the case of the 
security officer, it is to obtain a security-related outcome. For example, the security 
officer might say, “Get down, stay down!” or “Stop or I’ll shoot!” These phrases are 
referred to as verbal force in the continuum of force discussion in this study. These 
phrases, spoken by a uniformed and armed security officer, are much more likely to 
elicit the intended outcome than if spoken by another plant employee. Also, although 
there are no barriers to entry, security officers are the only group on site who most 
likely uses 10-codes, codes that are intended to enable brief and standardized radio 
traffic. Many of the 10-codes are standard between local law enforcement agencies, 
such as 10-4, which means message received, but they are not standard across the 
U.S. Most plant employees do not know some of the common security 10-codes, such 
as 10-33, which often means “Emergency!” 
Knowledge Tools 
Knowledge tools refers to the knowledge of the outsiders and general employees 
about the legal authority of another group. For example, station employees know that 
security has the authority to use deadly force, but few know that security does not 
always have the right to arrest or to detain people. So if security were to ask the 
average person to do something (e.g., Stay in this room until the police get here.), the 
average person would comply even though they have no legal obligation to do so. 
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The security officers can use this knowledge to their advantage when interacting with 
suspicious people. 
Personal Tools 
Some of the security officers are massive, with heights exceeding 6 feet 4 inches and 
a weight of more than 300 pounds. A few of them have been professional fighters in 
the competitive ring and many are battled-hardened veterans. Even though hand-to- 
hand combat is not taught as a part of the nuclear security officer training program 
because the risk of physical confrontation is very low, many of the security officers 
have received extensive training of this sort before they became nuclear security 
officers. In contrast to their engineering peers at the station, the security officers tend 
to have high social skills and enjoy working with people; that is, many tend to have 
charisma. It is common to see an officer carrying the bearing of confidence, straight 
talk, physical fitness, and clean-cut appearance of his or her former military career, 
and these physical tools of bearing promote site-worker respect for the officer’s 
outcome power. 
 
Another way to examine the culture of the commercial nuclear security officer is to 
look at how the culture leads to better outcomes. Here, it may be helpful to look at 
how some of the research on business outcomes since these may be closely tied to 
commercial nuclear security organizations, which in effect are also businesses.  
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Productivity, Profitability, Retention, and Customer 
Satisfaction 
In the book, First, Break All The Rules (Buckingham & Coffman, 1999), the authors 
describe a study based on a meta-analysis of performance data from over 2,500 
business units and opinion data from over 105,000 employees. From this analysis, 
they concluded that six of the survey questions they asked had the strongest links to 
the business outcomes of productivity, profitability, retention, and customer 
satisfaction. These questions included the following: 
1. Do I know what is expected of me at work? 
2. Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right? 
3. Do I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day? 
4. In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good work? 
5. Does my supervisor, or someone at work, seem to care about me as a person? 
6. Is there someone at work who encourages my development? 
Since these six questions have the strongest links to the previously mentioned 
business outcomes, one would expect to be able to find best-practice evidence of 
these areas of concern during the present study. Evidence of this linkage is discussed 
later in the results of this study. 
Values as Expressed Through the Rewards System 
Kerr and Slocum (2005) discuss how the reward system might be used to maintain, 
transmit, and influence culture. Reward systems are concerned with performance and 
rewards. In their context, rewards include bonuses, salary increases, promotions, 
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stock awards, and perquisites. The values and beliefs of an organization can be 
reflected in what behaviors are rewarded. During this study, I collected information 
on how the rewards systems are used to promote desired behaviors of officers in a 
commercial nuclear security environment. Rewards are described in subsequent 
chapters.  
Security-oriented Cultures and High-reliability Organizations 
As previously noted, commercial nuclear security operates alongside other groups in 
the high-reliability organization of the commercial nuclear power plant. In her study 
of high-reliability organizations, Rousseau (1989) identified two types of cultures. 
One she identifies as a satisfaction culture, with the following norms: 
 Achievement—Members set challenging but realistic goals, establish plans to 
reach these goals, and pursue them with enthusiasm. 
 Self-actualization—Members value creativity, quality over quantity, and 
individual growth.  
 Humanistic/ helpful—Members are expected to be supportive and 
constructive, participative, and open to influence in their dealings with one 
another.  
 Affiliative—Members place a high priority on constructive interpersonal 
relationships and are friendly, open, and sensitive to the satisfaction of their 
workgroup. 
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The organizations characterized by their members as excellent or ideal took the form 
of satisfaction cultures.  
 
In contrast, those organizations whose members experienced as less than ideal took 
the form of security-oriented cultures, which also happened to predominate the high-
reliability organizations that she studied. The security-orientated culture is fearful, 
and it faces two kinds of fears. The first is task-based fear driven by a comprehension 
of the technology, and its risk and potential catastrophes. The second is sociopolitical-
based fear, which is reflected in the members’ beliefs regarding anticipated 
consequences of failure from the social and political entities of which they are a part. 
Members in a security-oriented culture have negative beliefs and attitudes concerning 
member satisfaction, a desire to stay in the organization, their perception of how well 
a person fits into the organization, and role clarity.  
Ways to Influence Culture 
The literature on organizational culture is replete with studies that have confirmed the 
methods of influencing culture already discussed, but some of these studies also 
identify additional ways that culture can be inculcated. This section touches briefly on 
three well-known scholars in this field and highlights the conclusions of their studies.  
Yukl 
Yukl (2000) identifies the following ways to influence organizational culture: 
Leadership Behavior 
Espoused values and visions 
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Role modeling and attention 
Reactions to crises 
Programs, Systems, Structure, and Cultural Forms 
Design of management systems and programs 
Criteria for rewards and personnel decisions 
Design of structure and facilities 
Symbols, rituals, ceremonies, and stories 
Ford and Ford 
Ford and Ford (1995) assert that change is a phenomenon that occurs within 
communication and that change is created, sustained, and managed in and by 
communication. They identify four types of communication or conversations that can 
facilitate change: initiative conversations, conversations for understanding, 
conversations for performance, and conversations for closure. Because of the 
continuous change nature of the high reliability organization, which is focused on 
understanding and resolving even the smallest failures, effective communication is 
key to ensuring that changes are effective. 
Pasmore and Friedlander 
Pasmore and Friedlander (1982) discuss the negative effects of hierarchy and the 
benefits of involving employees in organizational problem solving. The nuclear 
security officer organization is hierarchical because of a perceived need for command 
and control during a crisis. Because of this, in the present study, the data were 
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examined for evidence of processes that might mitigate the negative impact of the 
hierarchical organization.  
 
All of these authors discuss how culture can be influenced. In the case of commercial 
nuclear security, because of the highly technical and high reliability organizations in 
which they exist, it was anticipated that many of these culture-influencing processes 
would be found to be embedded in the commercial nuclear security officer culture. 
Indeed, many of these processes or traits that are necessary in order to sustain key 
aspects of the culture were found to be reflected in this study’s data and are discussed 
in chapter 6. 
 
With this literature background providing a research context for this study, the next 
chapter discusses its design and methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Although organizational culture has been a popular area of scholarly research in the 
last two decades, the unique culture of commercial nuclear security officers has not 
been studied. The purpose of this realist ethnography is to help fill this gap, not only 
because it adds to the body of research in organizational culture, but also because 
nuclear security officers are invested with the important powers and responsibility of 
protecting us from nuclear materials that will be with us for many generations to 
come.  
Research Design 
This research is presented in the form of a realist ethnography of the commercial 
nuclear security officer. According to Creswell (2007), an ethnography is a 
qualitative study that focuses on an entire cultural group of people who have been 
with each other so frequently that they have formed a shared pattern of behaviors, 
beliefs, and language. As a method, ethnography involves extended observations of 
the group through participant observation and interviews of group participants.  
Realist Ethnography 
The particular type of ethnography used for this study is realist ethnography because 
it provides an objective account of the studied population; it reports objectively on the 
information learned from the participants at a site; and it reports on what was 
observed or heard from the participants. The realist researcher also reports objective 
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data in a measured style, uncontaminated (as much as possible) by personal bias, 
political goals, and judgment. The research report provides the mundane details of 
everyday life among the people studied and provides the participants’ views through 
closely edited quotations. 
Ethnographic Method 
The procedures for conducting an ethnography come from Creswell (2007) and Van 
Maanen (1988). Although Creswell notes that there is no single way to conduct 
research in ethnography, some basic steps are common to most ethnographic studies. 
An overview of the ethnographic method is in Appendix C. The following are the 
steps I followed in my particular study:  
1. I determined that realist ethnography was the most appropriate type of 
ethnography of all the different types of ethnography for the information that I 
desired to present from the group participants.  
2. I selected the participant group of commercial nuclear security officers in the U.S. 
I decided not to select the commercial nuclear security officers at only one station 
because I wanted to focus on the cultural issues common to the occupation rather 
than on the cultural traits specific to one region. The reason for using this focus 
was so that the study might be more useful to more scholars and practitioners than 
it would be if it examined only one region. Additionally, I wanted to discover 
linkages between the commercial nuclear security culture and the larger private 
security culture so that any common occupational culture traits could be 
discovered.  
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3. I conducted an analysis of the culture-sharing group by determining the social 
situations and actors most common to the group and by observing the actors in 
these key settings. I looked for what people do (behaviors), what they say 
(language), and the tension between what they do and what they should do.  
4. Fieldwork was conducted at the site where the group lives and works. Field 
research data included participant observation, field observations, collection of 
unclassified artifacts and documents, and semi-structured, informed-consent 
interviews.  
5. The fieldwork data were analyzed to create a description of the commercial 
nuclear security officer culture and resultant themes.  
Results 
The results chapter of this study (chapter 4) starts with a day in the life of a typical 
nuclear security officer and then, through a series of vignettes, explores the officers’ 
posts, key social interaction places, and actors and activities. The next chapter 
(chapter 5) then provides a list of the main themes that emerged from the coding of 
the semi-structured interviews, participant observations, formal field observations, 
and artifact and document analyses that most affect the culture in which the nuclear 
security officer lives. Finally, the last chapters (chapters 6 and 7) conclude with a 
discussion of each of the key themes and the study’s implications for researchers, 
practitioners, and regulators. The ethnography thus provides a holistic cultural portrait 
of the group based upon the views of the participants and interpretations of the 
researcher. 
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Research Strategy 
Subjects 
The experience levels, source cultures, and reasons for selections of the interviewees 
appear in Appendix D. Overall, a diverse population of volunteer interviewees was 
selected in order to obtain the broadest set of data possible so that the results would 
be applicable to commercial nuclear security in the U.S. as a whole, rather than to just 
one U.S. nuclear reactor site. The selections included primarily senior and key 
commercial nuclear security managers who have worked or are working at a variety 
of commercial nuclear power plants. The intent was to select the people who could 
best identify the basic underlying assumptions for commercial nuclear security 
culture because they see the tensions between how commercial nuclear power asks 
the officer to behave and how commercial nuclear security officers actually do 
behave. To reduce the potential for power-influenced conversation, none of the 
volunteers was from the population that was working with me or that was subordinate 
to me. Many of people interviewed had started out as commercial nuclear security 
officers and had been promoted through the ranks into their senior positions.  
Type of Interviews  
One-on-one, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were used because this method 
provides the richest, fullest communication value and the ability to fully flesh out the 
interviewee’s thoughts. This type of interview was found to be the most practical to 
net the most useful information. The interview questions (Appendix E) were 
developed based on the literature review and some pilot interviews. Further 
refinement of the questions was completed during the iterative interview process. All 
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interviewees provided informed consent. The interview protocol included information 
regarding the purpose of the study; a disclosure of confidentiality; a listing of the 
interviewee’s rights during the study, including the right to participate or withdraw 
from the study; and the use to which the study would be put. The informed consent 
letter given to interviewees is included in Appendix F.   
Method of Recording  
A digital recorder was used for all of the 15 interviews and all recordings, which 
totaled more than 15 hours. They were transcribed in order to code the themes and 
sub-themes and optimize the ability to add the interviewee’s own words into the 
realist ethnography through carefully selected quotations. The longest interview was 
nearly 3.5 hours; the shortest was 27 minutes, and the average interview was 60 
minutes. 
Location 
The interviews took place during periods when managers congregate during industry 
events such as at conferences and meetings. Some of the interviews took place at or 
near my home. The institutional agreement precluded conducting interviews at the 
site where I had been authorized to conduct the field observations. Because the 
institutional agreement also precluded interviewing active employees of my current 
company, the interviews were conducted with volunteers from other companies and 
very recently retired security managers (i.e., less than a month). 
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Field Observations 
Access 
Due to access restrictions, only one site was selected for formal field observations. 
An institutional agreement was developed and approved with this institution, which 
requires that this site’s identity be kept confidential. (See Appendix G for a redacted 
copy of the Institutional Agreement for Study letter used to obtain approval from the 
nuclear facility.) To augment this part of my research, in reporting my results I later 
on include some anecdotal information from my previous experience as a participant 
observer at a multitude of commercial nuclear power plants, but I do not identify any 
of these specific sites. 
Determination of Security Officer Social Situations 
For the field observation site, I first mapped out a typical day for a officer to 
determine the security social situation locations (Spradley, 1980), permissibleness, 
predominant key actors, activity frequency, and applicability of those activities to the 
majority of the officer population (see Appendix H). Based on these factors, locations 
at the site where field observations might best be conducted to net the most data were 
identified.  
Selection and Performance of the Field Observations  
Selection criteria for the field observations included an attempt to maximize 
simplicity, accessibility, unobtrusiveness, permissibleness, and frequently occurring 
activities (Spradley, 1980). The following field observation locations were selected, 
and it was at these locations where I conducted 10 hours of passive field observations, 
which produced about 36 pages of field notes: 
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Vehicle Access Control Point 
Checkpoint where people enter the site by vehicle, also known as a vehicle access 
control point. This location is free entry to limited entry depending upon the duration 
of the observation. Any member of the general public can approach a vehicle access 
control point, but only authorized people can stay for an observation or be allowed 
access through it. Many nuclear power plant sites are configured in such a way that 
many or most of the plant employees must pass through a vehicle access control point 
that is guarded by security officers. This post is similar to the access facility post 
where people walk through on foot in that the security officer is the first site 
employee seen by most employees coming to work or people visiting the station. It 
was thought that this high-visibility job assignment, or post, would provide rich data. 
Access Facility 
The access point is where people enter the site on foot, also known as the access 
facility. This location is limited entry in that it is accessible to only site employees or 
authorized visitors. A majority of the site population works inside the fenced-in area 
of the nuclear power plant, called the protected area. In order to gain access to the 
protected area, employees and visitors must first pass through security in a fashion 
similar to the one people experience when going through security at an airport. Since 
security officers are the first employees whom the station employees see every day, I 
thought that this high-visibility job assignment, or post, might also provide rich data. 
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Shift Brief 
The daily shift brief is limited entry and was selected for field observations because 
this is where all the officers collect for the only time during their workday. Each shift 
of officers (most of the site work schedules are for 12-hour shifts for commercial 
nuclear power plant security) gathers together in a briefing room. Some officers 
arrive early and can thus be observed talking unguardedly with other security officers. 
The brief takes about 20 minutes, during which time the briefing leader interacts with 
the officers to communicate, align, and motivate them for current and ongoing issues 
or activities. Field observation was conducted during the daily shift brief because this 
is the only time security officers come together as an entire group. Again, I thought 
that the data collection for this activity would be unique and valuable. 
Roving Patrols 
Roving patrols are security officer job assignments that include vehicle patrol and 
foot patrol. These positions are restricted entry. Some officers perform patrols of key 
security equipment, structures, and components to ensure that they are maintained 
secure. Some officers are assigned to vehicle patrols to observe and report items of 
concern, and some are assigned personnel or vehicle escort duties. These officers are 
highly mobile, which is very different from the sedentary officers in the remote and 
isolated posts. I speculated that a field observation of this type of post would provide 
different rich data from which the basic underlying assumptions of security culture 
could be identified. 
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Fixed Post 
A fixed post is an isolated job assignment location. These areas are restricted entry. 
Most security officers spend a majority of their time alone in an isolated post. Since 
one of the security culture traits is vigilance, I thought that observing the fixed post— 
how officers maintain vigilance and pass their time—might be key to discovering 
some basic underlying assumptions of the commercial nuclear security officer 
culture. 
Alarm Station/Command Post 
Often supervisors are assigned to the alarm station/command posts, which are the 
restricted-entry posts that are in constant communication with all the officer posts in 
the field and, thus, they make a good selection for a field observation in order to net 
the greatest amount of culture-related data.  
Additional Social Situations 
The standard security department meeting schedule was reviewed and a total of 42 
additional key social interaction situations that affect the security officers or security 
management were identified. I observed these social situations multiple times each, 
collecting pertinent artifacts and documents, which were later analyzed for cultural 
traits. In addition to the artifacts and documents, a total of 56 pages of analysis and an 
additional 73 pages of field notes were generated regarding these. The social 
situations included standard meetings and briefings, and key processes. Refer to 
Appendix I for a list of these additional social interactions. 
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Additional Security Officer Thoughts 
I was an active participant as the manager for 10 different skip meetings in 2013 
alone, where other layers of management and supervision were “skipped” and only 
the officers were present with me to discuss their concerns. I took advantage of these 
meetings, for the purposes of my research. On average, six officers participated in 
each meeting and the meetings took about one hour each. More than 20 pages of field 
notes were gathered from these meetings.   
Field Notes  
No digital recording was conducted during the field observations due to security 
restrictions. To the maximum extent possible, a laptop was used to rapidly record 
notes. For the other situations, hand-written field notes, compiled immediately after 
the field observation, were used.  
Artifacts and Documents 
Using the above activities, 58 unclassified artifacts and documents were gathered that 
I determined would be key to obtaining data that might best identify the underlying 
assumptions of the commercial nuclear security culture. Of these artifacts, several 
were physical objects, such as the security officer gold-colored badge and the security 
token coin. The rest were documents, such as newsletters, written communications, 
improvement plans, standard meeting agendas, vision statement, mission statement, 
and process documents, all of which totaled more than 1000 pages. A listing of these 
types of artifacts, along with a brief description of each, is contained in Appendix J. 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
Data Collection 
Data were collected from the interviews, field observations, artifacts, and document 
reviews.  
Data Analysis  
Data analysis was conducted through a two-step process, as described by Creswell 
and Clark (2007). Soon after the data were collected through the interviews or passive 
field observations, the data were transcribed and coded in ATLAS TI to identify the 
emergence of major categories within the data. After coding two interviews, I had a 
list of more than 200 codes in Atlas TI, which I re-reviewed and consolidated and 
redefined. At this point I also went back to my literature review and developed 
another several dozen codes, which also resulted in changes to the initial codes. These 
base codes were then reduced to themes. A second person, a code checker, was used 
to validate or adjust the themes and related categories. (See Appendix K for the 
directions to the code checker.)  
Interview Questions 
 Questions for subsequent interviews were refined to address emerging themes. 
Buckingham and Coffman (1999) identified six questions that they found to be 
associated with the business outcomes of productivity, profitability, retention, and 
customer satisfaction. Evidence of best practices to address these questions were 
identified in the data and are included in the chapter 6 discussion of this study. 
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Ethnographic Structure and Validation  
Structure 
Based upon an analysis of the data described above, a realist ethnography was 
constructed in accordance with principles derived from the work of Creswell (2007) 
and Van Maanen (1988). The structure of the ethnography is primarily of a 
descriptive narrative following this general pattern: 
 Description of the culture that was observed in the vignettes reported in 
Chapter 4. 
 Analysis of the data from my perspective into the key themes reported in 
Chapter 5.  
 Analysis of the data from the larger scholarly research perspective in the 
discussion of Chapter 6. 
Validation 
This realist ethnography was written to meet the validation criteria identified by 
Creswell (2007) in accordance with the following: 
The clear identification of a culture-sharing group 
In the case of this study, the culture sharing group is the commercial nuclear security 
officers in the United States.  
The specification of cultural themes examined in light of this culture-sharing group 
The cultural themes of this culture-sharing group that were identified in the data are 
provided in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 focuses on the day-to-day life of security 
officers, while chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the 16 key themes.  
  
64
A detailed description of the cultural group 
A detailed description of the cultural group is described beginning in the chapter 4 
timeline of a day in the life of a typical commercial nuclear security officer and is 
further detailed in the subsequent vignettes in the same chapter. These vignettes 
concern key posts where security officers typically assigned and the social situations 
that typically take place at these posts. Furthermore, the 16 key themes of this culture- 
sharing group are contained in chapter 5 and provide additional in-depth description. 
The identification of themes that derive from an understanding of the cultural group  
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth description of the key themes that were derived from 
an understanding of this cultural group. These key themes include frictions between 
the subculture of commercial nuclear security and the commercial nuclear power 
culture. There are also positive themes. 
The identification of issues that arose in the field and that reflect the relationship 
between the researcher and the participants, the interpretive nature of reporting, and 
the sensitivity and reciprocity in the co-creating of the account 
In the section on Mitigating the Obstacles in chapter 7, I describe my position as a 
leader and as an active participant while conducting the research, and I explain how 
my bias was mitigated.  
An overall explanation of how the culture sharing group works  
This overall explanation of how the culture-sharing group works appears in the 
discussions in chapter 6. It also identifies common occupational culture traits between 
the private security officer culture and the commercial nuclear security officer 
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culture. Best practices to maintain a high-performing nuclear security officer culture 
are also identified. 
Data Security 
All recorded interviews were transcribed by the researcher. All audio files, 
transcripts, and field notes are kept confidential in a password-protected computer by 
the researcher. The names and identities of all study participants and research sites 
will be kept anonymous in any hard-copy transcripts or field notes used by the 
researcher, in the dissertation itself, and any subsequent publications. For legal 
purposes, the raw data has been downloaded to a flash drive and will be maintained 
by my dissertation advisor, for secure double-locked storage and ultimate disposal 
after a period of seven years. 
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Chapter 4: A Day in the Life of a Nuclear 
Security Officer 
 
This chapter provides, in the format of a realist ethnography, a description of the 
culture in which the commercial nuclear security officer works. The chapter consists 
of two sections. The first is a timeline of a typical workday so that the reader can gain 
a better understanding of the sequence and content of the vignettes that follow. The 
second section is a series of vignettes that describe the posts that the commercial 
nuclear security officers are most often assigned to during a typical workday and the 
social interactions that take place at these key posts.  
Timeline of a Typical Workday 
3:45 a.m. Officer Jones wakes up. His wife is still asleep. He showers quickly, 
dresses, eats a quick breakfast, retrieves his prepared lunch and dinner from the fridge 
and puts them in his backpack. His backpack is bulging with the meals and other 
items he wants to bring to work to carry with him throughout the day. With the 
college textbooks and other “attentiveness aids,” his backpack often weighs more 
than 20 pounds. Attentiveness aids are authorized electronics and reading materials 
that are used by a security officer to reduce the chance that the boredom of the job 
will result in the officer falling asleep. 
 
4:20 a.m. He drives his motorcycle to work, which takes about one hour.  
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5:20 a.m. Officer Jones parks in the non-designated area of the parking lot. The 
designated areas, which are closer to the plant, are for senior managers, the regulator, 
and corporate executives. By driving a motorcycle he gets to park closer to the plant 
than he would if he were driving a car. He walks on the black asphalt plant access 
road and sees some of the other shift-working officers who are also on their way to 
the shift brief ahead of him and headed to the building that contains the officers’ 
locker room. He goes to his locker to retrieve his hard hat and other plant protective 
equipment and begins the walk to the access facility. 
 
5:28 a.m. He enters the access facility, processes through the search train to be 
searched for prohibited items and contraband by the night shift officers. He stands in 
line for the armory, which opens at 5:30, the start of the payday. This is the first 
opportunity he has to talk with his fellow officers.  
 
Commercial nuclear security officers are hourly employees and can make between 
$17 to more than $33 dollars per hour normal-time work rate depending on the site or 
company that employs them. When one considers an overtime rate of 15%, which 
pays at 150% of the normal-time work rate, commercial nuclear security officers in 
2013 often made between $55k and $82k per year, and some have been known to 
have made more than $100k per year if his or her overtime burden was higher. 
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5:30 a.m. The armory door opens and small groups of officers are invited in 
under supervisory oversight to arm-up with pistols. The hard hats and backpacks are 
left outside of the armory. 
 
5:32 a.m. Now armed with his pistol and ammunition, Officer Jones gathers his 
backpack and protective equipment and walks to the briefing room to wait for the 
shift brief to begin. It begins when the last armed officers arrive from the armory. 
When a security officer is fully laden with equipment and weapons, he or she is 
carrying 28 pounds, and this does not include their personal items carried in his or her 
backpack. 
 
5:40 a.m. The shift brief begins on time and ends about 5:50. No managers 
talked today so the brief was short. Sometimes the security manager will come to the 
brief and make a presentation that can last an additional 15 minutes or more. 
 
5:50 a.m. Officer Jones walks to his first job assignment, most often called a 
“post,” and conducts turnover with the officer posted there from the night shift. He 
notices that the post stinks of breakfast sausage.  
 
He changes posts every 2–4 hours to a new work assignment. This change of posts is 
called “post rotation.” Today all of his post assignments are isolated and remote from 
the rest of the station workers. He is posted by himself and sees other officers only a 
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few minutes at a time when conducting turnover of his post to another officer. 
Sometimes, but not today, he is assigned foot or vehicle patrols, or vehicle or people 
escort duties, which provide a much higher amount of activity.  
 
On post, he eats his lunch and supper that he brought from home in his backpack.   
Most posts have both a microwave and a small refrigerator. But few, if any, have 
water or any hygiene facilities such as sinks or toilets. 
 
6:20 p.m. The night shift relief officer arrives for turnover. He’s later than usual 
because a manager spoke at the shift brief. At most commercial nuclear security 
organizations, a 12-hour shift is common, but the 12 hours do not include turnover 
time. 
 
6:25 p.m. Officer Jones arrives at the armory to disarm. There is no line so he’s 
let right in. The payday ends when he is disarmed. 
 
6:30 p.m. After exiting the access facility and stopping off at his locker to put 
away his hard hat and other protective equipment, he walks to his motorcycle to begin 
his trip home. 
 
7:40 p.m. Officer Jones walks through the door at his home. Traffic on the way 
home is worse than coming to work. From door to door, his workday was more than 
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15 hours. He’s tired because this is the third day in a row he’s worked this schedule, 
but tomorrow is a day off.  He’s scheduled to work security for another company at 
the local racetrack for the day. The NRC work-hour requirements do not cover 
commuting time or second professions. 
 
A vignette is defined as a short literary essay or sketch. What follows is a series of 
short vignettes that describe key places of security officer social interaction. Their 
purpose is to provide a more intimate view of security officer culture than what 
appears in the key themes discussed in chapter 5. Each of the locations—vehicle 
access control point, access facility shift brief, roving patrols, fixed post, and alarm 
stations—was carefully selected for its richness in social situation. A field 
observation was performed at each one of these sites in order to provide a detailed 
description.   
Vehicle Access Control Point 
Significance 
The vehicle access control point is one of the few posts where more than one officer 
is posted at a time and where officers can converse with one another face-to-face. It is 
also called the checkpoint. Any member of the general public can approach a control 
point, but only authorized people can stay for an observation or be allowed access 
through it. Many nuclear power plant sites are configured in such a way that many or 
most of the plant employees must pass through one in their vehicle on their way to the 
nuclear power plant parking lots.  
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The social situations at this post are significant because it is one of the few places 
where the security officers are very visible to the station employees and where the 
station employees routinely interact directly with the security officers. 
Description 
The officers at the checkpoint are posted to ensure that only authorized vehicles, 
cargo, and people enter into controlled areas of a commercial nuclear power plant. 
They identify that people are authorized for entry by doing “face-to-badge 
comparisons.” They search vehicles and cargo to keep contraband and prohibited 
items out of the controlled areas. They keep watch to ensure that no one tampers with 
the vehicle barriers, and they report suspicious activity. They do these activities 
during rain, snow, sleet, hail, wind, and extremely hot and cold temperatures. When 
the weather is extreme, people still need to have access to a nuclear power plant, even 
if it is just for emergency access to ensure the station’s emergency response plan can 
be carried out. Many sites, but not all, have installed canopies where vehicles can 
drive under and stop to be searched out of the way of the hot sun or the vertical rain. 
But most do not have anything to mitigate the horizontal wind or rain. 
 
This vehicle checkpoint has a small canopy and a fairly large “shack” in which the 
officers sit when there are no vehicles to process. Five people are present in this 8’ x 
8’ shack, outfitted with bullet resistant windows, through which one can view the 
vehicle access control point search area. The uninitiated would call bullet resistant 
glass, bullet proof, but a security officer would scoff at this term, as nothing is ever 
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really bullet proof. No vehicles are waiting outside the shack in the vehicle search 
area to be searched. Two chairs are present and there are visible semi-automatic 
rifles, key tools for deadly force. A sliding door opens to the outdoors and another 
door opens to a toilet.  
 
The officers’ backpacks are strewn about on the floor. One of them has a pink ribbon 
tied around the backpack’s handle located at the top of the pack, similar to the way 
one might flag one’s luggage to be readily identified in an airport luggage carousel.  
One of the officers is a female. Four of them wear the black colored officer’s 
uniform. All are wearing a holstered pistol. A supervisor is wearing color: a blue shirt 
with khaki trousers. Four are minorities (two are African American, one is Hispanic, 
one is Filipino), and one is white. Two of the officers are conducting a post turnover, 
while the supervisor is doing a “post check,” a supervisory observation of the 
employees on post to ensure that all requirements are being met. The officers talk 
about their gear, asking each other what the other possesses in order to ensure each 
has what they are required to have, including weapons, ammunition, and protective 
equipment. They talk about the pace of the post. Traffic is dying down. Rush hour is 
over. The air in the post smells of strong, sweet, toilet disinfectant.  
It Takes Three to Search 
One officer in the shack who is standing behind the bullet resistant glass is clearly 
observing the search officer outside the shack while the search officer searches a 
vehicle.  In another post, perched high above, and unseen from this location, another 
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security officer is also observing the search area. These observing officers are the 
search officers’ back-ups. Thus it takes a minimum of three officers to search a 
vehicle. The other officers with me are talking about how exposed they feel while 
posted as search officers.  
 
Some sites have redesigned their checkpoints to eliminate them altogether. Headcount 
and subsequent cost reduction were the main drivers, not officer protection. Senior 
NRC and utility security personnel point out conflicts such as these as being the 
difference between regulated security and real-world security. At some facilities only 
a few vehicles need to go through a vehicle checkpoint whereas at others, nearly all 
traffic has to go through a vehicle checkpoint. These differences are caused by 
terrain, topography and/ or prior design by the engineers who put the barriers in place. 
These differences between the regulatory requirements and real-world security are 
referred to by the NRC and security management as regulatory security versus real 
world security, and they recognize that the two are sometimes not the same. 
Authority to Search 
Drivers approaching the shack may notice a sign to the driver’s right side of the 
vehicle that states that entry onto the private company property where the nuclear 
power plant is located is contingent upon the employee’s or visitor’s consent to have 
their vehicle, person, and personal effects be searched at any time. It also states that, 
“Firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, and other weapons are prohibited, except 
for authorized personnel. Possession of alcoholic beverages or unlawful drugs or drug 
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paraphernalia is similarly forbidden.” A similar sign is located inside the access 
facility in front of the search train. The Code of Federal Regulations requires the 
searches.  
 
Further up the road, beyond the shack, are additional signs that state that, “The willful 
unauthorized introduction of any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous 
instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or 
property into or upon these premises is a Federal crime.” The fences are marked with 
octagon shaped signs that state, “WARNING DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ENTER. This 
facility is Protected by an Armed Security Force. Trespassers Risk Serious Injury or 
Death. KEEP AWAY. Fence is Alarmed and Extremely Dangerous.” In black 
silhouette behind the mixture of red, black, and white letters is the shape of a 
helmeted person holding an assault rifle. 
Cost Pressures 
Each security post staffed with one officer results in the hiring of almost five people 
when you consider the need to cover four shifts, officer training, vacation, and other 
time-off benefits. The all-in officer costs when benefits and wages are considered can 
approach a half million dollars per post in 2013 dollars, depending on the make-up of 
the officer’s compensation package, which can vary considerably from site to site. 
Overstaffing by even one post to ensure there are enough officers to minimize the 
traffic delays during rush periods can have a significant budget impact. A checkpoint, 
staffed with a minimum of three officers for each shift is expensive. 
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Some of the equipment the security officers use is old fashioned when compared with 
what is available. One such item is a mirror on a pole that is used to look under the 
vehicle’s undercarriage. The mirror often becomes dirty with mud and dust and 
eventually scratches to make it more difficult to use. They get replaced periodically. 
But as with all things technology based, improvements are expensive and spending 
money on security can be difficult to sell to utility executives whose orientation and 
upbringing are focused on making electricity or “making megawatts.”  The question 
the managers and executives ask when faced with such a request is, “Will it save 
headcount?” For an undercarriage search device, the answer would be no. Such a 
device might make each vehicle search a minute quicker, resulting in shorter lines of 
vehicles waiting to be searched, but the time savings is much more difficult to 
quantify in dollars. More important is the potentially enhanced security risk when the 
mirror may not be doing the job adequately because it is scratched up beyond its 
useful life. 
Often Unpredictable Work Schedule 
The officers are talking about shift work, about how the schedule is changing again, 
this time to put more officers on the 12-hour shift. They talk about overtime. One of 
them wants a lot more because he says he wants to save the additional money for an 
earlier retirement. He looks to be about 30.  
Fear of Becoming Contract Security 
The conversation shifts and the four officers talk about their worry of becoming 
contract security. Security officers often bring up this topic. Security managers are 
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careful never to say “never,” but the industry trend is to make security proprietary 
rather than contract. The officers are worrying because three different nuclear power 
plants have recently announced their closure due to different financial issues, and the 
nuclear industry is trumpeting the need to be cost competitive with natural gas. 
Everyone knows that contract security, with its lower wages and lesser benefits 
packages, is less expensive than proprietary security. 
Industrial Safety Impact on Security 
Cars drive up. They stop. Their drivers roll down their driver’s side windows and they 
show their badges to the officer posted in the traffic lane. The officer conducts a face- 
to-badge comparison even if the employee is known to the officer to ensure that he or 
she is only allowing access to authorized people. The officer is wearing nothing 
special. Just his officer’s uniform. At some facilities the officer wears an orange 
reflective vest so the oncoming car will be less likely not to see the officer and run 
into him or her with their vehicle. Some of the officers at those sites complain that the 
vest makes them a better shooting target.  
Security Officer Visibility and Abuse 
The first person someone sees going down the access road on their way to work is 
security. The security officer’s uniform and demeanor is noted by a lot of people. 
Since the officer is in uniform, they are “security” and when someone has a complaint 
about an officer, it rarely comes with a name—it comes with “Security did so and 
so.” One security officer told me a story about how the officers used to have 
individualized and numbered gold-plated badges. These were eliminated partly as a 
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cost-saving measure and partly to provide the officers a degree of anonymity. They 
didn't like having their badge number reported.  
 
Site employees are sensitive to people touching their personal belongings, which 
includes officers searching their personal vehicles. One vehicle is being searched. The 
driver steps out of his vehicle and opens all of its doors and compartments. Then he 
steps over to the waiting area, all the while intently watching the officer search his 
vehicle, leaning forward, anxious and seemingly ready to run forward to intervene. 
The officer inside the booth is attentive to what is going on too—watching the search, 
the vehicle, the surroundings, and the driver. A story is often told how one manager, 
still working at the station, verbally abused a security officer for putting fingerprints 
on his car’s newly completed wax and shine job. Officers sometimes suffer such 
verbal abuse, but more often the negative reaction by site employees to the security 
officers is coldness in the form of lack of eye contact, silence, and the occasional 
anonymous complaint. 
 
This is a security service post. When there aren’t enough security officers to do all the 
required work, perhaps due to too many officer call-offs or due to poor scheduling, 
this post can provide officers to ensure that the physical security minimum staffing 
needs are met. Consequently this post might not be fully staffed with extra people to 
deal with high traffic periods, which include rush hours and shift changes. Without 
the extra officers, a long backup of vehicles results, and the occupants may be late for 
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work, which could cause other issues. Tardiness for shift personnel, including 
operators, is managed tightly. Security officers are viewed by the station as doing a 
good job on a day-to-day basis when the lines are short, the delays are minimized, no 
one has gotten hurt, regulatory requirements have been met, and the post has kept out 
of the lime light. But in the absence of attacks, it’s difficult to measure good security, 
which concerns the protection of the health and safety of the public against 
radiological sabotage, not just good customer service. 
Slips, Trips, and Falls 
The officers at the post are constantly looking up the access road that leads to the 
shack for situational awareness. They need to be alert to vehicles driving down the 
road undetected. At night, the area is well lit so that oncoming vehicles can easily 
been seen. A year or so ago, one officer was preoccupied with looking down the 
approach path to the checkpoint and was walking at the same time. He stepped off the 
curb, tripped and fell and broke his ankle.  
 
Slips, trips, and falls are the most common security officer injury. Thus, there are 
restrictions on running, continual admonishments and training to “keep eyes on path,” 
and management’s desire to stage as much of the officer’s equipment as possible to 
lighten the officer’s burden and to streamline their body profile. The desired result is 
that if an officer does trip, he or she will recover and not fall and get injured. 
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Emergency Operations 
Even the officers’ shift brief focuses on this vehicle access control point. They are 
asked as a group at the brief, “What do you do if a vehicle fails to stop?” The officers 
mummer, “Push the emergency raise button,” which puts a crash-proof barrier in 
front of the driver in just a few seconds, keeping the vehicle out of the controlled 
area. There are other places to “push the button,” but the officer posted in the shack 
who stands behind the bullet resistant glass is one of the persons authorized to do so.  
Keeping the Posts Clean 
One of the officers, a woman, is sweeping the floor. She remarks that she has never 
seen the contracted cleaning company cleaning the post and when they do, she says, 
it's superficial. The post is grungy. She shrugs her shoulders. 
Access Facility 
Significance 
All employees must enter through an access facility on foot in order to reach the 
nuclear power plant; this access point is similar to the one might experience in going 
through security at an airport. This location is accessible only to site employees or 
authorized visitors. It is similar to the vehicle checkpoint in that it is one of the few 
posts where more than one officer is posted at one time, where officers can converse 
with one another, and where station employees routinely interact with the security 
officers. Security officers are the first employees that the station employees see every 
day as they process through the facility. Not all sites have a vehicle access control 
point, but all sites have at least one access facility.  
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Description 
The room is rectangular with a high ceiling, perhaps over 12 feet high. It has thick, 
greenish colored windows on three of four sides. It reminds me of aquarium glass, 
which is fitting, because the station employees refer to this room as the “fishbowl” or 
“bubble.” Not only can we see out in most directions, but also site employees can see 
us, like fish on display in an aquarium. We’re sitting at a long desk that runs parallel 
and up against the front windows. Each pane is separated with a navy-grey steel 
column about six inches wide. The windowless wall and door into the room is to our 
backs. The desk is covered with various types of equipment, including several hand-
type radios (walkie-talkie type), telephones, power strips, and computer screens. One 
of the computer screens displays the company web page. The other two have the 
hollow images of x-ray pictures that have been transmitted from one of the three x-
ray machines outside of the room, perhaps 20 feet away and in front of us. Vertically 
located in the front of the table’s entire length and below the window is a soft surface 
and various papers have been push-pinned into it.  
The X-ray 
The x-ray images displayed on computer screens are for the moment unchanging and 
are a reminder of what has recently gone through the x-ray machines. They remain 
unchanged until replaced by other images from newly arriving people’s belongings. 
The colors of the image denote the density of the materials, the darker colors being 
more dense and the lighter less dense. Organic materials such as food or explosives 
can be determined from the various colors. Most of the colors displayed are shades of 
light brown, orange, yellow, and black. Even simple items that are put through the x-
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ray are not obvious to the untrained eye. It takes special training to recognize what 
one is seeing and this training is provided during the new security officer classes.  
The officer who is remotely running one of the x-ray machines and who is in the 
fishbowl with me shows me some of the more obvious-to-identify items, including 
keys and such. But when he starts to show me the more complex images, I become 
quickly lost.  
Life in the Fishbowl 
The fishbowl windows give us a good view of everything in front of us. The views 
include people coming and going from the access building. Both the entrance and the 
exit have four turnstiles each. It takes a few seconds for each person to go through the 
turnstiles as they place his or her right hand in the biometric readers and wait for the 
audible click of the turnstile, a greeting of sorts, as their hand geometry is accepted by 
the turnstile he or she is attempting to use, and the turnstile unlocks for passage. The 
people entering and exiting do not look at us or speak to us.  
 
The officer with me stands up to begin the process of monitoring a rush of people 
coming in through the search train. Security staffing can be tricky. The department 
needs to be nimble and open extra search lanes during the rush periods to preclude the 
lines from becoming too long. Staffing too many highly visible officers during 
inevitable idle periods results in the perception by the executives and plant workers 
that security is overstaffed and can result in pressures to downsize to reduce station 
costs. 
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A woman processes through the search train. The dual-mounted colored display of 
the x-ray next to me shows the secrets of the items that she has with her and has just 
put onto the x-ray conveyor belt. I see a key, a zipper, and lots of things that I cannot 
distinguish with my untrained eye. The officer presses a button and says, “Okay, 
Mona,” greeting the woman going through the search train by name. Mona continues 
through the two screening devices with her hard hat on. The officer asks, “Is that it 
for today?” Mona gets closer to the thick glass window and says, “No, there’s lots 
going on today.” She’s thin, older, appears to be in her late 50s and is a construction 
worker who works for another company that has security infrastructure contract work.  
She exits the area through the entrance turnstiles to our left.  
 
“They unloaded enough barbed wire, razor wire,” the officer states. He says this out 
loud, apparently to himself, or maybe to me. To be heard from outside of the 
“bubble” where we are sitting, one has to talk loudly, almost shout, to penetrate the 
thick boundary of the bullet resistant glass. The sound actually carries through the 
open key tray holes—the ones that similarly give access to a movie ticket salesman. 
There is a sound system that one can use to talk to people in the area directly in front 
of us, and there are two different speakers. But the sound system doesn’t work, and 
people have grown accustomed to talking through the glass. 
 
A plant worker enters the entrance turnstile with his backpack and receives the 
expected greeting from the turnstile he has selected. “Click,” the turnstile responds. A 
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second officer enters the fishbowl. He is much larger in size and has a full head of 
hair. Although the two are dressed similarly the first cuts more of an imposing figure 
due to his apparent physical fitness. Comparing the two officers, the first looks like a 
security officer; the second looks like someone’s friendly grandfather. 
Officer-to-Officer Communications 
Another officer enters the screening equipment area outside of the fishbowl in front 
of us. An alarm goes off, and she turns to her left and points at the pistol strapped to 
her right leg. She is waved on by the second officer with me, who uses his right hand 
in a come-forward motion. No words are spoken through the glass.  
Security Work-arounds 
“Is this too long to actually get in?” the first officer asks me. He is describing the 
vehicle search area and how not all the vehicles that he needs to search can fit in it. 
Since the time when the area was designed, the length of the trucks on the road has 
been allowed to increase. So when larger vehicles come to the site, the officers need 
to be able to recognize the longer vehicles to ensure they put them in the search area a 
certain way or they will not fit. He describes to me how difficult this sometimes is to 
accomplish. 
 
There is a fan blowing because the work area is warm. The officer tells me it’s 
because he thinks the controls for the temperature are upstairs. I find the controls in a 
locked box over my right shoulder. The temperature is 78 degrees F, which is too 
warm for comfort. Two more people wearing hard hats are screening through the 
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machines. One, without looking at us sitting behind the glass, raises his right hand as 
if to signal the officer operating the x-ray. The two do not make eye contact. I assume 
the gesture means to turn on the x-ray belt so the employee’s items will start the 
screening process through the x-ray. I ask the officer what the hand signal means. He 
doesn’t know. It is a curious exchange among the three of us. 
 
The fishbowl is lit by six institutional-sized florescent light banks, and the four bulbs 
of each are diffused through a plastic diffuser plate. The room is bright. The lights 
from our room reflect off the glass in front of us, making reflective light images on 
the ceiling in the room that we are observing.  
The officers at this post are dressed in shades of light grey and black, including black, 
eight-inch boots and grey trousers. This officer has a black bag strapped to his left leg 
and black work gloves with grey palms are clipped to one of the bag’s straps. Much 
of the black belt encircling the officer has various shaped pouches containing all sorts 
of equipment. Hooked to his belt on his back left hip and back right hip are two 
different radios. He’s wearing a black shirt with the company logo and two 
suspenders with phone, radio microphone, and ear insert for the radio clipped to his 
right suspender. His pistol is strapped to his right thigh.  
Frequent Radio Communications 
The walkie-talkie radios are very heavy and brick-like in shape. They each contain 
numerous knobs, buttons, and dials that can be tuned to many different channels. I 
hear a female voice on the radio calling out numbers followed by the words “radio 
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check.” After a voice answers each set of numbers, with “loud and clear,” she sends 
out another set of numbers followed again by the words “radio check.” This process 
has been going on for several minutes. There is silence on the radio for a few minutes 
and then a radio announcement is made, stating there are 30 minutes being left to look 
at the overtime list. No one replies to it. It appears to be more of a broadcast. 
 
Around the window edges there are clips where window shades apparently used to 
reside. One officer says the shades were there to eliminate the now obvious glare 
from the florescent lights described earlier. He doesn’t know why the shades were 
removed, though he says he’s worked here for 12 years. The first officer says shades 
would not be good if an officer were standing because then you couldn’t see the 
“bubbles.” He stands up and I stand beside him. I ask “bubbles?” He says, “Yes, the 
globes,” which are mirrored surface hemispheres mounted in the ceiling. I stand to 
see, and he is right. The mirrored hemispheres display the reflected images of areas in 
front of the screening equipment.  
 
The fishbowl contains some weapons and ammunition. The first officer picks up one 
of the many notebooks of various-colored spines to the left of the desk and is paging 
through it. He appears to be mostly looking at shift schedules. There are no people 
screening in at the moment. He settles back in his chair, hands crossed, and right foot 
tapping. 
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Unique Security Language 
One officer says, “They got that gate open by delta.” The other responds with, “I’m 
going to golf.” They speak in a language of acronyms and with a phonetic alphabet. 
Other stations also speak the language of the 10-code, where “10-4” means okay. The 
security language can be confusing to other station personnel. For example, often 
security refers to the multitude of doors in the nuclear power plant by their unique 
security identification numbers, while the plant operators will refer to the multiple of 
doors in the nuclear power plant by their unique equipment part numbers (EPNs), 
which are the same numbers that are used by maintenance to track maintenance on a 
particular component in the plant. There are two names for the same door.  
Shift Brief 
Significance 
The daily shift brief is where all the officers meet together as a group for the only 
time during their workday. Prior to each shift of security officers going to work, they 
all gather together into a briefing room. Some officers arrive early and can thus be 
observed talking unguardedly with other security officers.  
Description 
Often Unpredictable Work Schedules 
It’s 1710, nearly 20 minutes before the security shift brief is to start, and there are 
already 11 security officers present in the room. One new hire officer is talking to his 
supervisor. He originally was going to be on the other night shift crew but got a call 
from work just the night before to report today, the last day of this crew’s work 
schedule before a three-day off period. Some of the oncoming shift officers are lucky 
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because they have volunteered to work extra hours on their day off to make extra 
money either at a time-and-a-half rate or a double-time rate depending on the 
circumstances of the overtime. Some may be unlucky in that they have been “forced” 
to work because no volunteers were available or volunteers weren’t made known of 
the opportunity. Security work schedules are constantly changing in support of station 
needs and officer call-offs. So the security officer’s personal work schedule is often 
unpredictable.  
Culture Traits of Shiftwork 
It’s the last day of work before a period of time off, so the officers and supervisors 
call this workday “my Friday,” despite the fact that it’s actually a Tuesday. “This is 
my Friday,” said with a look of joy, signals that the person is not working his or her 
days off. “Sorry, this is my Monday” is often used by shift supervision as a response 
to someone asking a question that requires knowledge of recent events. The 
supervisor might not know enough to answer a question because of a weak turnover 
of the information or just because they haven’t yet gotten up to speed on the issue. 
It’s said with a hint of apology and fatalism as if it’s just expected that people coming 
back on his or her Monday couldn’t be expected to be fully up to speed with the 
current issues, despite the electronic leashes of email, pager, and blackberry that are 
provided to supervision and management. Shift work comes with a significant 
communications challenge of ensuring that people are kept up to date on day-to-day 
mundane changes and on issues that have arisen since the people have last worked.  
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Officers, Not Guards 
It’s a common practice to refer to commercial nuclear security guards as officers, 
although NRC regulations refer to them as guards. Those who refer to them as guards 
are often quickly corrected, even interrupted, with an emphatic, “officers!” often with 
a scolding tone by those in the know. The term officer is generally thought by the 
nuclear industry to be more professional and respectful than guard. This thought 
stems from a concern that nuclear security officers be afforded a higher level of 
respect than the “guard” stereotype would otherwise allow and that the term officer is 
a reflection of this added respect. During their workday, the security officers often 
introduce themselves as “officer” (e.g., “Officer Jones”) to managers in their own 
department and to nearly everyone outside of their department, thus foregoing their 
own personal nick names or given names. 
Black—the Color of Security 
The 24’ x 50’ briefing room’s predominant color is black, the color of security. The 
hard, plastic, black chairs with silver metal legs, the black uniforms, and the black, 
hard, plastic-coated floor make up the center of the room. The chairs in the briefing 
room are arranged in rows, which face the narrow dimension of the room and the 
rows are spilt with a walkway up the center. In the front of the room are a projection 
screen and a podium. The chairs are surrounded on four sides with off-white walls 
and dropped-ceiling white tiles embedded with two bulb florescent light fixtures. The 
lighting in the room could be improved. Officers spend only 20 or so minutes in the 
briefing room per workday, from whence they leave and walk to their first posting of 
the day. Each of the shift briefs takes place in this room, and there is normally only 
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two per day, one for the day shift and one for the night shift.  Nuclear security at most 
commercial nuclear sites is worked in 12-hour shifts. 
Culture Trait of Tardiness Control 
A common process for shift turnover includes having the oncoming security crew 
arrive and wait outside the armory door until an appointed time. At that time the 
armory doors open and officers in small groups and under supervision enter to be 
armed with his or her assigned pistol. The officers then walk to the briefing room to 
wait until the others have been similarly armed and arrive for the brief. This process, 
waiting to have the brief until after the officers are armed, has advantage in that it 
provides some acknowledgement and allowance that from time to time officers are 
going to be a few minutes late. The slightly tardy officer just gets into the line outside 
of the armory, with perhaps only a little impact from the supervisor with the watchful 
eye. But missing the shift brief, also called guard mount, can have serious 
consequences at some sites. 
I actually had a case where I terminated somebody for being one 
minute late, and the licensee’s lawyer was mentioning that a labor 
judge would have problems with this. My retort to that was, if he 
served in the U.S. Army he’d understand that one second late to guard 
mount, you might as well be a year late. (Interviewee 8) 
 
At this site, being late to guard mount resulted in discipline wherein the officer was 
terminated. Discipline of this magnitude would most likely not occur in work groups 
that do not work shift work. 
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The security shift crew’s senior leader, called the security shift supervisor, walks up 
to the podium. He’s wearing a bright aquamarine colored polo shirt and tactical khaki 
trousers, the kind that security contractors often wear. They can be special ordered 
from the many tactical clothing stores online such as Five Eleven. His clothing is 
adding color to the room. The few supervisors are dressed in uniforms unique to their 
status, which include dark blue shirts and the tactical khaki trousers. They are not as 
colorful as the security shift supervisor. Color appears to be the reward of rank. The 
walls too have some color as most of the space on them from one’s knees to head is 
covered with various posters, white boards with information written on them with 
mostly black marker. There are pictures too, one of which is an overhead 3’ x 14’ 
Google-earth-like view of the nuclear power plant.  At the top of one white board 
reads in 6” capital black letters, “RECENT REPAIRS.” There is a short list of 
security equipment, but it does not include the briefing room lighting. Another reads 
in 6” capital black letters, “INTEL UPDATES.”  
Desire for Some Anonymity 
There’s list of some acronyms written on one of the white boards with their respective 
definitions, including MSO, member of the security organization. When human- 
performance related events occur at the power plant, they are often attributed in 
writing to a work group in the form of a hand-out or email. The acronym MSO 
provides the officers a degree of anonymity that is not normally afforded them due to 
their highly distinguishable uniform. The term MSO could mean security officer, 
security supervisor, or security staff member, so using the term gives some of the 
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officers less of a feeling of being singled out, even though when MSO is used in the 
context of a human performance event, it’s nearly always refers to a security officer.  
 
Other posters on the wall are titled “Security Standards of Conduct,” “Requirements 
for Assuming Duty,” “Talk TO US ANYTIME, ANYWHERE OUR DOORS ARE 
OPEN, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM,” “Security Division Clock Reset,” 
“Day Shift Crew Clock,” “Night Shift Crew Clock,” “Swing Shift Crew Clock,” and 
“Staff Crew Clock.” The clocks are 1 day, 5 days, 12 days, 32 days, and 47 days, 
reflecting that a human performance clock of some sort is being reset fairly often.  
Management Expectations—Measuring Human Performance 
Clocks are used by the nuclear power plant to measure time between human 
performance related events. Crew clocks are reset for the lowest level or least severe 
events, division clocks are reset for the next highest events, and station clocks are 
reset for the highest events. A crew clock reset might be for someone not showing up 
for required training. A division clock reset might be for a regulatory violation such 
as an officer falling asleep on post. A station clock reset might be for a person getting 
hurt so badly as to require time off from work because the employee can no longer 
meet the essential functions of his or her job. A large number of days between clock 
resets can be cause for pride and celebration. There are positive messages, too, 
including plaques with the pictures and names of the most recent quarterly top rifle 
and pistol shooters, several award certificates for the most recent peer-to-peer 
awardees, and safety good-catch awardees. 
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The officer’s conversations wax and wane, and the topics include their gear, recently 
changed foot patrol rover checks, and the day’s weather. It’s projected to be hot today 
and the officers are discussing age, heat stress, and the potential for swapping security 
checks with the younger officers. There are frequent and short bursts of laughter. 
They talk about work-related topics such as “checks” and topics of home, family, and 
racing cars. 
Uniforms with Individuality 
The officers are dressed in black boots, trousers, and shirts. Although the color of the 
black shirt is similar, the cuts vary. Some have slogans or emblems for HU (short for 
human performance), and others for safety. Many shirts carry the logo for Under 
Armor, a popular sports brand. Their shirts are not uniform except for the color black. 
When the officers put on their gear, their shirts are mostly covered by the black 
tactical vest, which is used to carry various equipment, such as non-issued knives, 
issued flashlights, and ammunition clips for assigned weapons. Some of the officers 
wear subdued American flags on their tactical vests. Once in a while, a patch with the 
word Infidel is worn, only to be removed when a supervisor or manager demands it be 
taken off. Most of the people in the room are men.  
 
There are two women officers and one woman supervisor. Overall, the group is 
younger than middle aged. The hair of the minority group of grey haired men 
contrasts nicely with the black uniforms. Tattoos are visible on several of the younger 
men and the tattoos vary in their sizes and density. Some peek below their short-
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sleeved shirts, others cover their arms, and still others glance above the collar on the 
side of their necks. Some of them are pictures of dragons or tribal designs. Many of 
the officers sport goatees, kept short by the necessity of it not interfering with the gas 
mask they must be able to wear as a part of their gear.  
The Ongoing Conversation about Professionalism 
What does and does not look professional is discussed frequently by the more senior 
officers who have seen both gradual and abrupt shifts in grooming and clothing 
standards. Inoffensive tattoos are allowed as professional, as are one earring per ear 
for men and women. A neat appearance such as clean clothing with no holes has 
always been required. Haircuts are expected to be non-controversial, and from time to 
time, someone will push the boundary by coming in with something as radical as a 
Mohawk cut. In previous times, no tattoos were allowed, and for men no earrings and 
no ponytails were allowed, but times have changed. The ones who haven’t changed 
their attitudes with the times sometimes vent their dissatisfaction via anonymous 
complaints to the senior managers or executives.  
 
The security shift supervisor begins his briefing and uses a microphone to project his 
voice. The officers are silent and still. The words on the PowerPoint presentation 
from the front projection screen are too small to see in the back of the room or on the 
monitors half way back. The leader says he’s not going to read the words and no one 
objects. He paraphrases what’s on the slide, and starts to go onto the next topic. The 
security shift supervisor starts with an industrial safety message, which includes a 
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description of the station’s most recent injury and the lessons learned from it. He 
covers a nuclear safety culture message on treating people with dignity and respect. 
He pauses to ask if there is anyone who wants to recognize someone for a good job 
from the last shift they completed together. One officer volunteers and thanks one of 
the other officers for being helpful the day before during a door test that just didn’t 
seem to be going right, but, with assistance, worked out just fine.  
 
The supervisor covers the planned security activities for the day and the out-of-
service equipment. He asks them how they would respond to various scenarios at the 
vehicle checkpoint. The security officers murmur, “Push the emergency raise button.” 
Roving Patrols 
Significance 
Roving patrols include vehicle patrols and foot patrols. The officers assigned to these 
patrols are highly mobile and involved in physical activities that are very different 
from the vast majority of sedentary officers assigned alone to the isolated and remote 
posts in that they have opportunities to interact with many of the other workers from 
the station population. The officers involved in these posts are more likely to have to 
use the continuum of force on a day-to-day basis.  
Description 
Maintaining Proficiency for the Critical Tasks 
Security officers are expected to be able to perform all of the approximately 22 
functions of their jobs, called critical tasks, each day they work. Some sites ensure 
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that the officers rotate through each post type so that the officers can maintain 
proficiency in all of their critical tasks. Roving patrols for commercial nuclear power 
plants perform continuous surveillance, observation, and monitoring of the owner- 
controlled area to detect and deter intruders and ensure the integrity of physical 
barriers or other components and functions of the onsite physical protection program.  
Vehicles Used for Patrol 
Often a portion of this continuous surveillance is a vehicle patrol. The vehicle patrol 
drives company-issued vehicles, more often than not white trucks, which are obvious 
to identify because they are often equipped with police car style lights, spotlights, 
and/or have the word security painted in large letters on the side doors. Some security 
officers think that having the word security on the door of the vehicle makes them “a 
target.” The vehicle patrol is especially desired by officers during good weather days 
because of the independence and freedom that the post offers.   
 
A lot of people of different sizes and shapes need to drive these vehicles. Constantly 
used, they are often dirty and smell like they need to get sent out for deep cleaning. 
They are in near continuous movement except when officers might take brief breaks 
to patrol on foot or to conduct turnover with another officer. The high level of use and 
frequent turnover of this rolling post cause an extreme amount of wear on it. The 
vehicle starters often fail, as do the seat adjustment levers and tracks. The seats rip 
due to gas mask pouches, weapons belts, and weapons. The tires wear out sooner 
because the road surfaces, such as gravel, are often extreme. 
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Vehicle Size Restrictions and Obviousness 
Some vehicle cabs aren’t big enough for big people, especially security gear-laden 
big people, and the big officers complain about it. Big officers often wear tactical 
vests, and items in the pouches of the tactical vests cause their chests to bulge out 
further. Consequently the big, laden officer cannot fit comfortably into a small-
cabbed vehicle even if equipped with a steering wheel with tilt capability. Golf carts, 
with their smaller turning radiuses, are more fitting for such an environment and have 
been employed at some sites, but some officers feel that they erode their security 
officer status. The golf carts lack the security lettering, intercom system, police-style 
lights, and spotlights. It’s more difficult to look official in a golf cart. 
Vehicle Patrol and Social Power 
The vehicle patrol is largely intended to provide a security presence to deter an attack 
(i.e., to make people think twice) before attempting an attack on a nuclear power 
plant. From the perspective of the outsider, the two-hour or so job assignment 
consists of driving slowly around the station perimeter. 
Foot Patrol’s Physicality 
Armed security foot patrols periodically check external areas of the protected area, 
including physical barriers and vital area portals. They conduct patrols of all 
accessible areas containing security sensitive equipment. In contrast to the other jobs 
to which a security officer can be assigned, this job is very physical. The foot patrol 
officers walk up and down stairs while carrying up to 28 pounds of gear and observe 
the condition of, or “check,” security infrastructure items such as fences, gates, walls, 
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doors, and key station equipment. There are many plant buildings that the officers 
patrol at a commercial nuclear power plant. They could include the two reactor 
buildings, the auxiliaries building, the turbine building, and the outdoor protected 
areas. Some of the buildings might have nine different floors and dozens of rooms. 
The checklist of items that they check during these patrols can be more than a dozen 
pages long with an item to check for each line on the page.  
 
These officers are constantly moving. This particular officer has about five sheets of 
paper on a clipboard. Each line on the paper represents an object, door, or barrier that 
the officer is required to check on a periodic basis. As each item is viewed, the officer 
checks it off from the checklist. The order for checking is not fixed. He has deviated 
from checking items in sequence on the page multiple times so far. He walks quickly 
past steel pipes, bundles of wire, pumps, and large 20-foot cylinder shaped tanks, 
some placed vertically and some placed horizontally. He passes by large breaker 
panels, pausing to read name plates from time to time, quietly making a mark on one 
of the sheets of paper, and continuing through this labyrinth of steel, concrete, and 
wires. He wears hearing protection, squeezed soft rubber type material that has been 
pushed into his ear canals, a hard hat, and safety glasses. Even with this hearing 
protection, some rooms are loud with sounds caused by water flowing through pipes, 
pumps at labor, and monstrous industrial sized fans. In some rooms the light is harsh 
from dozens of sometimes flickering florescent lights. Some rooms are dim.  
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Foot Patrols and Social Power 
Foot patrol officers also employ social power in that they are providing a visible 
officer presence, which is a deterrent to people who might otherwise create a security 
incident. The foot patrol officers are the most likely officers to be dispatched by the 
alarm station to respond to an alarm or to a potential disturbance. Thus, they have to 
use the legitimate power with which they have been awarded as a result of their 
position. Commercial nuclear security officers have no police powers in that they 
cannot detain people for reasonable suspicion, but they can arrest people for probable 
cause. They also are authorized to use a continuum of force, which includes force up 
to and including deadly force, should it be required. To implement these powers, the 
officers are most likely armed with a pistol or other lethal weapon, pepper spray, and 
handcuffs. Being so obviously armed, some people who interface with the security 
officer while he or she is on patrol can feel a sense of intimidation, even when no 
intimidation is intended. 
 
The primary deadly force weapon for the officer who has been dispatched is the 
pistol. When the pistol has a round in the chamber, it’s called “hot” or “carrying hot,” 
and when there is no round in the chamber, it is called “cold” or “carrying cold.” 
Carrying hot or carrying cold is left up to the utility to decide and manage.  
Industrial Safety and the Pistol 
The officer-preferred method to control the pistol is to have it issued to him or her 
cold and then, under supervision, load it; that is, make it hot. This method ensures 
that the officer gets frequent opportunity to manipulate the pistol and is comfortable 
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that his pistol is, in fact, hot, but it risks a “negligent discharge” should the officer 
make an error and pull the trigger, which has been known to happen, especially when 
unloading the pistol improperly. For the risk adverse nuclear power plant, firing a 
pistol by accident, or a negligent discharge, is a significant safety concern.  
 
Most security officers think that if they are expected to use their handgun, they should 
carry it hot. After all, a pistol is used for “close quarters” combat, and the extra time 
used to load a pistol could make a difference in the officer’s defense. But often the 
decision to carry the pistol hot or cold is made by a utility executive with limited 
security experience. A utility executive once yelled at me because he thought it was 
ridiculous that security officers were routinely carrying hot pistols into the control 
rooms of the nuclear power plants.  
A Culture of Secrecy 
Some security activities are classified as SAFEGUARDS, which creates a culture of 
secrecy. The NRC requires that SAFEGUARDS information be limited to specially 
qualified people, including security people, and that the access to these materials be 
limited to those with a need to know. But many times, what security does is not 
classified. Conversations with plant employees are often limited because the security 
officers often don’t know what they should or can share. As a result, they put up a 
wall of “I can’t talk about that, it’s SAFEGUARDS.” Often, unknown to the officer, 
this statement just isn’t true. It’s the easy and better-safe-than-sorry answer. But once 
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the easy answer is given, it increases the station employee’s ignorance of what they 
can and cannot know about security. 
Influence of the NRC Inspector 
Officers do not like to carry the gas mask pouch and often ask management to find a 
way for them not to carry it. The problem with the gas mask pouch is that it hangs 
from the waist belt to the left or right leg and makes the body profile bulge about nine 
inches in that particular portion of the body. This arrangement is extremely 
inconvenient due to the ease with which the pouch gets caught when going through 
doors, getting into vehicles, and sitting in chairs. A few sites have figured out ways to 
resolve this officer concern by staging the gas masks in key locations. One regional 
NRC inspector in the western U.S. was noted to say, “I’ll never let that [staging the 
gas masks] happen.” Regional inspectors sometimes disagree with each other, and 
often different regions have different interpretations despite the central office’s 
attempts to make regulation consistent. A security officer once asked a regional NRC 
in the Midwestern U.S. why the mask had to be carried, and the inspector said, 
“Don’t ask me, we don’t require it. “ This incomplete answer caused officer-to- 
management issues because the officers were then convinced that management wasn’t 
doing all they could do to resolve the officers’ concern. Individual NRC inspector’s 
opinions often influence policy and procedures. Utilities call this influence 
“regulation by inspection.” 
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Attentiveness Aids and Interference  
Provided they get their patrols done on time, an officer on foot patrol is free to stop at 
the bathroom, visit the cafeteria whenever he or she likes, and relieve other officers in 
the fixed posts so they can have a “bio break” or “chow break.” This foot patrol 
officer decides to stop by the personal computer that is set up for his post so he can 
use it to log into the company LAN to do his time reporting. When he gets there, the 
computer is being used by an extra officer who has no work assignment and who is 
using the computer as an attentiveness aid and is watching a YouTube video. Feeling 
a little rushed to be on his way to his next checkpoint, the foot patrol officer asks the 
extra officer if he can get on the computer for just a few minutes. The response is an 
angry “No!” The foot patrol officer shrugs his shoulders and heads back to continue 
his patrol. The downside of attentiveness aids is that some of the officers begin to 
behave as if the activity of using the attentiveness aid is their job assignment. 
Fixed Post 
Significance 
The isolated and remote posts are where the majority of the officers spend their 
workday posted alone. The remote post locations make it a challenge for maintenance 
and cleaning of the post, and for supervisory and management oversight. Typically 
the officer’s only job assignment while assigned to these posts is to be vigilant. 
Largely unsupervised, the officers in these posts are entrusted with a higher level of 
responsibility to do the right thing even when the supervisor is not watching. 
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Description 
I’ve journeyed to and entered into more than 150 tower posts in the last four years. 
They have a multitude of names, depending on the site or style. The names include 
hardened defensive position, HDP, pronounced as “ach dee pee,” bullet resistant 
enclosure, BRE, pronounced as “bree” or “bee are ee,” bullet resistant cylinder, BRC, 
pronounced as “bee are cee,” fighting position, tower, bunker, and probably others.   
Each tower post is designed to have an armed officer, protected from blast and bullet, 
able to effectively defend the facility. Each has gun ports or window-like openings so 
the officer can use his or her weapon effectively. Some slide, some push, and some 
are just gaping holes, ready to have a weapon inserted. The weapon(s) are normally 
contained in racks inside the structure where they can be quickly grabbed and 
employed by the posted officer. The number of people inside a tower is limited 
because the rooms are small. Having more than about four people in the room can 
interfere with the officer’s ability to function, and the ventilation systems don’t 
support habitability for more than a few people. 
Preparing for a Post Assignment 
Officers carry a lot of personal items. Sometimes what they carry reflects whatever 
they think they’ll need at the posts they think they will be going to during the day. 
Other items, such as textbooks and a laptop, might be to facilitate educational studies 
and thus reflect what might be the officer’s long-term goals. Others reflect a need to 
be entertained, including hand held games, music devices, and iPads. Some bring 
large coolers with multiple meals and drinks contained in them. It would not be 
unusual to see an officer laden with nearly 40 pounds of personal items carried by 
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hand and by backpack on his way to work. Other than the meals and clothing, the 
items carried, including electronics and books, are often referred to as “attentiveness 
aids.” Officers need something to do. They can’t just sit and stare for their 12-hour 
shift and reasonably be expected to remain either awake or vigilant.   
Challenge of Being Vigilant 
There are multiple processes in place to help the officers stay vigilant, or attentive.  
In addition to attentiveness aids, their days are scheduled to include visits by 
management to the posts, called post checks, required responses to radio calls called 
radio checks, and post rotations to different assignments, called post rotations. 
Security management evaluates each post for which attentiveness aids are appropriate 
for the post. A post that needs a high degree of ongoing vigilance, such as a 
checkpoint, will have fewer attentiveness aids authorized for use. A post that needs a 
lesser degree of vigilance, such as an isolated and remote tower, has a much larger 
variety of authorized attentiveness aids.   
Swapping Posts 
The differences in authorized post attentiveness aids from post to post often result in 
officers wanting to swap posts. For example, an officer may have a strong desire to 
do homework for a class or to watch DVD movies. Or maybe an officer feels a bit 
tired and needs a higher level of stimulation than what some posts might offer for that 
day or night. But swapping posts is often discouraged, because if an officer is always 
swapping to a low-activity post, it can affect his or her overall proficiency for the 
critical tasks, which each officer is required by regulation to be able to perform on a 
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day-to-day basis. Supervisors are often inconsistent in deciding when a swap is 
appropriate, and this inconsistency is a source of officer frustration.  
Unpredictable Work Schedule and Attitudes Toward Attendance  
Security officers pay close attention to the post schedule. For example, based on a 
reading of the post schedule that was made available the day before, the officer 
expects to be posted inside for the first four hours, outside for a few hours, and then 
to an external, elevated post. So the officer layers his or her clothing because cold 
weather is predicted and brings in a couple of textbooks. But the post schedules often 
change at the last minute for a number of reasons. The end result is that where an 
officer thinks he or she is going to be posted the next day may not, in fact, be at all 
like reality. The officer may get posted at the personnel access facility and to 
personnel escort where neither the additional clothing nor the textbooks will be of any 
use at all. They instead will be a source of frustration because of the extra baggage 
that is now being carried around all day. 
 
Officers stationed on post look forward to their end-of-day relief. Some posts can be 
reached in just a few minutes by the oncoming officer. Other posts can take up to 15 
minutes to reach. Depending on one’s appetite for overtime (relief is often conducted 
at a time-and-a-half rate), the late relief can be a blessing or a curse. Late reliefs are a 
common officer complaint or concern, especially for those who have fixed end-of-
shift responsibilities, such as picking a child up from childcare or participating in a 
car pool. 
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Life in an Isolated and Remote Tower 
Most of the fighting positions are elevated, some up to 60 feet in the air. To reach the 
post, metal steps or treads are most common. The step of one’s foot echoes through 
the metal structure upon ascent and descent. Upon reaching the summit, some sort of 
heavy closed door or hatch prevents further travel. A radio is often used to call the 
post to gain access to it. But often, too, the visitor is announced to the post by the 
vibration of the heavy access door at the bottom of the tower being opened and 
closed, which sends vibrations through the structure. Or similarly, the visitor is 
announced by the vibrations caused by his walking as he climbs the metal stairways 
up to the tower, or by the clunking sound as the visitor turns the door handle and uses 
the sound as a sort of door chime to request entry.  
 
The officer on the inside of the structure opens the door. The room is simply a metal 
box hung high in the air with thick bullet resistant glass windows all around it. At 
night it is often dark due to reduced lighting, and during the day it is bright because of 
the four bullet resistant windowed walls.  
 
Inside one of these posts are the physical tools of the craft: rifles, pistols, and 
ammunition. The amount of ammunition in the post and its equipage depends on how 
the post is being used in the strategy of defense. Some contain a lot more ammunition 
than others. Many posts have binoculars, other special monitors, or hand-held devices 
to see approaching people far below. Some posts are equipped with computers, 
AM/FM radios, and/or iPods. In addition to the hand-held “duty radio,” there might 
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be a public announcement system and telephone system. The volumes of the 
attentiveness aids are kept low to ensure the officers can hear their “duty radio.” 
Radio checks come over the duty radio to ensure the officers are alert. Most posts 
have refrigerators and microwave ovens. If the station is attacked, the officer is 
expected to make his or her weapon(s) ready and if necessary, open a gun port and 
shoot the enemy.  
 
They entertain themselves with YouTube, Netflix, and personal items on their smart 
phones. Eating for entertainment is a concern. The sedentary life of a tower post can 
be unhealthy. They communicate from post to post using social media, telephone, or 
other communication devices. They see other people during post turnover, which can 
happen every few hours. They also get visits from supervisors and sometimes 
management during posts checks, which can happen multiple times during a shift. 
They rarely interact with other station personnel from these posts. Being lofted so 
high into the air, with a clear view of the perimeter of the site, they see what happens 
down below, in the water, along the beach, and in the parking lots. Little escapes their 
notice. During an attack on the station, the post might receive a call from one of the 
two alarm stations. 
 
Two officers in an isolated and remote tower are conducting turnover. The first 
officer listens to the other officer talk about his kid’s soccer game, and then the 
second talks about his pregnant wife. There is one chair in the post, so the two of 
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them are standing. As the two officers talk, both are looking out of the thick, bullet- 
resistant glass windows. They talk about equipment status and the gear they should 
each have. 
 
The view is often breathtaking from these towers—countryside views, lake views, 
river views, and beach views—due to the often remote locations of the commercial 
nuclear power plants. People outside of the power plants apparently don’t know how 
visible they are to the officers in the towers. Officers sometimes swap lewd stories of 
what they see.  
 
Bathroom breaks or “bio breaks” can be an issue. Lofted high in a tower can make it 
difficult to get a volunteer to come up to provide needed relief. Also, the distance 
from tower to bathroom, coupled with inclement weather, can result in some tower 
reliefs for “bio breaks” to take a significant amount of time. Some towers have 
emergency chemical toilets that can be used. One station made a deal with the union 
to allow supervision to relieve officers for emergency “bio breaks.” Rotation relief 
officers, officers who can be called for breaks, partially address this issue, as do post 
rotations. Ideally, posts are rotated frequently enough so that officers can find a 
bathroom before going to the next post.  
 
Some posts are cold in the winter due to the wind that blows through cracks in the 
gun ports. Extra heaters can be found in those posts, and sometimes people have 
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additional clothing or blankets to use to keep warm. In the summer it can be so hot 
that the air conditioners can’t keep up with the heat load from the sun beating down 
on the structure, the body heat of the officer, and the wind leaking through the gun 
ports. In this case the posts are rotated more frequently to manage the heat stress. 
What might have previously been a two-hour post rotation becomes a one-hour post 
rotation or a 30-minute post rotation. Sometimes when one of the air conditioners 
fails, it’s easy to convince the maintenance department to send people out to get it 
repaired, but other times it is not.  
Maintenance and Cleaning Challenges 
Getting items fixed in these remote towers can be a challenge. The cleaning staff 
doesn’t like to climb a 60-foot spiral staircase, and it’s challenging for them to bring 
up enough cleaning supplies to do meaningful cleaning. An officer watching a DVD 
may not appreciate the interruption and on his own volition, contrary to management 
expectations, waive the cleaning for that week. It’s like a campsite in that people are 
expected to leave it cleaner than they find it and to take out one’s own trash. But 
shift-to-shift cleaning supplies are not always available, and some people just don’t 
care if the post is clean or not. There is friction between officers as a result of 
unacceptable post conditions caused by smells and by what another leaves behind, the 
mess another has made in the microwave, and the general griminess of the post.  The 
deeply embedded dirt comes as no surprise when one considers the use of each post 
by a myriad of people in 24/7 operations. 
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Management Expectations 
The company local-area network contains information pertinent to the officer. This 
information includes procedures, development materials, training modules, and 
required reading—the monthly newsletter. Post orders detail what is expected of the 
officer at the post. Each officer carries the security officer handbook, the excellence 
guidebook, and the safety handbook. They know what is expected of them.  
Radio Checks 
With the turnover and brief social interaction complete, the second officer relieves, or 
takes over responsibility for the post. The first officer gathers his belongings and exits 
through the heavy metal door, which closes with a heavy sounding clang of metal 
upon metal. The hand-held radio in the post comes alive with sound. A 30-minute 
cycle of radio checks has started and the second officer groans. Each post is required 
to acknowledge the check on the radio with a “10-4” or a “loud and clear” as the post 
is called. Some battle-hardened veterans have distain for these frequent radio checks. 
They feel that the radio checks demonstrate a lack of trust with the officers. They 
didn’t do such frequent radio checks in the military even when serving in hostile 
areas.  
 
But for the electric utilities that require them, the radio checks serve several 
functions. Radio checks give verification that the officer in the post is attentive and 
okay and that the radio system is working. There is also the hope that the officer will 
feel less isolated and alone. More importantly, they’re pretty much an industry 
standard, and a security manager has an uphill battle to fight should he or she want to 
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do something radically different and be challenged by his executive, who most likely 
knows little about security. 
Reluctance to Report Low-level Issues 
With the radio check complete, the second officer settles into his post, sits back, and 
begins to read his novel. The phone on the wall rings, and he answers it. “I can see 
you. . . .” a high pitched and disguised voice on the other end of the phone says, 
which is followed by a giggle and the sound of the connection being severed. The 
phones don’t have caller ID, and the tracing of phone calls between posts is not in the 
current station software. Prank phone calls have been a problem lately, especially for 
the newly hired officers. New phones are being installed in the posts to reduce the 
anonymity of the calls in an attempt to stop them. A prank phone call of the above 
magnitude, free of sexual or racially charged language, will most likely go unreported 
as would a particularly sloppy officer who leaves trash on post. These posts are 
largely unsupervised and the security officers who are assigned to these posts are 
entrusted with a higher level of responsibility to do the right thing even when the 
supervisor is not watching, even when being encouraged by a second officer to not do 
the right thing. 
Alarm Stations 
Significance 
There are two security alarm stations at a commercial nuclear power plant. The first is 
called the central alarm station, or CAS, and the second is called the secondary alarm 
station, or SAS. At some commercial nuclear power plants, the alarm station posts are 
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assigned to security officers and at others to supervisors. These posts are in constant 
communication with all the officers in other posts or in the field. 
Description 
Unpredictable Work Schedule 
The alarm stations are making radio calls announcing that overtime is available for 
people on the 8-hour shift to “hold over” because they had too many people call off 
for the next shift. Officers working the 12-hour shift can’t volunteer because the NRC 
work-hour rules prevent them from working additional hours today. Only the few 
people that have been working an 8-hour shift are eligible. 
 
The CAS is bullet resistant, located within the protected area, and is itself within a 
vital area. Also, the interior to the CAS is not allowed to be visible from the perimeter 
of the protected area, which generally means this facility has no windows, which 
makes the room feel industrial due to the florescent lighting and seem more remote 
and isolated. You can start work in CAS in the dark of the winter morning and leave 
it during the dark of the winter evening and see the sun on only the many camera 
displays visible on the CAS closed-circuit television monitors. The CAS has a 
microwave, refrigerator, and a bathroom facility. It’s a self-contained workspace.  
The SAS is often designed to the same requirements. These stations monitor the 
status of the intrusion-detection system equipment, designed to give warning when 
people are attempting to gain unauthorized access to the station. They house the 
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people who assess alarms, initiate and coordinate an adequate response to an alarm, 
summon offsite assistance, and provide command and control. 
Challenges of CAS and SAS Assignments 
The knowledge, skills, and abilities to work in these posts are quite a bit above that 
which is required of an officer in other post assignments. The people in the alarm 
stations are often stationed alone and need to be able to prioritize tasks, follow the 
schedule, complete a multitude of sometimes complex tasks, and reference a 
multitude of procedures during the day. The job can be overwhelming because of the 
demands of the job and the high activity level, especially on a day when the 
environmental conditions (e.g., surf, hot sun, rain, or snow) are causing nuisance 
alarms. In one case, a talented officer was selected to be a supervisor and started his 
training in the alarm stations, only to ask his manager if he could be demoted back to 
officer about three months later. The stress of the new position was too much for him. 
He had grown accustomed to the lower activity of the security officer’s post 
assignments and wanted to return to the life of a security officer even though he 
would lose his newly gained security pension, which is available to only supervisors 
and above in the management structure. 
 
The alarm stations are required to always be staffed with at least one trained and 
qualified alarm station operator. Since the alarm operator must not be assigned other 
duties or responsibilities that would interfere with the ability to execute his or her 
required functions, supplemental staffing is often supplied to one of the stations to 
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help with the workload. For some sites, the alarm station operators are supervisors. At 
others, the alarm station operators are security officers.  
Need for Supervisory Development to Include the Alarm Stations 
Having a supervisor who has never been an alarm station operator generally results in 
the supervisor not being adequately developed for the security shift-supervisor role, 
the top position on shift. Some company interpretations of labor law result in the 
alarm station operators being exempt employees because they dispatch officers to 
investigate alarms and supervise such things as radio checks and foot patrol rounds. 
Some sites ensure that the alarm station operators are supervisors because in case of a 
labor action, operator positions are not easily filled, which leaves the site more 
vulnerable to the labor action. It’s easier to train and replace officers or borrow 
officers or supervisors from another site and make them officers at the affected site 
than it is to try to bring people in to be trained as alarm station operators. 
A Culture Trait of Suspicion 
In security there is a trait of suspicion, as demonstrated in the process by which each 
alarm station operator is not allowed to change the status of a detection point or 
deactivate a locking or access control device at a protected or vital area portal without 
the knowledge and concurrence of the alarm station operator in the other alarm 
station. Also, operators in both alarm stations are required to be knowledgeable of the 
final disposition of all alarms.  
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All on-duty security force personnel maintain continuous communication with an 
individual in each alarm station. They do this through radio or microwave transmitted 
two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary. The alarm 
station operators also have a conventional telephone service between local law 
enforcement authorities and the site, and a system for communication with the control 
room. 
A Culture Trait of Isolation 
Managers from other departments rarely, if ever, enter the alarm stations. When 
people other than security go into the alarm stations, it’s usually just to repair broken 
equipment. This alarm station is humming with electronics and the operator is 
processing alarms through the keyboard interface to a computer terminal. More than a 
dozen camera views, some fixed and some changing every few seconds, can be 
viewed. The radio system is alive with ongoing activities with security officers who 
are in the field testing some of the security equipment.  
 
There are 19 separate monitors of different sizes, each larger than a desktop computer 
monitor screen. The average is about 1.5’ x 2’ wide. Nine different camera views are 
displayed on most monitors. Other monitors are black screens, filled to the left side 
with white text. To the right is sometimes green, yellow, and red text, which, by the 
color noted, displays the status of alarms. People’s disembodied voices, radio 
communications, are constantly being broadcast over a speaker system.  
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The safe that contains the SAFEGUARDS materials is located in this room. The 
materials include the security plan and response plans for security events at the 
station. The operator is busy. A second officer “badges” into the room by sliding his 
security badge through the security badge reader outside of the door and he’s greeted 
with an audible click. He says nothing as he sits down at a second terminal and begins 
reading a procedure that was already up on the screen.  
Use of Nuclear Human-Performance Tools 
You can see it is light outdoors by the images on the closed-circuit camera monitor 
displays. Some of the images are black and white and shades of grey. Others are in 
color. Some are thermal images, the rainbow-colored shapes of people walking down 
a road.  
 
The second officer and the operator talk about a delivery vehicle that has just been 
searched and is about to enter the protected area once the gate is open. They open the 
gate using three-way communications, “open gate 3 Alfa” says the operator. 
“Understand. Open gate 3 Alfa” says the second officer. “That’s correct,” says the 
first officer. The second officer places his right index finger on the nameplate that 
says “gate 3 A” and pauses. He pushes the button and the gate that is simultaneously 
being monitored on the screen opens. The second officer is practicing “point STAR,” 
pointing at an object prior to manipulating it, Stop, Think, Act, Review. It’s the same 
process that they use in the control room to control the reactor. Security operators 
have embraced much of the nuclear power culture for high human performance. 
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Following these techniques, three-way communications, and point STAR have 
demonstrated improvements in human performance.  
 
There is a lot of paper on the horizontal surfaces. And there are papers hanging from 
the walls. The voices from the radio traffic broadcasting continue. Frozen images of 
fences, vehicles, and water flows, display on the computer screens. 
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Chapter 5: Key Themes 
 
Overview 
This chapter presents the key themes manifested by the nuclear security officer’s 
culture. They were developed from the participant observations, passive field 
observations, semi-structured interviews, and artifact analysis. The key themes 
include frictions between the subculture of commercial nuclear security and the 
commercial nuclear power culture. There are also positive themes.  
 
The key themes are as follows: 
Theme 1:  Organizational isolation  
Theme 2:  Officer isolation 
Theme 3:  Officer abuse 
Theme 4:  Hiring manager assumptions 
Theme 5:  Attitudes towards employment 
Theme 6:  Attitudes towards staffing 
Theme 7:  Unpredictable work schedule 
Theme 8:  Industrial safety impact on security 
Theme 9:  Management expectations 
Theme 10:  Teamwork 
Theme 11:  Opportunities for officer involvement 
Theme 12:  Gender in security 
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Theme 13:  Maintaining physical requirements 
Theme 14:  Working conditions 
Theme 15:  Celebrating accomplishment 
Theme 16:  Supervision 
Theme 1: Organizational Isolation  
Overview 
The first theme is the security organization’s feeling of isolation from the rest of the 
nuclear power plant, despite the plant having put some mitigating processes in place. 
This feeling of isolation is even greater if the security organization is a contract 
security organization. Other factors that drive the feeling of social isolation include 
the difference in the day-to-day mission of the security organization as compared with 
the missions of the other site organizations, the lower technical experiences and 
education of the security organization members, the authority of the security 
organization to enforce unpopular rules and regulations, the sometimes unequal 
benefits received by the security officers as compared with the rest of the station 
population, the ignorance of other organizations of what security does, and sometimes 
the failure to include the security organization in station processes and decision- 
making. 
Description 
Two Basic Management Models 
There are two basic management models for commercial nuclear security. The first 
model is a proprietary security model in which usually all the security department 
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employees, most likely the largest single work group at a nuclear power station, 
report to the nuclear power company leaders and receive benefits similar to those of 
the other company employees, with the frequent exception of pension for the security 
officers. This model is the most popular one because it allows direct influence over 
security officer culture.  
My company doesn’t have a clue how to run a security force, not a 
clue. The concept that we have people who are empowered, trained, 
and expected to shoot people, and maybe get killed in the process to 
defend the plant, is totally not in consonance with any of my 
company’s core values. (Interviewee 8) 
 
This interviewee suggests that although the proprietary security model is the most 
popular, the nuclear power company’s core values may not be in alignment with those 
required to have the most effective security force. This concern and the higher cost 
associated with having a proprietary security force are the reasons contract security is 
used at many commercial nuclear power plants. 
 
The second model is contract security management in which the security officers 
report to on-site contract security leadership, who manages a nuclear security contract 
with the nuclear power company. Limited numbers of nuclear power company 
managers work alongside the contract security leadership and are responsible for the 
security officers’ performance through indirect leadership and contract oversight. 
They also manage the security regulatory and programmatic controls. The advantage 
of this model is that the contract security companies have stronger core competencies 
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in security, and contract security can cost significantly less for the commercial 
nuclear power company because security contractors often receive lower wages and 
benefits. 
Contract Security Isolation 
The disadvantages of the contract security model are that some contract security 
values conflict with those of the commercial nuclear power company, and the 
contract security organization’s social isolation from the rest of the station is 
significantly more prevalent than if they were a proprietary security organization. 
Being in a contract security organization is the most significant factor driving the 
security organization’s social isolation from the rest of the station organizations. 
When a contract security organization is transformed into a proprietary security 
organization, the members report that they note significantly more inclusion and less 
social isolation. To them, being a member of a contract nuclear security organization 
is like being “the red-headed stepchild.” 
Mission Isolation 
The security organization is primarily focused on the mission of protecting the 
nuclear power plant. The rest of the large station organizations are primarily focused 
on working together for the mission of safely generating electricity. The day-to-day 
focus of these two groups can be conflicting. 
Security has always been the red-headed stepchild of the station. Some 
people just hate security. We don’t put any pulses on the lines to make 
electricity. We’re not out there to fix a pump. (Interviewee 7) 
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The interviewee suggests that since the nuclear security organization is not routinely 
involved in the station’s efforts to safely generate electricity that security is often 
viewed as a lesser station organization. The other work groups are closer to each 
other, and more a part of the station family. 
Technical Isolation 
An overall lack of technical skills in the security organization results in security being 
isolated from the rest of the site’s more technically orientated population.  
I think that the technical folks on the site aren’t going to recognize 
them as an equal because they don't have that education and that 
background. (Interviewee 4) 
 
This interviewee suggests that the lower security organization member’s technical 
skills and experiences result in the rest of the station organization members not 
thinking of the security organization as an equal. The differences in technical 
experiences and education are very apparent when security organization members are 
asked to participate with other station organizations.  
I didn’t even know what picocuries were and I go, “Can you guys 
explain this to me?” And I laughed and I felt really stupid because I 
really don’t know what [they] were talking about and I [had] to help 
with [the] report. (Interviewee 1)  
 
This interviewee from security explains how it felt to be assigned to work on an 
integrated team with other station employees on a non-security related issue. The 
interviewee did not regret the decision to work on the team, but did not realize how 
much of a technical gap there was between the security organization and other 
organizations until participating in this cross-organizational assignment. The 
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technical isolation is sometimes reduced by sending senior security supervision 
through a month-long plant operations course so they can learn the basics of plant 
operations and better communicate with the rest of the station population. 
I’ve seen now three, counting myself, security managers who have an 
operations background, but only three. It’s not the typical because 
normally most security managers that I know of sometime in their life 
they were a security officer. (Interviewee 8)  
 
This interviewee indicates that there has been some industry effort to hire nuclear 
plant operations background personnel as security managers in an effort to reduce the 
technical isolation, but that it is more likely that the security manager has been 
promoted up from being a security officer. 
Authority Isolation 
Security has the task of being the authority group that enforces unpopular rules and 
regulations to control access of people, vehicles, and cargo into the nuclear power 
plant in order to protect it. But these rules and regulations often impede people from 
what they want to do, such as getting to work promptly. Also, some station 
employees feel intimidated by the weapons carried by the security officers. Being the 
authority organization that enforces the rules and regulations creates isolation 
between the security organization and the rest of the station organizations. 
Unequal Treatment Isolation 
Companies that transform their contract security organization into a proprietary 
security organization often keep costs lower by not offering the security officers the 
same pension benefits as the other site employees. At least one in seven commercial 
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nuclear power sites has the situation in which, unlike the rest of the station 
population, their relatively new proprietary security organization officers do not have 
a pension benefit.  These unequal benefits isolate the security organization from the 
rest of the station organizations. 
Lack of Understanding Isolation 
Much of what the security organization does on a day-to-day basis is hidden from 
view and discussion from the other station organizations; therefore the other station 
organizations do not understand what the security organization does on a day-to-day 
basis. This lack of understanding can be driven by the sometimes classified nature of 
security work, a tendency for secrecy, and the remote locations in which security 
work takes place as compared with the work of the other station organizations. 
Another reason is that unless there is an impact to the other station organizations, 
security functions just aren’t a part of the other organizations’ day-to-day 
conversations.  
 
In response to this lack of understanding, some stations have developed 
communication plans with targeted messages to increase the value and understanding 
of the security organization members. These communications plans include posters 
and monthly news articles in the station or company newspapers. In the effort to 
educate the other site workers, multiple sites and NEI have used video presentations 
to advertise to the rest of the site what security people do for the station.  
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Lack of Inclusion Isolation 
The social isolation experienced by the security organization is less when the security 
organization is treated as a partner with the other station organizations.  
The facilities that do treat security as a true partner with all the other 
departments tend to have better performing security programs. There is 
no doubt about it that those that don’t give security the same amount 
of attention, hold them to the same expectations, and hold them as a 
true partner, they struggle a little bit. (Interviewee 9) 
 
This interviewee claims that the stations that treat the security organizations as a 
partner by giving the security organization a seat at the table for station management 
processes and decision-making tend to have the better performing security 
organizations. Similarly, some sites have elevated the position of the security 
manager to security director so that the role has equal footing with the rest of the 
station. Thus the security director can participate in the same level discussions as the 
rest of the site directors.  
Theme 2: Officer isolation  
Overview 
The nuclear security officer is socially isolated from his or her own nuclear security 
organization and from the other station organizations. The reasons for this additional 
isolation include the impact of shift work and the common practice of non-rotation of 
shifts, which results in the same people chronically working the night shift. The 
uniforms they wear and the weapons they carry further identify and isolate them from 
the rest of the station population. But the most significant isolating factor is that the 
majority of the security officers are assigned alone to remote and isolated posts.  
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Description 
The previous theme concerned the social isolation felt by the members of the security 
organization as compared with the other station organizations. This related theme 
identifies that the security officers also feel additional social isolation, including 
isolation from their peers in their own organization, and thus are further isolated from 
the other station employees.  
Shift Work Isolation 
Most commercial nuclear security officers work a 12-hour shift. The 24-hour day is 
divided into two shifts, the day shift and the night shift. Shift work is socially 
isolating.  
They see when the site has a party, for example, a thousand people are 
given the day off and they all go someplace and they go do whatever 
they’re doing whether it’s off site or on site. Security guys can’t do 
that. They have to work shift. If you’re a night shifter, you’re home 
sleeping when they’re doing that. If you’re on your day off, yeah sure 
you can come in on your day off, but who wants to do that? 
(Interviewee 9) 
 
This interviewee notes that the working security officers often can see the station 
party taking place at the nuclear power plant, but unlike the engineers who can just 
stop doing work for the day to attend it, they can’t go to it because of the nature of 
security work. Many other shift workers such as those from the operations department 
are similarly left out of some significant station-teaming activities. 
Night-shift Isolation 
Many of the commercial nuclear power plants do not rotate the security shifts. This 
non-rotation adds to the isolation of the security officers assigned to the night shift. 
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Because the night shift has significantly less activity, fewer other station personnel 
are present and therefore the opportunities for social interaction with the other work 
groups are much less. 
Uniform Isolation 
 A uniform’s intent is to provide the security officer with visual evidence of social 
power and, as a result, the uniform and the weapons they carry isolate the security 
officer from the rest of the site population.  
They are very visible only because of the uniforms and what they 
carry. So, they’re in everyone’s eyesight regardless of what they are 
doing. (Interviewee 13) 
 
This interviewee notes that the visibility of the security officers is high because of 
their uniform and the weapons they carry and, as a result, the officers as individuals 
and security as an organization are probably more likely to be recognized for 
punishment and rewards.  
Post Isolation 
The majority of the security officers are posted alone in isolated and remote posts 
away from other security officers and the other station workers. These posts not only 
result in the security officers feeling more isolated and alone, but they also contribute 
to a culture of fatigue and boredom. 
When I first started, I felt very isolated. Very much and then it kind of wore 
out I guess after a while. It just was very lonely feeling. I was sitting 
somewhere unfamiliar. I guess [that] was part of it. I worked midnights so it 
was dark and quiet. Nothing’s going on. (Interviewee 2)  
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This on-post isolation is often mitigated by conducting post rotations every hour or 
two and frequent radio checks between posts. It’s also sometimes managed by 
limiting the number of posts that are assigned to only single individuals and by using 
ready rooms where officers can stand their posts together. Various management 
programs are also in place to limit the officers’ isolation from the rest of the station 
population. These include period visits to the posts by supervision, shift brief visits by 
managers from other departments, and meals with groups of security officers and the 
site’s executive teams to open lines of communication. 
We made sure that whenever there was a site picnic or cookout or 
something like that, that the security guys all got fed first. I made sure 
that we had arrangements made up in advance so that the food was put 
together and I didn’t get whatever was left over at the end, you know, 
hauled away in the cart just before it hit the trash can and we made 
sure that we had stuff packaged up for them and they were getting to 
eat at the same time that the rest of the crowd was getting to eat. 
(Interviewee 10) 
 
This interviewee notes that his station was careful to ensure that the security officers 
who were working the day of a site celebration were not ignored and got to play at 
least a minor part in the celebration but not as an afterthought. 
Theme 3: Officer Abuse  
Overview 
Nuclear security officers are often seen being idle by the other station organizations 
and, as a result, they often feel disrespect from the other station organizations. Unlike 
other security industries, commercial nuclear security officers are not exposed to 
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assaults or threats of violence from the general public, but they are exposed to 
infrequent verbal abuse and more frequent ostracism and coldness.  
Description 
Perceived Idleness and Disrespect 
Nuclear security officers are often seen by the station population as being idle. The 
security officer’s main function is to wait for an attack and then to defend the nuclear 
power plant, so there is a lot of idle time, which leads to a greater risk of becoming 
bored and falling asleep—one of the worst things that a security officer can do. One 
way officers maintain an adequate level of attentiveness so that they will not fall 
asleep is to use what are called “attentiveness aids” such books and television. These 
aids, however can lead to only more disrespect because the other station employees 
see not only the apparent idleness of the security officers, but also see them reading 
books and watching television. Thus, they get the impression that the officers don’t 
work hard and have it too easy. The security officers report feeling disrespected by 
some station employees. 
No Assaults or Threats of Violence  
From all the people I interviewed and all the companies that they represent, there 
have been no assaults on or threats of violence to commercial nuclear security 
officers from the general public in at least the last 10 years and most likely much 
further back than that. From time to time security officers get into arguments with one 
another, but this too is infrequent nationally. This lack of violence from the public 
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and other station departments is very different from that which is reported by 
industrial security companies in the literature review.  
Low Verbal Abuse 
From time to time, security officers will suffer some amount of verbal abuse from 
visitors to the nuclear power station, such as vendors and less frequently station 
employees. The reported incidents are fewer than once per year per station. This 
attribute is also very different from that which is reported by industrial security 
companies in the literature review.  
More Frequent Ostracism and Coldness 
The most common abuse that the security officers suffer is ostracism and coldness. 
Everyone interviewed had a story to tell on this topic.  
You had a security officer and a plant personnel, and we’d be at some 
sort of function and they would be laughing and joking and having a 
good time and “What department are you from?” “I’m from security.” 
They’d like turn and walk and not even say another word to them. 
Turn and walk away. (Interviewee 3) 
 
This interviewee tells the story of a security officer at his plant who was at a company 
party and when the security officer identified himself as such, he was immediately 
rejected from the social interaction. More frequently than ostracism, the security 
officers deal with employees, including the rare executive, at the vehicle checkpoint 
and access facility who display coldness and an unwillingness to provide even a 
minimum of social politeness such as a brief hello.  
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Theme 4: Hiring-manager Assumptions 
Overview 
This theme concerns the sometimes contradictory opinions of the managers who are 
seeking the best possible security officer candidates. They agree that they want to hire 
people who will stay. Many think that former military personnel make good 
candidates and that former police officers often make poor candidates. The number of 
women in a site’s commercial nuclear security organization can be between near zero 
and a third of the station’s security force, depending on the site manager’s hiring 
assumptions. Thus, commercial nuclear power plants can have very different levels of 
experience in their security organizations and very different percentages of gender 
balances. 
Description 
Managers do not agree on where to find the best commercial nuclear security officers. 
Security officer attrition averages range from about 8 to 12 percent per year, so most 
nuclear power stations have new-hire training class about once per year.  
Desire for People Who Will Stay 
Hiring practices and manager concerns reflect a desire to hire people who will stay 
longer. 
I look for folks that are going to stick around for a while. You know, 
looking for the folks that were family, tried to find somebody who had 
family, always looked for people who were intelligent. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee who has no security experiences other than commercial nuclear 
security reflects the desires of many of the managers to hire local people, often with 
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no military, police, or other armed security experience. The local people often come 
with a higher initial and continuing training need because of the numerous weapons 
qualifications required of a commercial nuclear security officer. However, because 
they are local, they may have more incentive to stay on the job.  
Former Military As Good Candidates 
Many of the sites believe that the best candidate for a security position has at least 
some previous weapons-carrying employment, preferably former military experience. 
Typically what makes a good candidate, which I can tell you from past 
experience, is somebody that has at least some military background.  
Law enforcement in some cases is good. In some cases not so good 
because you’ve got to break bad habits. (Interviewee 8) 
 
This interviewee reflected the opinion of the majority. People with previous military 
background are a preferred source of commercial nuclear security officers, and 
former police often do not work out well because they are used to more activity than 
what commercial nuclear security provides on a routine basis. Nonetheless, because 
of the remote locations of some of the commercial nuclear power plants, the applicant 
pool usually doesn’t contain many former military personnel.  
Typical Security Organization 
If there is a military base nearby or there is a recruiting strategy that emphasizes the 
desire to hire only people who have had previous weapons-carrying employment, the 
security force will have much fewer women in it because fewer women have these 
experiences. A common security force is made up of about one-third people with 
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some sort of previous security experience, one-third people from other occupations, 
and one-third with no prior significant employment.  
Sites Preferring Battle-hardened Veterans 
There has never been a terrorist attack on a commercial nuclear power plant in the 
U.S. This fact is not lost on the commercial nuclear power security force or on the 
plant executives, and it is one of the drivers for some sites to prefer to hire only 
battled-hardened military veterans in case that day comes.  
 Would you really feel comfortable going to bed at night ….and 
you’ve got right now what percent of that have seen action? If the flag 
goes up, or whatever you want to say, and you’re going to be in the 
fight and you replace that with a bunch of people that just came out of 
shoe sales so to speak. (Interviewee 14) 
 
This interviewee makes a comparison between two nuclear power sites. The first, his 
own, is comprised mostly of military veterans who have seen a lot of action in war. 
The second site, the one that he visited, had a large population of people who have 
seen no action. His view was that if the flag were to go up, meaning should the power 
plants be attacked, he would be much more comfortable having the veterans defend 
the plant.  
Theme 5: Attitudes Toward Employment 
Overview 
This theme concerns the longevity attitudes of the officers who join commercial 
nuclear security. All are attracted by the high wages and benefits. Some come 
intending the job to be long-term employment. Some come with the intent to leave 
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one day. Some find themselves trapped in a job that they don’t want because the high 
wages and benefits can’t be found in another, more desirable profession.  
Description 
Commercial nuclear security is a paramilitary organization focused on plant 
protection. The detailed reasons that people are attracted to this profession are 
numerous, but they include the high wages and benefits. Other studies have attempted 
to describe the attitudes towards employment (McLeod, 2002; Michael, 2002) and 
although there are some similarities, there are more differences.  
Types of People Attracted to the Job 
Stepping stones  
People hire into commercial nuclear security to take advantage of the new employee 
security training, and the frequently generous utility education benefits. These 
“stepping stones” intend to use this education as a stepping stone to employment in 
another security field, such as the police, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the 
border patrol.  
Pensioners 
People hire in to commercial nuclear security upon their retirement from another 
security organization such as the military or police to augment their pensions. These 
“pensioners” are attracted to the paramilitary security occupation because of its 
familiar reporting structure, armament, and training. 
Family Supporters 
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People, especially in the rural areas, hire into commercial nuclear security intending 
to make it a career because the wages and benefits are high enough to support a 
family. These “family supporters” are amongst the more desirable employees because 
it is assumed they will stay longer. 
Paramilitary Being Military Enough 
People seeking something similar to the military or the police but who left these 
organizations due to the higher stresses in those organizations come to paramilitary 
commercial nuclear security because it’s “military or police enough” or familiar and 
less rigid. These “paramilitary is military enough” people seek to work with people 
who have backgrounds similar to their own. 
People on the Go 
Often people hire into commercial nuclear security intending only to stay until 
something better comes along or because they were laid off from their desired 
profession. These “people on the go” intend to stay until the economy improves and 
they can be rehired into their preferred profession.  
Feeders 
Increasingly people are hiring into commercial nuclear security with the intent of 
finding another job in the commercial nuclear organization, such as operations or 
accounting, or to find a job in the larger utility organizations. Utilities often employ 
tens of thousands of people in multiple professions and the job opportunities are 
higher for those already working in the company. Some utilities purposely hire people 
into security as “feeders” to other nuclear power plant work groups. But unfortunately 
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the term also has other connotations. One security officer overheard a human 
resources employee refer to security as a "feeder group" and thought she meant it as 
an insult, as in the phrase "bottom feeder group." His interpretation of this assumed 
insult promptly spread through the officer ranks, resulting in officer outrage that 
human resources was being disrespectful to the security officers. 
Platinum Handcuffs 
Many find that they don’t like the job or are ready to leave, but due to their financial 
situation, are not able to leave. Some of the officers call this predicament, “platinum 
handcuffs.”  
There are a lot of security officers who truly hate their job, but they 
know that they’re not going to go out and find another job that starts 
out at 18 dollars per hour. (Interviewee 15) 
 
This interviewee notes that although there may be different reasons for joining 
commercial nuclear security, many of the people, such as the stepping stones and the 
people on the go, find that the high wages and benefits trap them into a career that 
they may not have intended to stay in for long.  
Theme 6: Attitudes Toward Staffing 
Overview 
This theme concerns the drivers for security’s minimum and supplemental staffing, 
the unintended consequences of overstaffing, the impacts of attrition, and how 
officers lost by attrition are replaced. 
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Description 
Minimum Security Staffing and Supplemental Security Staffing 
A site’s security officer staffing is a function of the site’s protective strategy, which 
sets the minimum security officer staffing required by the NRC and the services that 
the nuclear power plant site wants security to support, which sets the supplemental 
security staffing.  
 
The site’s protective strategy is highly reliant upon the site’s terrain. For example, a 
site located in the center of a large flat, treeless field with no buildings, located along 
the perimeter of the security fence is easier to defend and this site’s protective 
strategy will require fewer officers for protection than sites without this ideal terrain. 
A general rule of thumb is to ensure that weapons that are shooting fields of fire will 
overlap (Whitehead, Potter, & O'Connor, 2007), and this overlap is a significant 
factor in setting the minimum security staffing. Commercial nuclear power plants are 
prohibited by the NRC from dropping below minimum security officer staffing, and if 
this should happen, the utility is required to take prompt actions to restore staffing 
and make reports to the NRC. Most likely this failing will prompt regulator actions 
and negative publicity to the company. 
 
The sites with higher security service demands, such as personnel and vehicle escort, 
search, and access controls require more officers to perform these services. For 
example, efficient sites have only one personnel access point through the security 
fence. The security officers and supervisors who perform these extra security services 
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are referred to as supplemental officers. When the number of supplemental officers is 
low, some security services can be curtailed or stopped entirely which can result in 
long lines of cars or people waiting to get searched, which subsequently leads to irate 
employees. Most irate calls to the security manager are in response to a lack of 
expected security services, especially during the morning rush period or during an 
outage period when a high number of contractors add to the number of people 
needing to enter the site. Lack of security services can quickly cost the company a lot 
of money because of station work-delays, but efficient security services are not 
regulated by the NRC. 
Security Infrastructure Often an Inefficient Back-fit Design 
Physical security for the current commercial nuclear power plants has largely been a 
back-fit effort, because the terrain, nuclear power plant, and buildings were already in 
place when many of the security requirements were first implemented. Thus 
inefficiencies and the resultant frustrations associated with inefficiencies abound and 
affect both minimum security staffing and supplemental security staffing. 
Supplemental Officers Sometimes Used to Meet Minimum Staffing 
It is a common occurrence to “rob Peter to pay Paul.” That is, if the security manager 
finds that the shift staffing for the day is short on minimum staff officers, he or she 
curtails or shuts down a security service. This curtailment may include disrupting 
planned station work support because the now freed-up officers are needed elsewhere 
to meet the minimum staffing requirements. The training requirements for the 
minimum staff officers and the supplemental officers are the same. 
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Overstaffing the Security Shift 
To avoid regulatory scrutiny for going below minimum staffing and irate employee 
reactions for having too few supplemental security officers, the security manager 
staffs extra officers on shift. As a result, the shift is often overstaffed with extra 
officers who have no planned work assignments. A security officer who is a part of 
this overstaffing will often introduce himself or herself as, “I’m extra.” From a cost 
perspective, the goal for security staffing is to have just enough extra officers 
scheduled for the day to cover for the unanticipated equipment issues and officer call-
offs. The officers and supervisors know that overstaffing occurs, and this overstaffing 
has multiple unintended consequences.  
Unintended Consequences of Overstaffing the Shift 
Overstaffing is common knowledge and encourages a culture of many officers feeling 
that someone will be present to cover for them, should they not want to go to work 
and call-off. The second unintended consequence is that station workers in need of 
security services see security services as being flexible with plenty of security officers 
to go around and expect their unscheduled security needs to be met. This dynamic 
creates a continuing struggle to meet unscheduled security services, especially on the 
many days when the overstaffing just meets the security officer call-off burden and 
the net result is that there are no extra officers. 
Security Officer Call-offs 
Some officers call-off for various stated reasons, including family emergency and 
sickness.  
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I think operators tend to be, and I’d hate for any of my security guys to 
hear this, higher professionalism and commitment there than your 
average security guy because I think they have a higher recognition of 
the impact it has on their fellows. They’re smaller crews. You’ve got 
an Ops crew of five or six guys and they know they need an X number 
of guys here and if I call off it’s going to have this impact. 
(Interviewee 10) 
 
This interviewee notes that the security culture includes more incidents of call-offs 
when compared with the gold standard of the operations department because of a 
perception that their absence doesn’t have much of an impact on the other security 
officers on shift.  
Company Policies That Entice Poor Behaviors 
Some company policies with regard to sick time benefits (e.g., use it or lose it, but 
don’t use it if you aren’t sick) result in the unintended consequences of employees 
calling off from work to use this perceived entitlement rather than lose the time. 
Hiring New Officers Due to Attrition 
Increased Shift Overtime Due to Attrition 
The common schedule is a 12-hour non-rotating shift schedule with four self-
relieving crews. Self-relieving crews are staffed so that crew members can schedule 
time off, including such things as training, military reserve duty, and vacation. There 
are more officers available to cover the time off needs on the day a new employee 
security officer class graduates and is assigned to the security shifts. Over the next 
year, the individual officer’s work burden gradually increases due to attrition until the 
next new hire class is put on shift.  
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Length of New-hire Training: 3–4 Months 
The security training that new hires receive to be a commercial nuclear security 
officer is regulated by the NRC and includes a significant amount of weapons 
training, which could include handguns, assault rifles, and shotguns, as well as non-
lethal force weapons such as pepper spray. The general nuclear training requirements 
include radiation protection fundamentals, emergency plan requirements, general 
security requirements, chemical hazards, and industrial safety fundamentals. 
Most people don’t even realize we have a 3–4 month training program 
and most people, I think, really believe that we hired someone off the 
street and in two weeks they’re standing post. (Interviewee 15) 
 
This interviewee points out that the training program is rigorous and takes months to 
complete. Thus the time to recruit, hire, and train delays getting extra people on shift, 
should attrition be more than anticipated. 
Theme 7: Unpredictable Work Schedule 
Overview 
The security officer’s number one concern is how overtime is allotted and how often 
it needs to be worked. This theme concerns the need for and impact of overtime, 
especially forced overtime, the impact of shiftwork, and the nuances and impact of 
the industry preferred 12-hour shift. Overtime and shiftwork conspire to make the 
security officer’s work schedule unpredictable.  
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Description 
Need for Overtime 
Cost pressures keep the total number of security officers low. Attrition drives the 
number of security officers even lower. It is not possible to recruit, hire, and train 
additional officers to minimize unforeseen staffing burdens, which can last for 
months at a time. For security services to be flexible, there needs to be a pool of extra 
officers to use for security services that are above and beyond the normal, and this is 
the primary reason for officer overtime. One recent advertisement for an armed 
nuclear security officer (see Appendix M) stated, “Overtime should be expected; 
normal range is 10 to 20%” (G4S, 2013). The planned and unplanned need for 
overtime work is the main reason for the security officer’s often unpredictable work 
schedules. 
Overtime and How It Is Allotted 
There are always some officers who want more overtime because of the extra money 
and the ones who want the most are often referred to as “overtime whores.” Some 
officers want no overtime at all, perhaps because they have a second income from a 
military pension, or they want a social life or time with family. Some deal with the 
inflexible childcare provisions of the single parent or the dual income family. Others 
share childcare responsibilities with a security officer on another crew.  
 
The best processes to award overtime include an emphasis on using volunteers, a 
focus on trying to even out the overtime amongst all officers, and a fair procedure to 
follow when overtime needs to be “forced” to meet the shift staffing requirements. 
  
142
Fairness requires that the forced overtime burden be shared amongst all officers. The 
amount of overtime that can be worked is capped due to government “work-hour 
rules,” the intent of which is to minimize fatigue issues at nuclear power plants.  
Impact of Overtime  
What is clear is that if officer staffing-shortages result in large amounts of overtime, 
security officer performance suffers. The impacted performance is evident in 
subjective areas such as morale and in objective areas such as attrition, allegations 
made to the NRC, industrial safety accident rate, and human performance error rate. 
Some companies have business performance metrics for attrition, call-offs, and 
overtime, and they use these metrics in an effort to minimize the costs associated with 
each. 
Impact of Shiftwork 
Commercial nuclear security has a culture that is shared with other shift workers from 
other industries. One symptom of this shiftwork culture is a fear of answering the 
phone because it might be someone from work calling to assign forced overtime. 
Another cultural trait is fatigue. 
Personal Life  
New hire officers don’t experience the full impact of the shiftwork schedule until they 
qualify. The new-hire employees can’t fully grasp the shift work schedule until their 
first full day or night of shift assignments and then are assigned forced overtime for 
the first time. The new-hire class officers work a 40-hour week until they graduate. 
Normally their schedule is an 8-hour day shift, and most likely the trainees are not 
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eligible for overtime. The actual work period with its briefs and turnovers will be 
longer than the new-hire employees imagine it will be. The first time one of these 
new-hire employees calls his or her significant other with the news that he or she 
needs to work on the day off that they had planned to be together will most likely take 
some of the shine off of the new job. 
Long Commute Times 
A long door-to-door workday and long commute distances are common. Due to the 
high station wages and benefits, many security officers will travel up to 100 miles to 
come to work. The number of employees with long commutes is very often 
significant. These long commute distances were not what was envisioned by the NRC 
when they published the work-hour rules nor were they considered by companies 
when they established the 12-hour shifts. 
 You’re not going to find that kind of a paying job unless you have a 
great deal of education or unique craft, or you just flat out work 12, 14 
hours a day, six days a week. So for many of them, it is the ideal 
balance between time with your family and enough money to survive. 
So they’ll drive quite a ways for that. (Interviewee 5) 
 
This interviewee suggests that because of the high wages and benefits, people are 
willing to drive long distances to work in security at a commercial nuclear power 
plant. But these long distances contribute to a very long workday, often up to about 
15 hours door to door. 
Time for Training  
The shift work-schedule also makes it difficult to find time to train for more than 
requalification or recertification. By its design, the 12-hour shift schedule has self-
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relieving crews where small groups of officers can be taken off shift to conduct a 
limited amount of recurring training on a quarterly or trimester basis. A common 
complaint for security officers is that security does not teach during training; rather, 
the training centers on requalification or recertification. The nature of the security 
officer’s job is that they are required by the NRC to be able to perform all of their job 
functions, also called critical tasks, on any given day. The officers must maintain the 
qualifications necessary to perform each of them. Thus, officer training needs to have 
a significant emphasis on recertification of these critical tasks.  
 
But the officers would like to have training on non-critical task-related security topics 
such as plant operations, operating experience, security threat assessments, and 
interview techniques. They also request additional time on the range to practice their 
shooting skills. Management would like additional time to train the supervisors on 
management and leadership topics. But training time is limited due the shift schedule, 
and some just-in-time training is completed by using “read-and-signs” or the material 
is covered at a shift brief. A “read-and-sign” is normally a document that summarizes 
a change in policy or procedure that is read and signed by the officer to demonstrate 
that the officer has read and understands it. One corporate senior executive described 
the culture of security as a “read-and-sign organization,” because officer knowledge 
retention of “read-and-sign” information is often low.  
We are not designed with respect to a training program that the other 
departments have where they can dedicate training time during a 
normally scheduled work week. We do not have that option because of 
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our shift schedules. It would have to be done on an overtime basis, 
which we don’t support. (Interviewee 11) 
 
This interviewee points out that security forces often do not have the dedicated 
training time that other station departments have. To find additional training time 
would require more overtime, which is capped by the NRC work-hour rules. 
Experiential Learning  
Another impact of the shift work is the uneven experiential learning of the fixed 
crews. Most often, the 8- and 12-hour shift schedules are fixed and the security 
officers do not rotate from day shift to night shift. The general practice is that the 
assignment of shifts, or “shift picks,” are done by the officer’s seniority. Because it is 
less desirable, the night shift tends to collect the less experienced and junior officers.  
The day shift is going to get the activity, so they’re going to get the 
operational experience. Evening shift, not so much, and then the night 
shift hardly any at all. (Interviewee 6) 
 
This interviewee is at one of the very few sites that use an 8-hour work shift. He notes 
that not only do the back shifts tend to collect the more junior officers because of the 
way shift picks are done, but he also notes that the people on the back shifts are less 
likely to learn from experience because of the low number of security support 
activities on the back shifts. 
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Theme 8: Industrial Safety Impact on Security 
Overview 
This theme concerns the need for security to go into harm’s way, to train the way that 
they’re going to fight, yet to do so in a workplace nuclear power culture that highly 
values excellent industrial safety performance. 
Description 
The nuclear safety culture includes promoting an environment where employees can 
raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation. The culture also includes a 
high regard for nuclear safety, radiological safety, and industrial safety. Industrial 
safety is where the paradox lies. 
Unsafe Acts in a Safety Culture 
Going in harm’s way is an unsafe act. The security force is unique when compared 
with the rest of the station employees in that their mission is to protect the plant, but 
that mission can conflict with industrial safety values. Protecting the plant requires fit 
people under stress to perform unsafe acts, which include going into harm’s way to 
engage attackers with deadly force. 
Nobody else is expected to necessarily die in defense of the plant. 
Now we’re not supposed to die, but that’s always a possibility, so that 
in and of itself separates the security force from anybody else on site. 
The rest of the site doesn’t have that appreciation. They don’t 
understand it. (Interviewee 8) 
 
This interviewee notes that security personnel feel they are separate from the rest of 
the site organizations because as a part of their job, they are essentially being asked to 
die in defense of the plant. This defense culture results in the security officer’s 
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attitude toward industrial safety being different from that of the rest of the station 
employees in that many see a value conflict in good industrial safety as compared 
with good security 
Seconds to Make a Decision to Shoot 
An officer needs to decide to shoot or not to shoot based on their training and what 
they see and hear, rather than on what others tell them. The decision to shoot must be 
made in a matter of seconds. 
Security officers, when a contingency happens…bad guy jumps the 
fence or whatever, they have to remember off the top of their head, I 
have to go to this point, I have to go to that point, I have to remember 
my responsibilities, I got to remember to put on my protective gear. 
All those things. They have to remember, snap to, and run and get out 
there. And, oh by the way, an event for the operator he’s got minutes 
or even you know at least minutes if not tens of minutes or hours to get 
through something. Security…seconds. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee notes that the security officer who is under stress during an attack 
needs to quickly remember what they have been trained to do and to make the correct 
decision on how to respond in the matter of seconds. Even the gold standard of the 
operations department people have much longer to make a decision. This quick- 
decision requirement factors into the difference in the way that security officers 
perceive industrial safety risk. 
Risks for Industrial Safety Injuries 
Managers from every department invest energy and focus on keeping a good 
industrial safety accident rate and present their industrial safety performance in a 
multitude of meetings in front of peers from other departments and with senior station 
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managers and executives. Energy and focus are necessary because opportunities for 
security officers to get injured are numerous. 
They’re given jobs that are, you know, largely prone to lots of 
opportunities for errors, but also injuries. They’re running drills, 
they’re walking a lot, they’re bending a lot, they’re carrying weapons 
and walking through halls, and opening and closing, and messing with 
big heavy doors, gates, locks, and those kinds of things. They drive a 
lot; 24/7 security vehicles are going. Lots of opportunities for 
accidents and injuries. (Interviewee 10) 
 
This interviewee describes the various physical activities that the security officers are 
engaged in 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, and, as a result, the officers are at risk 
for accidents and injuries.  
Focus on Industrial Safety  
The nuclear culture is risk adverse and tolerates only the highest performance in 
industrial safety. Industrial safety is measured and compared with other nuclear 
power stations across the U.S. Sites with poor industrial safety performance are 
penalized not only by their parent company with reduction in discretionary bonuses 
for their employees but also by the INPO in their index and ranking of performance 
of the commercial nuclear power plants. This high focus on industrial safety 
influences the way that security is performed. 
If you’re in the military or law enforcement you expect security or you 
expect those guys to possibly have a minor injury in training. Their 
philosophy is, You get hurt a little bit in training, but that prevents you 
getting hurt much worse in a real situation. For us, because there 
haven’t been any real situations, they don’t see that need to train to 
that level. (Interviewee 10) 
 
  
149
This interviewee notes that other parapolice or military organizations appear to have a 
higher tolerance for industrial safety injuries than does commercial nuclear security 
because of a perceived need to perform higher intensity training.  
 
But training isn’t the only security activity that is influenced by the organizational 
focus on industrial safety. For example, defensive strategies are sometimes designed 
so that officers do not need to run to implement the strategy because running puts an 
officer at risk for serious injury from tripping and falling. As much as possible, 
security equipment is staged so that security officers do not have to carry it in the 
course of their duties because carrying a lot of weight can cause chronic injuries. 
Security patrol routes are designed to be along “safe paths” to minimize the 
opportunity to trip and fall or to drive into an obstacle. Officer posts are designed to 
be more sedentary to reduce the probability for trips and falls in the plant. Foot patrol 
frequency is reduced to only that which is necessary. Training intensity is reduced to 
minimize the chance of injury. Gym facilities on post are rarely provided because of 
the fear of officer injury. Pistols are carried cold and manipulated infrequently instead 
of being carried hot, thus allowing the officers to maintain greater familiarity with 
their weapons. 
Impact of Work Injuries 
This organizational industrial safety focus has significant impact on the work life of 
those who are injured. One security supervisor injured himself when he “ran as fast as 
he could” during a fire drill. Because of the severity of the injury, which rose to the 
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level of a station clock reset, the injury was a point of station discussion by all 
departments on a daily basis until the topic was replaced by the next injury about six 
months later. Station employees sometimes joke under their breaths, “If you find me 
injured, please ensure you throw me over the fence” because they know the high 
accounting they will need to undergo should the injury occur at work.  
Theme 9: Management Expectations  
Overview 
This theme concerns how management expectations are taught to the commercial 
nuclear security force and how they are monitored to ensure that they are understood 
and met. It also concerns how even small deviations from management expectations 
are reported, tracked, trended, and resolved. There are also concerns about how daily 
feedback from station employees can result in behaviors that may be detrimental to 
good security. 
Description 
Teaching Management Expectations 
During the new employee classes, the newly hired security officers learn what is 
expected of them through review and study of more than 70 security-related policies 
and procedures and a myriad of company general policies and procedures. They also 
learn through class lectures, on the job training, and task performance evaluations. 
During the task performance evaluations, each officer must perform graded tasks to 
the satisfaction of a certified task performance evaluator to become certified in the 
task. Tasks can range from using the x-ray machine, personnel search, weapon 
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qualification, and vehicle search. There are about 22 critical tasks that the students 
need to complete before they can be qualified as an armed nuclear security officer. 
Continuing security training is completed through a systematic approach and includes 
the security officers recertifying on the critical tasks once per year.  
The way I see nuclear security these days is up and above local law 
enforcement. It’s unique, but they’re the elite of the basic security 
officers out there. I think they’re better qualified, better trained, than a 
lot of the law enforcement officers out on the streets these days. 
(Interviewee 9) 
 
This interviewee comments about how the commercial nuclear security officer 
training program is thought to produce a very highly trained security officer, even 
better trained than some law enforcement officers. Commercial nuclear security 
officers include former Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) officers, former 
sheriffs, and former police officers, and they are sometimes led by retired Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees, so discussion of the differences are 
common. 
Procedure Use and Adherence 
Expectations continue to be enforced through a culture trait of “procedure use and 
adherence,” which is monitored through the field behaviors of the security officers.  
We do provide a lot of oversight. We’re one of the largest groups 
when it comes to observations done. We’re out in the field a lot, from 
myself on down. Eight hours of observation per month have to be 
documented. (Interviewee 12) 
 
This interviewee describes the supervisory and management oversight of nuclear 
security officers in the field as a part of the formal station observation program. 
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Supervisors and managers demonstrate a culture trait of oversight by spending time in 
the field doing formal observations of security officers’ behaviors to ensure that 
management expectations are understood and are being carried out.  
They have to be on their A game all the time. Every day when they’re 
sitting around the x-ray machine they have to have their A-game going 
because they never know when someone is going to be slipping 
something through. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee notes the management expectation that security officer always have 
high performance or a cultural trait of vigilance because of the unpredictable nature 
of a potential security threat. Management and supervisory oversight in the field is 
used to maintain this high performance. 
Corrective Action Program 
Deviations from procedures are expected to be reported to supervision and recorded 
in the nuclear power plant’s corrective action program, a program required by the 
NRC for the entire station to ensure that even the smallest defects are tracked, 
trended, and resolved. These are cultural traits of reporting problems and problem 
resolution. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence for issues are formally developed 
and implemented. Effectiveness reviews are conducted to ensure that the corrective 
actions are effective. 
Daily Feedback 
While conducting uneventful screening activities hour after hour, an officer is more 
likely to receive feedback for good or poor customer service than for excellent 
security work, such as a detailed contraband search. 
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The primary function is defending the plant and also providing 
customer service. In meeting regulations, we’re providing a service to 
the employees in the search trains for example. So, it’s a lot of 
interaction with the site population. And a lot of positive comments 
come from the site population because the officers understand this is a 
service we are providing. But at the same time, they get to know the 
people. So, when they come in, they’re smiling, they’re greeting, and 
there is interaction with the site population. The drawback to that 
is…you can become too complacent, too comfortable, too. So, now 
and then stuff can get in. So you gotta be careful. There is a fine line 
between the customer service you are providing and then becoming so 
relaxed that you aren’t paying attention to your job. (Interviewee 13) 
 
This interviewee identifies the concern that security officers can become too close to 
the site worker population and as a result become complacent or too comfortable and 
not pay adequate attention to the security officer’s primary duties. He identifies a 
cultural trait of positive feedback for good customer service. 
Theme 10: Teamwork 
Overview 
There is a theme of teamwork in security for two main reasons. The nuclear safety 
culture trait of procedure use and adherence and the large number of procedures that 
the security officers are encouraged to do from memory encourage mutual support 
and teamwork. The second is that the successful defense of the plant during drills and 
exercises requires that the security officers perform as a team. There is some evidence 
of security officer reluctance to report their fellow officers for low-level infractions 
because of the need for teamwork and because of isolation-driven solidarity.  
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Description 
Aiding Each Other for Procedure Use and Adherence 
The commercial nuclear security culture includes a trait of procedural compliance. 
Procedures are divided into three categories: continuous use, reference use, and 
informational use (INPO, 2009). Most of the more than 70 security-related policies 
and procedures are designated as informational use, which means they are within the 
knowledge and skills of experienced individuals and the user may complete the task 
from memory. However, the user is responsible for performing the activity in 
accordance with the procedure. 
There is also a culture there of helping each other out because of all 
the procedures that you have to follow. In security, failure to follow a 
procedure can have significant consequences on your employment 
status. (Interviewee 6) 
 
The interviewee states that security officers are expected to know many procedures. 
But they use some of them infrequently because they are assigned some of the more 
complicated posts or complicated activities on an infrequent basis. Some procedures 
are located at the security officer’s post so that he or she can refer to them to help 
remember all the things he or she needs to do. Many of the procedures are not 
immediately accessible and can be inconvenient to obtain and thus the security 
officers don’t always refer to them when they should. Commercial nuclear power 
security is highly regulated and, as a consequence, errors caused by not following 
policies and procedures are highly visible to the organization, station, and regulator. 
The interviewee also states that not following a procedure can have a significant 
impact on the officer, including discipline and termination of employment. Thus, 
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security officers often rely on each other to verify or remember what the policies and 
procedures require them to do, rather than referring back to them. 
Aiding Each Other in Defense of the Plant 
A force-on-force drill or exercise is performed to demonstrate the officer’s ability to 
defend the nuclear power plant and to simulate combat between a mock adversary 
force and the nuclear power plant’s security force. The adversary force attempts to 
reach and simulate damage to significant systems and components (referred to as 
“target sets”) that protect the reactor’s core or the spent fuel pool, which could 
potentially cause a radioactive release to the environment. The licensee’s security 
force, in turn, attempts to interdict the adversary to prevent the adversary from 
reaching target sets and thus causing such a release (NRC, 2013b). 
Generally it takes one drill for somebody who is not gelling with the 
team to either realize themselves is not as important as the team or 
they will never get it and they will leave security. (Interviewee 5) 
 
The drills and exercises are run on a quarterly basis per security shift (GPO, 2013). 
This interviewee states that security officers quickly realize during these drills and 
exercises that they need to be part of the team in order to succeed. The drills and 
exercises test the security officer’s ability to work as a team to adequately defend the 
station. Poor performance on drills and exercises can have an impact similar to that of 
employment status.  
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Officers Reporting Issues Involving Other Officers 
The nuclear safety culture includes a trait of problem identification and resolution, 
which includes security officer identification of noncompliance issues completely, 
accurately, and in a timely manner. This day-to-day reporting of issues includes the 
need for security officers to report mistakes that they identified with their peers’ 
behaviors and performance. 
I think that they would be less inclined to report a fellow officer for 
doing something inappropriate…. I think they do, for lack of a better 
word, cover for each other. From time to time you do see somebody 
reporting another officer, but I think that’s more rare. (Interviewee 8)  
 
This interviewee, who was in the minority group, believes that there is a reluctance 
for officers to report one another. This reluctance is thought to be driven by two 
factors, first being the teamwork requirement for the security officers to be able to do 
their jobs effectively. The second is that the security officers, since they are isolated 
and uniquely responsible for protecting the plant, feel the need for solidarity, which is 
similar to what in the police culture is known as “the thin blue line.” 
Theme 11: Opportunities for Officer Involvement 
Overview 
This theme concerns the efforts of security management to provide opportunities for 
security officers to get involved. Management demonstrates that the officers’ 
opinions matter and work with the officers to make improvements. 
Description 
During a typical workday, most of the security officers are assigned alone to isolated 
and remote posts. Some stations are designed differently and have a handful of 
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officers posted to one or more ready rooms instead of the isolated and remote posts. 
The few officers not assigned to these isolated and remote posts or ready rooms 
perform more physically active assignments such as searching people or vehicles, or 
performing vehicle or foot patrols. Thus the security officers, the highly trained 
paramilitary force, complete their initial training courses and certifications, and then, 
for the most part, are primarily asked to sit and wait.  
You’re on the assembly line and at the end of the day you’re thinking, 
I did my part. We made our quota to make 1500 saws, or whatever it 
is. Or if you’re a homebuilder and you walk away, well there is a 
home. In security, nothing happened and we documented it, and we go 
home and it was successful and all is well. (Interviewee 6) 
 
This interviewee identifies that the nuclear security officer job has little tangible 
evidence of a successful day’s work. This lack of measurement highlights the 
challenge of providing meaningful opportunities for security officers to do what they 
do best every day, especially in the absence of attack. 
Making Opportunities to Involve the Security Officers 
Commercial nuclear power plants have discovered various ways to provide 
opportunities for security officers to do what they do best every day. These 
opportunities include qualifying all commercial nuclear security officers to the same 
qualification level, rather than having different classifications of security officers 
perform specific tasks. For example, officers are scheduled for post rotations from 
low-activity posts to high-activity posts on a periodic basis so that they don’t spend 
day after day in a low-activity post such as a tower. Upgrade programs have been put 
in place so that officers can perform some supervisory tasks such as serving as alarm 
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station operator during a supervisor’s absence. Collateral duties have been assigned to 
the officers, such as being a procurement specialist who can order such things as new 
weapons or training supplies. Officers are given procedure changes to review or 
procedures to re-write in an effort to make the processes more streamlined and/or 
officer friendly. On shift, officers can obtain special qualifications such as those for 
equipment tester or forklift driver. 
The officers you know, if you include them, they’ll help you figure out 
the shortcuts. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee points out that by including the security officers in solving 
problems, not only do they get a chance to do what they do best every day, but also 
the result is a better and more efficient processes.  
Demonstrating that Officers’ Opinions Matter 
Since the officers are together as a group only during the short daily shift-brief and 
then spread out throughout the site and mostly posted alone, gathering their opinions 
can be time consuming and difficult. 
If you’re talking, you’re open, you’re honest, you’re straight-forward 
and you’re telling them what is going on and you’re telling them 
truthfully from the heart, this is it. And you’re keeping them in the 
know and you’re listening to them and you’re taking what they’re 
giving you and you’re putting some value in it and showing them that 
you’re going to make some changes. It works miracles. (Interviewee 
15) 
 
This interviewee reflects on the importance of open and honest communications with 
the security officers and finding ways to gather the officers’ opinions and then to 
demonstrate that these opinions matter by making changes. He further reflects that 
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making changes based on the officer’s opinions can result in significant 
organizational improvements including morale and efficiencies. Ways to gather these 
opinions include having the supervisor canvas their employees for their opinions on 
topics, formal surveys, and the use of security improvement focus teams (SIFTs). 
Security Improvement Focus Teams (SIFT) 
Many sites use improvement focus teams where officer representatives meet together 
periodically to discuss items of officer concern and prioritize them for resolution. The 
officers then go back to their assigned crews to gather the opinions of the peers. The 
team then meets again with supervisors and managers to resolve the identified issues. 
In this fashion, officer issues are identified, officer opinions are made to matter, and 
the officers are engaged in solving the issues that they have identified.  
Theme 12: Gender in Security 
Overview 
This theme identifies that the majority of commercial nuclear security officers are 
male and discussions of violence are commonplace. Uniforms and equipment are 
procured to a unisex standard that favors men. Some security managers prefer to hire 
only battled-hardened military veterans, and this orientation tends to exclude women. 
Although there may be initial skepticism, when tested, women’s performance on the 
job is good.  
Description 
The majority of the security force is comprised of men, and women comprise from 
only a few to nearly one-third of a site’s security force. The security officer mission 
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to defend the plant from attack, and the weapons and other tools employed to succeed 
in this mission, result in frequent discussions alluding to violence.  
I believe a good sock in their face is better than a smile, you, know, 
when it comes for security. Because guess what? I don’t want you to 
be my friend. I want you to have all your crap right. All this friend 
stuff? Can you do it and do your job? (Interviewee 14)  
 
This interviewee expresses his concern that there be a separation between security 
and the rest of the station population in order to have effective security. His choice of 
violence-laden words to express this thought is not atypical.   
Physical Nature of the Job  
The nuclear security officer positions require a higher level of physical capability 
because of the foot patrols and the site’s defensive strategies.  
It’s more of a guy culture because when you think of security or law 
enforcement or something, you think of it as a guy's job because of 
carrying a gun, having to go to the range and shoot. The physical stuff 
you have to do. I mean this stuff [pointing to the equipment carried on 
the interviewee’s body] is not light and you know running everything 
we have to do, you don't see a lot of women ….in these kind of 
positions. (Interviewee 1) 
 
This interviewee, a woman, suggests that women are less likely to be attracted to the 
nuclear security officer field because similar professions of security or law 
enforcement have traditionally been male, and that the physical requirements of the 
position are not appealing to many women. 
The Unisex Standard 
Equipment such as uniform items is often procured to a male or unisex standard, 
which favors a man’s body proportions. 
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I asked this young female, “Does that fit?  “No.” “Would you wear 
it?” “No.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
This interviewee was asking a female security officer about the bulletproof vest that 
was available for her to use. But because of her small size, she knew the vest would 
not fit and thus she would not opt to put it on in an attack. 
Preference for Battled-hardened Veterans 
Battle-hardened veterans sometimes look negatively toward hiring anyone other than 
other battle-hardened veterans, largely because they feel that only veterans like 
themselves can be counted on in the time of an attack. There are few women who are 
battled hardened. 
They were really moms. You know, like Brownies. Let’s go to 
Brownies after work today. You know, moms. If you would have said, 
“port arms,” they would not know if you were talking left, right, 
….nothing. They had no clue. And you’re sitting there, looking and 
going, I’m glad that that nuclear plant is 20 miles from my house, and 
not this one, because I think those places pretty much would be taken 
with people with sticks. (Interviewee 14) 
 
This interviewee was from a station that hired mostly battle-hardened veterans and 
few women in security. He visited a station that had about one-third women in their 
security force and he did not have high confidence, based on the high number of 
women that he saw, that they would be as successful in defending an attack because 
he didn’t view them as strong or militaristic enough. 
Women’s Security Performance  
In 2004, responding to new requirements from the NRC, the number of security 
officers in commercial nuclear security increased significantly and the training and 
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qualification standards increased and became much more paramilitary. Many of the 
original employees had no previous military experiences upon which to draw. 
I’ve seen the stereotypical housewife. Hates jails, hates guns, hates the 
whole military part of it, but she’s still there after eight years. Then I 
watched her in a drill and as soon as the action started, she forgot all 
that fear, forgot all that, “Oh, I hate guns” and “I’m afraid I’ll mess 
up” stuff and engaged without hesitation. I have a lot of confidence in 
our officers. (Interviewee 5) 
 
This interviewee emphasizes the discrepancy between his own stereotypes of women 
and the high standards to which they rose when performing their jobs. Commercial 
nuclear security undergoes a rigorous testing and inspection program that is led by the 
NRC, and the nuclear power stations have to prove they can defend against the design 
basis threat (NRC, 2013b). There have been no identified concerns with the utility 
hiring practices, which in many cases give women equal access to the positions. 
Theme 13: Maintaining Physical Requirements  
Overview 
Security officers are concerned that they may not be able to reach retirement age 
because they perceive the physical fitness requirements to be more difficult to meet as 
the security officers get older. Unlike many other station employees who can be 
accommodated with less physical employment should they lose some physical 
capability, security officers must continue to meet all of the physically demanding 
requirements to maintain their employment. This concern is further exacerbated 
because many security officers, unlike most other station employees, are not provided 
a pension. 
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Description 
To maintain employment, security officers must meet the minimum job functions of 
the commercial nuclear security officer. These functions include the physical 
requirements of being able to carry approximately 28 pounds of security related 
equipment up and down stairs, to open heavy doors, to see out of both eyes, to hear, 
to speak, and to shoot with both hands. In contrast to other site workers, these 
physical requirements are stringent. 
Age-related Concerns  
At many stations the main security officer concern is the potential inability to meet 
the physical requirements year after year. 
The top one is being able to physically meet the requirements to keep 
their job.  I know that for a fact. That is something that they worry 
about a lot. (Interviewee 10) 
 
This interviewee identifies that the top security officer concern is being able to meet 
the physical requirements of the nuclear security officer. These requirements include 
the need to pass an annual physical fitness test, a physical examination, and various 
weapons qualifications. There is very little work available for security officers who 
cannot meet the security officer essential job functions, so the inability to pass the 
required tests and qualifications can result in a loss of the officer’s employment.  
I had two people retire from the security force since I’ve been here, but 
only two.  Most of them fall apart, run into heart problems, put them 
on long-term disability, and after the sufficient time has gone by, 
they’re terminated. (Interviewee 8) 
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This interviewee explains that it is difficult for security officers at his site to reach 
retirement age because of the inability of many of the security officers to meet the 
physical requirements as they get older. 
No Pension  
Unlike commercial nuclear security, other physically demanding organizations, such 
as police departments, fire departments and the military, offer retirements to their 
employees after 20 years of service in recognition that older people find the physical 
requirements more difficult to meet.  
[The officers say,] “We come in and do this for 20 years. Our knees 
start to give out and it gets tougher and tougher to meet the physical 
quals. We deserve a retirement.” So far they haven’t been getting it, 
and I’m sure that it’s appropriate that they should. (Interviewee 8) 
 
This interviewee identifies that it becomes more difficult for the security officers to 
meet the physical requirements as they get older and that some security organization 
are trying to bargain for a 20-year retirement. Currently, at many stations, security 
officers have a 401K savings program but, unlike other station employees, have no 
pension.  
Encouraging Security Officers to Find Other Work 
The physical demands of the nuclear security officer make it more of a risky 
profession if an employee wants to work until traditional retirement age.  
When I talk to individuals about it I encourage them to build their 
skills over those 20 years and be able to market themselves to move 
into a job that is less physically demanding, a little more sedentary, a 
little more of an office job. (Interviewee 10) 
 
  
165
This interviewee points out that the nuclear security officers at his site are encouraged 
to build skills over their nuclear security officer career so they can find less physically 
demanding work when they get older. A limited amount of less physically demanding 
work can be found by moving into nuclear security supervision or staff.  
Theme 14: Working Conditions 
Overview 
The security officer’s working conditions are often a concern to the security officers. 
One concern is the general work environment, which includes the physical 
environment of heat or cold, cleanliness, post accessibility, and post habitability. 
Another concern are the delays and challenges associated with getting security 
equipment repairs and maintenance completed. Some officers are also troubled about 
the limited physical protection provided for some supplemental security officers, in 
that they often are not afforded the same protection that the minimum staffing officers 
receive. 
Description 
The working conditions for the security officers are sometimes sub-standard when 
compared with the rest of the nuclear power plant’s employees.  
If facility maintenance is maintaining and keeping clean the cafeteria 
and the offices that the rest of the employees work in, but yet they’re 
not taking the same vigilance to maintain the officer’s working 
locations, then that’s not treating them as a true partner. Those sort of 
things start to grate on security officers. They get the mindset that 
they’re not cared about, and that impacts their morale, which impacts 
their performance, which impacts attendance and everything else. 
(Interviewee 9) 
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This interviewee identifies not only what challenges he has in getting his station to 
tend to the cleaning of the security posts and to get timely repair and maintenance of 
his security equipment, but also how such lack of vigilance in these matters 
negatively affects attitudes and overall performance.  
General Work Environment 
As alluded to previously, the remote posts have physical environmental challenges. 
Most posts are designed to withstand bullet impingement and many are also bomb-
blast resistant. As a result, they ventilation systems and therefore must rely on air 
leakage from the outside for fresh air. On a cold, windy day or a hot day, the fresh air 
entering the post is often greater than what the heater or air conditioner can mitigate. 
On a calm day, when the fresh air leakage is low, the odors from the microwave and 
bodily functions linger. And it’s not just the tower posts that present environment 
challenges; it’s also the outside conditions. Officers search vehicles, cargo, and 
people outdoors in the bitter cold and wind of winter and the oppressive heat and 
humidity of summer. Officer complaints about their protection or relief from the 
environmental conditions are common. 
 
The remote locations of the posts make cleaning and maintaining them a challenge. 
The posts are sometimes located high in the air, some up to 60 feet and only 
accessible via multiple flights of external metal stairs or internal, narrow, and winding 
staircases. Officers travel up and down these stairways often laden with up to 28 
pounds of security-officer related equipment and untold pounds of personal items 
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such as lunches and attentiveness aids. Most posts are not equipped with water or 
toilets, and officers must rely on a “bio break” from a break officer. If the break 
officer is not timely or is unavailable, and the post officer can’t wait, there may be 
emergency chemical toilets or a plastic coke bottle that has been known to be 
inadvertently left behind full of urine. The trashcan has been used for emergency 
defecation and, if the officer misses the mark, can result in the post being 
uninhabitable until cleaned.  
Getting Equipment Repaired 
A nuclear power plant prioritizes the plant equipment to be maintained based on 
guidance promulgated by the INPO (INPO, 2010). But because the guidance doesn’t 
include security equipment under the category of plant equipment, it’s up to the site’s 
security manager to convince the site to properly prioritize the security equipment 
repairs. Often the time invested in repairing security equipment can be a source of 
frustration for the maintenance department because it is not included in the metrics 
for commercial nuclear power plant work control. Rather, it’s performed with 
resources that could be applied to manage the metrics. As a result, there is constant 
friction between the security department and the rest of the station over the struggle to 
get security equipment repaired. 
The equipment isn’t working right and now there is a line. It’s the 
security officer’s fault. Not the maintenance program or the people 
that are keeping it up or the fact that the equipment is 30 years old. It’s 
the security people’s fault. (Interviewee 9) 
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This interviewee points out that station employees can be affected by delays in 
getting to work when the security equipment isn’t operating properly, and often the 
blame for the equipment outages is assigned to the security personnel rather than to 
the work control process that doesn’t adequately address security equipment repair 
priorities. 
Protecting Supplemental Security Officers  
Some security officers express concern about the protection of the supplemental 
security officers when they are not a part of the security infrastructure’s design. The 
NRC requirements focus on the protection of only the minimum staff security officers 
because these officers need to be protected so they can survive to defend the station 
from attack. But officers who are performing security services, such as many of the 
search officers, are often not a part of the minimum staffing requirements and are 
therefore left to be protected by the companies that employ them, and often with 
mixed results. Perceiving a lack of protection leads the security officers to think that 
their nuclear power plant executives do not actually care about them as individuals.  
Theme 15: Celebrating Accomplishment 
Overview 
This theme describes what commercial nuclear power plants do for individual, group, 
and station recognition and celebration of accomplishments to reinforce or sustain 
good performance. 
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Description 
Commercial nuclear power uses an accountability model that places value on 
coaching to correct or adjust behaviors and to reinforce or sustain behaviors. 
Rewards, recognition, and celebration of accomplishments serve similar purposes to 
reinforce or to sustain good performance. There are three basic categories of 
recognition or celebration: individual recognition, group recognition, and station 
recognition. 
Individual Recognition 
Individuals who identify issues or gaps in performance are often rewarded with a 
certificate or other token by security supervision or management. 
If they find something that is pretty important and relevant to nuclear 
safety especially or some significant industrial safety concern, we will 
recognize them with some type of monetary award, whether it’s a gift 
card or it’s some kind of free meal. (Interviewee 11) 
 
This interviewee describes how rewards and recognition are used to sustain good 
performance when a security officer identifies an issue related to nuclear or industrial 
safety. Good performance is recognized in other ways too. For example, quarterly 
marksmanship awards are given in the form of a certificate. The officer’s picture and 
name are put on a plaque, and the names of previous award winners going back three 
years appear on the plaque. The station’s security newsletter often contains the names 
of those who were recognized for good performance. Individuals are also recognized 
for high of performance by using individual multipliers for annual cash incentives. 
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Group Recognition 
The security organization, similar to other station organizations, celebrates group 
accomplishment and good performance. For example, at each security shift brief the 
leader asks for “any recognition items?” When this question is asked, officers or 
supervisors will volunteer examples of things that happened on a previous shift that 
were particularly good and thank the people responsible. Often the positive feedback 
is met with a round of applause.  
 
Group recognition can be security management recognizing a significant security 
milestone, such as reaching one year accident free and talking to the entire group 
about the efforts it took to reach that milestone. An award meal or shirts emblazoned 
with the milestone achievement or some other token is given out for such good 
performance.  
Station Recognition 
The station celebrates the accomplishment of higher-tier goals and milestones and 
significant group or individual performance. For example, the station celebrates the 
completion of a successful outage period that met the industrial safety and production 
goals. The security organization participates in this celebration by ensuring that meals 
and gifts are brought to the offices, where they are posted. The officers are thanked 
by the senior security leadership for their contributions. Station recognition and 
celebration are also accomplished through a station multiplier related to meeting end-
of-year station and company goals, and this multiplier is applied to annual cash 
incentives for station employees. Another way that station recognition is 
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accomplished is by having the station executives show station appreciation. For 
example, the senior executive will have a quarterly award ceremony and meal where 
he invites high-performing small groups or individuals to celebrate their good 
performance.  
Theme 16: Supervision  
Overview 
Security operates in a command and control hierarchy with a minimum of seven 
layers of authority. Communications in this structure can be challenging because of a 
culture of adhering to the chain of command to resolve an issue; that is, never 
skipping the layers of authority to communicate above one’s supervisor. 
Communicating downward is also problematic because new supervisors can be 
promoted and receive little supervisory training to help them in their new role, and 
current supervisory continuing training is often very limited.  
Description 
Supervisors are challenged by their limited ability to interact face-to-face with their 
remotely posted security officers. Interaction with security management is also a 
struggle for the supervisors because of the shift work schedule. Day shift supervisors 
are very busy doing security support tasks for the nuclear power plant and find they 
have limited time to interact with their assigned officers.  
The Command and Control Hierarchy 
One nuclear power executive recently said, “Security is stuck in that command and 
control model.” From the top nuclear employee to the officer, there is a minimum of 
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seven layers in the nuclear security reporting structure. These layers include the chief 
nuclear officer, vice president, security manager, security operations manager, 
security shift supervisor, security supervisor, and security officer. Plus, there are other 
nuclear security organizational structures with even more layers. Security officers and 
managers speak of “command and control” and demonstrate a cultural trait of strict 
adherence to the levels of authority to communicate and to resolve issues. This trait is 
especially strong for many of the former military personnel. Thus communications 
from the security officers to layers of authority in the organization higher than their 
immediate supervisors can be limited without a deliberate effort to address this issue.  
Rapid Promotions Without Leadership Training 
It’s possible to be promoted from security officer to a senior supervisor in a short 
period of time, especially because promotion to supervision doesn’t necessarily 
require any leadership training. 
In the first six months I was promoted to Sergeant, which would have 
been the first level of supervision. Six months after that I was 
promoted to lieutenant, which was an assistant shift leader. Then two 
years later to shift leader. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee notes that he was promoted to the first-level of supervision within 
six months of starting the job, which is not uncommon. Additionally, he had no 
previous supervisory experience to fall back on when he got promoted. 
I had no formal training for leadership, really. I would say that when I 
started here at 21 years old, I had a few supervisors that were really 
dirt bags, so I could learn, and say I would never be like that. I would 
never do this, I won’t do that. And I had ones that did things that I saw 
were developing others. I saw they were making other people feel 
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better. I saw they got the job we needed to get done, so I stole that and 
embellished or whatever into that way of doing things. (Interviewee 
14) 
 
This interviewee reports that during his career as a security supervisor he received 
little training in leadership and relied on emulating the good qualities that he saw in 
other supervisors and avoiding the flaws he saw in others. He learned how to be a 
supervisor primarily through on-the-job training. 
Developing the Supervisors 
The gulf between the knowledge and skills to be a security officer and those needed 
to be a security supervisor is often very wide. For example, many stations require that 
the alarm station operator positions, the most technically challenging security 
positions, be staffed with supervisors. But not only does the newly promoted 
supervisor need to perform well in the alarm stations, but also he or she needs to 
develop supervisory skills. 
We have a thing that we call quarterly training for supervisors that, 
that hasn’t been done in six or seven years. You know, eight years. 
And it’s all because of, you know, business needs elsewhere for the 
most part. (Interviewee 14) 
 
This interviewee notes that at this station what is supposed to be recurring quarterly 
training to improve the leadership and supervisory skills of supervisors is overlooked. 
Impact of Not Investing in Supervisors 
Lack of investment in creating more effective supervision can have significant 
organizational impact. The supervisors are key to ensuring the officers know what is 
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expected of them and that the officers have the necessary materials and equipment. 
They are pivotal in ensuring the officers are provided opportunities to do what they 
do best every day and are provided recognition and praise for good work. They meet 
with each security officer to encourage the officer’s development and ensure that 
someone at work is demonstrating care about each officer as a person. 
We let five of them [supervisors] go in a very short period of time. 
And that was after I had been there for over a year trying to work with 
them and get them up to speed. And then they were just going to 
continue to do it their way, or the old way…I will tell you it was 
overnight change. The officers almost applauded getting rid of those 
people. They were so obnoxious. Apparently, you didn’t really know 
how bad the officers were being treated. (Interviewee 7) 
 
This interviewee was brought in as a change agent to help turn around a troubled 
nuclear security organization. He found poorly developed supervision and, as a result, 
ended up having to dismiss many of the supervisors in order to turn the security 
organization performance around.  
Making the Supervisor Job Appealing 
Officers can be put off by the difficult trials of the supervisory function. It is 
technically complex, and supervising other people in a challenging environment can 
seem formidable. As a result, not all those who might become good supervisors apply 
for the position.  
I’ve taken a few people aside and asked them, “Why haven’t you 
applied for supervision?  Because I think you’d be good at it.”  I throw 
the carrot out in front of them and say, “Oh by the way we do have a 
pension in management that you don’t have right now.” (Interviewee 
15) 
 
  
175
As this interviewee mentions, unlike security supervision, the security officers in his 
company do not have a pension, so he therefore uses, with some success, the pension 
as an enticement to have officers volunteer to become supervisors. 
 
A summary of the NEI attributes of effective security appear in Appendix L. What is 
noticeably missing is effective supervision. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the importance of this study’s key findings and their 
relationship to the literature. It discusses the importance of understanding how the 
results of this study can be used to enhance the nuclear security culture and why 
doing so is important. It identifies that there are common cultural traits across the 
private security officer continuum, which includes commercial nuclear security, and 
therefore the best practices in developing and maintaining a high performance 
security organization are likely to be applicable to the entire private security 
occupation, despite the business that the security organization supports.  
 
The chapter also reviews best-practice information in six areas of inquiry that have 
been shown in previous studies to have the strongest links to the business outcomes of 
productivity, profitability, retention, and customer satisfaction. It explains that at the 
heart of a continuous change effort is effective communication and what best 
practices are associated with that communication. Lastly, the chapter concludes with 
a model of a high-engagement nuclear security culture.. 
Enhancing the Nuclear Security Culture 
Schein makes a link between the need for cultural understanding and effective 
leadership: 
The bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become conscious of 
the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage 
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them. Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is 
essential to leaders if they are to lead. (Schein, 2004, p. 23) 
 
For commercial nuclear security managers to improve their commercial nuclear 
security culture, not only do they need to understand it, but they also need to be adept 
at changing it when it is dysfunctional. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) stresses the importance of the human factor within the entire nuclear regime:  
Ultimately, therefore, the entire nuclear security regime stands or falls 
because of the people involved and their leaders, and it is the human 
factor, including management leadership, that must be addressed in 
any effort to enhance the existing nuclear security culture. (IAEA, 
2008, p. 4) 
 
Key to enhancing the nuclear security culture, then, are leaders and leadership, which, 
as this study points out, has not been addressed sufficiently. A culture cannot develop 
until the people do. Therefore in this discussion, not only will the results of this 
culture study be examined, but also the best practices that were noted during this 
study of how commercial nuclear security officer culture is influenced. 
Role of Commercial Nuclear Security Officer 
The commercial nuclear security officer’s role is defined as protecting the health and 
safety of the public from radiological sabotage. They do this by protecting property. 
This orientation is much narrower than that of the private security officers described 
in the studies completed by Button (2007), Mopasa and Stenning (2001), and Rigakos 
(2002). The following table (Table 1) summarizes categories of security for 
commercial nuclear security versus private security organizations. 
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 Table 1. Nuclear Security vs. Private Security 
 
Categories of Security Commercial 
Nuclear Security 
Typical Private 
Security Organizations 
Physical security of the 
nuclear plant 
YES NO 
Physical security of the non-
nuclear infrastructure (e.g., 
remotely located training 
building) 
NO YES 
Personnel security including 
violence in the workplace 
NO (YES if related to 
the protected area) 
YES 
Information systems security NO (YES only for 
classified information) 
YES 
Cyber security of the 
commercial nuclear facilities 
NO (but do support the 
program) 
NO 
Cyber security of the non-
nuclear infrastructure  
NO YES 
Investigations of potential or 
suspected criminality 
NO YES 
Loss prevention NO YES 
Traffic control/Parking 
control 
NO YES 
Executive protection NO YES 
High wages and benefits YES NO 
Interaction with public Very low for most 
posts 
Can be high 
Risk of daily physical abuse 
by the public 
Very low to non-
existent 
Can be high 
 
Commercial nuclear security refers to itself as being paramilitary, rather than 
parapolice. The paramilitary designation is used because the protection mission is 
similar to what the military would do for military force protection, including a 
fixation on rules of engagement for deadly force. 
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The Private Security Continuum 
Button (2007) suggests that security officers can be largely attributed with an 
orientation either towards one end of a continuum, starting with “watchman” to the 
other end of the continuum, “parapolice,” as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Watchman Orientation                                 Parapolice Orientation 
 
Roles Undertaken 
Organizational Needs 
Status 
Figure 6. Orientation of Private Security  
 
Whether the private security officer’s orientation is toward the watchman or the 
parapolice depends upon the workplace they operate in, the organization’s needs, the 
nature of the assignment, and the aspirations of the officers.  
The Nuclear Security Continuum 
As suggested by the present study, the nuclear security officer’s orientation is 
different. Despite their higher level of training and weaponry, the paramilitary 
commercial nuclear security officer falls somewhere to the right of the middle of the 
continuum, as shown in Figure 7, but not as far right as parapolice.  
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Watchman Orientation    Paramilitary 
Orientation 
Parapolice 
Orientation 
Roles Undertaken 
Organizational Needs 
Status 
Figure 7. Orientation of Nuclear Security Officer 
 
However, it is not to the level of parapolice orientation, which is characterized more 
by security task variety and physicality. The role that the paramilitary commercial 
nuclear security officer is asked to perform is narrower in scope than the previous 
studies of parapolice.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the commercial nuclear security officer culture and key 
themes. The present discussion summarizes some of the organizational structural 
challenges that can help improve the nuclear security culture.  
The Case for a Private Security Occupational Culture 
Despite some differences, such as wages and benefits, the breadth of job tasks, the 
amount of training provided, and daily exposure to violence, commercial nuclear 
security shares some cultural traits with the rest of the private security occupation. 
The commercial nuclear security culture tends to overlap with that identified in 
studies performed by Button (2007) and Rigakos (2002) in the following areas: 
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 Dissatisfaction with the job. Exhibited by the trait of security officers 
desiring to be something else or to be somewhere else. The structural factors 
for this trait include organizational and officer isolation and attitudes towards 
employment.  
 Feelings of envy and unequal treatment. Exhibited by the trait of 
complaints related to poor working conditions, driven by structural factors 
that other employees have noticeably better working conditions, including 
workspaces, benefits, and work schedules, and that they have better- 
maintained job-related equipment.  
 Sticking together. Exhibited by the trait of teamwork and solidarity driven by 
structural factors that include isolation, needing to know large amounts of 
information, organizational and officer isolation, the view security is often 
seen by the other employees as a “grudge purchase,” and competition for key 
resources such as funding and maintenance-worker time. 
 Male chauvinism. Exhibited by the trait of machismo, which is driven by the 
male working class culture, the occupational role of surveillance and 
protection, the tools of the trade (weapons and physical prowess), and 
traditional gender roles.  
 Hyper-vigilance. Exhibited by a trait of suspicion and risk-based minds, 
driven by training, regulatory requirements, and the security officer’s 
occupational role to seek out and report suspicious activity.  
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The present study suggests that private security officers, whether they be 
watchperson, paramilitary or parapolice and despite which industry that they 
support, share many cultural traits and that there is some significant degree of 
shared common occupational culture for the private security officer occupation. 
Because of this shared occupational culture, best practices identified in one 
private security organization that are indicative of developing and maintaining a 
high performance culture have a high probability of being applicable to another 
private security organization that supports a different line of business.  
Influencing Security Culture for Productivity, Profitability, 
Retention, and Customer Satisfaction 
As highlighted in the literature review of chapter 2, in the book, First, Break All The 
Rules (Buckingham & Coffman, 1999), the authors conducted a meta-analysis of 
performance data from over 2,500 business units and opinion data from over 105,000 
employees. From this analysis they concluded that six questions that they asked had 
the strongest links to the business outcomes of productivity, profitability, retention, 
and customer satisfaction: 
1. Do I know what is expected of me at work? 
2. Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right? 
3. Do I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day? 
4. In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good work? 
5. Does my supervisor, or someone at work, seem to care about me as a person? 
6. Is there someone at work who encourages my development? 
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As a part of this study, during my analysis of the interviews, artifacts, and documents, 
I looked for the best practices that commercial nuclear security has in place to obtain 
the best possible answers to these questions. The best practices were sought out so 
that I could create a model for establishing a high-engagement culture in nuclear 
security for the practitioner, so that he or she can use it to develop a high performing 
security organization. The key elements of this model include external factors, 
individual factors, supervisory leadership factors, and management systems. These 
dimensions are enabled through effective communications. 
Question 1: Do I Know What Is Expected of Me at Work? 
Commercial nuclear power plant security officers are taught procedural adherence. 
They participate in initial hiring, training, and continuing training, which includes 
drills and exercises, and they are given many procedures to follow. Security officer 
procedure adherence is monitored in the field by supervisors and managers through 
formal field observation programs. Problems noted during these field observations are 
required by the regulator to be entered into the station’s corrective action database so 
that these problems, and what was done to address them, can then be referenced by 
other site oversight groups and the regulator. The regulator conducts periodic 
inspections to ensure that regulatory requirements are being met and that any 
problems noted have been resolved to the regulator’s satisfaction.  
 
Knowing what is expected was discussed in theme 9, management expectations. 
There are many processes and monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure that people 
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know what is expected of them. The information burden is high, as is the number of 
procedures and policies to follow.  The requirements can be complex and therefore 
supervisory engagement is required to reduce security officer confusion, especially 
since the majority of the security officers don’t get a chance to use many of the 
procedures on a day-to-day basis when oftentimes they are stationed in remote and 
isolated posts.  
 
In addition to procedure adherence, nuclear security officers rely on each other to 
ensure that tasks are completed correctly. This need for teaming is discussed in theme 
10, teamwork. Additional items in place to ensure that people understand what is 
expected of them include a security-specific vision and mission statement, which can 
often be found posted in the security briefing room and classrooms where the security 
officers congregate.  
Measuring Security Performance to Establish Accurate Performance Expectations 
Determining what Buckingham and Coffman (1999) call “accurate performance 
expectations” can be difficult because measuring the security organization’s 
performance in the paucity of objective measures is a challenge. Perhaps the most 
significant measurement is the lack of attacks to date; that is, the targets are so 
hardened as to have influenced the incentive structures (Dowding, 1996; Lukes, 
2005) of any would be attackers to the point where they view that an attack would be 
unsuccessful. Dess and Robinson (1984) discuss the challenge of measuring 
organizational performance in the absence of objective measures. They note that 
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obtaining accurate economic performance data is often a problem in two salient 
research settings: business units of multi-industry firms and privately held firms.  
 
Commercial nuclear security is another area where obtaining accurate economic 
performance data is problematic. The reason is that unlike other commercial nuclear 
departments, such as engineering and operations, there are no nationally recognized 
metrics for the economics or performance of commercial nuclear security. The second 
is that security economics and performance data tend to be closely held, and the 
utilities are reluctant to share the information because of the perceived security 
sensitivity of the data. Even the site headcount of security officers is not shared from 
site to site because of the security sensitivity of the information.  
 
For an individual site, on a day-to day basis, the few objective measurements for 
performance are regulatory compliance and industrial safety. The NRC publishes 
their findings of their baseline inspections and triennial performance tests to the 
public on an annual basis in a non-security sensitive format (NRC, 2013b), which 
lacks the detail necessary to run a business. Unlike the parapolice organization 
described by Rigakos (2002), there are no investigations to perform, arrests to be 
made, and little opportunity to find ways to improve the efficiency of security. Costs 
are largely linked to total headcount and whether or not a site has contract security or 
not. The total headcount between sites can vary significantly, where one site can be 
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several times larger in the total headcount of security officers just based on the way 
the security infrastructure was designed.  
 
For example, I had the advantage of working at one site that had a small security 
headcount relative to the rest of the fleet of which I was a part. I then hired into a site 
that had nearly three times the security headcount that I had previously experienced. 
The site performance data differences were just as striking in the areas of security 
regulatory performance and industrial safety performance. The security staff at the 
new site were not aware of the significant differences in these areas: headcount (i.e., 
economics), regulatory performance (i.e., human performance), and industrial safety 
performance (e.g., injury rate) as compared with an average operating fleet-owned 
commercial nuclear power plant. In these three areas were enough data to 
demonstrate that the commercial nuclear security culture needed significant change in 
some areas. The reluctance and difficulty of sharing security performance and 
economic information among commercial nuclear power plant sites enabled this lack 
of understanding. 
Monitoring Performance Expectations 
Accurate performance expectations are monitored in a number of ways. One site uses 
a monthly scorecard that depicts monthly progress towards the annual security goals. 
These goals include limiting the number of industrial safety injuries, key security 
project milestones, financial goals, and regulatory goals, all of which were developed 
using a facilitative process with senior security shift leadership and staff. The security 
  
187
crews and security department track human event free clocks, as discussed in the shift 
brief vignettes. Each security officer conducts a one-on-one discussion with his or her 
assigned supervisor to discuss performance on a one- to two-month basis. Security 
officer performance reviews are done at mid-year and at the end of the year to discuss 
company, site, department, and individual goal achievement, individual development 
plans, and more subjective discussions about the officer’s reflection of the company 
values. The performance expectations are also reflected in rewards and recognition, 
which are discussed in theme 15, celebrating accomplishment. On a day-to-day basis, 
the commercial nuclear security officer knows what is expected of him or her. A 
common compliant, however, is when expectations change, the change management 
is sometimes not effective and a security officer, posted alone in an isolated and 
remote post, finds out late, perhaps only through a discipline process, that the 
procedure or policy has changed. 
Question 2: Do I Have the Materials and Equipment I Need to Do My 
Work Right? 
Working conditions are discussed in theme 14 and include general work environment 
concerns and the challenges in getting security equipment repaired. There is also a 
brief discussion of the differences between “real-world security” and “regulatory 
security” in the vehicle-access control-point vignette. Wagner and Harter identify that 
not providing employees with adequate materials and equipment can result in job 
stresses, which can result in them behaving poorly with family or friends. 
A full two-thirds of American workers who say they aren’t adequately 
supplied also report bringing job stress home with them. Among those 
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who say they have what they need to do their work, only one in four 
reports being grumpy at home. (Wagner & Harter, 2006, p. 23) 
 
Individuals’ Perceptions Affects Thoughts about What Materials and Equipment Are 
Needed 
It’s a management challenge to ensure that the security officers are provided adequate 
materials and equipment because of differences in the way that the security officers 
perceive the security threat. Increasingly the security officers are hired from the 
former military ranks, whose members have lived in real-world security and find 
regulatory security nuances frustrating. They don’t fully understand the reasons for 
the differences between real-world security and regulatory security or they think that 
the differences are illogical based on their personal experiences in war. 
 
From time to time a newer employee, most often one who used to work in an elite 
military unit, will write an unsolicited report detailing how he or she would improve 
the security of the commercial nuclear facility. The report is generated out of real 
concern by a real-world expert not as familiar as he or she should be with the 
limitations of regulatory security. The reports often reflect conservative changes that 
go unimplemented due to lack of regulatory necessity and cost. The differences in the 
backgrounds of the security officers and the extremely limited intelligence 
information regarding the threat to the commercial nuclear power plants result in 
significant differences in what is thought to be adequate and inadequate types of 
materials and equipment. 
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The answer to the question of whether or not an officer has the materials and 
equipment to do his or her job right is likely to fall along three categories of materials 
and equipment concerns: 
The Materials and Equipment to Meet the Regulated Security Role 
The first category of concern is materials and equipment to execute the regulated 
security role in protecting the health and safety of the public against radiological 
sabotage. This type of materials and equipment includes the search equipment, the 
bullet resistant posts, and the weaponry. 
The Materials and Equipment to Meet a Threat Greater Than the Regulated Security 
Role 
The second category of concern is materials and equipment that the officer feels he or 
she needs to meet a threat greater than what the regulator requires the utility to protect 
against but which might be the threat that the officer is convinced that the utility 
should protect against based on the officer’s perception of the potential threat. This 
type of materials and equipment includes the search equipment, the bullet resistant 
posts, and often more significant weaponry. It often also includes protection of the 
supplemental officers. 
Day-to-day General Work Environment Materials and Equipment 
The third category of concern is related to material and equipment for the security 
officer’s day-to-day job, such as personal protective equipment for industrial safety, 
ballpoint pens, operating air conditioners, and cleaning supplies.   
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Convincing Officers of the Regulatory Security Role 
The risk of attack to a nuclear power plant is classified information and none of the 
employees at a commercial nuclear power plant hold security clearances to the level 
where they can be told the risk by the regulator. That is, the information power (Yukl, 
2010) of the security manager and his staff are low. They do not have the opportunity 
or ability to obtain the information to satisfy the security officer’s questions to the 
degree that they would like to discuss them, and they therefore lack leadership 
legitimacy in this area of experience. The security manager enters into conversations 
with the security officers in new-hire training and on a daily basis to assure them that 
the regulator who is located thousands of miles away is keeping watch over such 
concerns and will change the regulatory requirements to address additional threats, 
should the risk to commercial nuclear security evolve to warrant the changes. Real- 
world examples of this issue can’t be discussed due to the security sensitivity of the 
issue. But to give the reader a concrete picture of this issue in overstated and 
cartoonish fashion, one officer might think a pistol is an adequate weapon based on 
his or her perception of the regulator-stated risk to a commercial nuclear power plant, 
while another thinks a tank is necessary equipment because of his or her perceived 
risk from real-life experience. 
Providing Materials and Equipment on a Day-to-day Basis 
Theme 11 introduced the concept of the security improvement focus team (SIFT), 
where security officers meet periodically to discuss officer concerns and with the help 
of security management prioritize their concerns and work through them to 
resolution. The process of the SIFT team often identifies material and equipment 
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issues that can be readily resolved. Since nuclear security tends to have people from 
varied backgrounds, the meeting participants identify many solutions to the officer’s 
day-to-day concerns. As technology evolves, and especially because proprietary 
security does not have the support of a security company that contract security most 
likely has, benchmarking and industry conferences fill a necessary gap in the 
identification of best practices and optimum materials and equipment. Commercial 
nuclear security, being a part of the commercial nuclear power culture, has a formal 
benchmarking process where security staff and officers go to such events and other 
stations to formally identify the best practices.  
 
Security officers have a computerized reporting system for the generation of 
“condition reports” where they are encouraged to identify gaps in materials and 
equipment and suggestion items. These reports are entered into the electronic CAP 
(corrective action program) database where they can be tracked, trended, and 
resolved. Many sites review each of the condition reports that were generated by the 
security officers since the previous workday so they can resolve the officers’ general 
work environment concerns such as material and equipment issues as rapidly as 
possible, often within the same day for such things as a broken chair or refrigerator or 
lack of cleaning supplies. The best organizations have an open stock of personal 
protective equipment, such as hard hats and safety goggles, and have ready access to 
such things as flashlight batteries.  
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Rather than providing deep cleaning supplies and equipment for the posts, some site 
best practices include having cleaning contracts in place for the cleaning contractor to 
deep clean the posts from time to time, rather than relying upon the good will or 
personal standards of the security officer. At some sites the post air-conditioning and 
heating system equipment is monitored by post thermometers. Policy guidance states 
the actions to be taken if the post gets too hot or too cold, including post 
abandonment for the extreme temperatures, rather than responding to somewhat 
vague terms of “too hot” or “too cold” and/or showing disregard for the officer’s 
comfort by requiring them to be posted in the extreme temperatures. This close 
monitoring aids in better communication with the maintenance personnel who are 
often tasked with the equipment’s repair.  
Question 3: Do I Have the Opportunity to Do What I Do Best Every Day? 
Impediment to a Security-oriented Culture in a High-reliability Organization  
Rousseau (1989) notes that the successful operation of high-reliability systems, of 
which commercial nuclear security is a part, involves the use of extensive control 
systems involving complex webs of information, hierarchical referral of critical 
decisions, redundancy in personnel, and performance routines. Due to its paramilitary 
mission, commercial nuclear security officers are increasingly being recruited directly 
from the military and, more significantly, many of the commercial nuclear staffs are 
comprised of former military personnel. She also explains that the military is often 
the labor market source for high-reliability operators because the predominant 
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characteristics of the military personnel are adherence to procedures, dedication to 
high standards, and reliance upon the organization’s hierarchy in decision-making.  
 
High reliability organizations are often comprised of security-oriented cultures. 
Working in a satisfaction culture most likely positively impacts individual efficacy 
and satisfaction, whereas working in a security-oriented culture corresponds 
negatively to member satisfaction, a desire to stay in the organization, their 
perception of how well they fit within the organization, and role clarity.  
It is unlikely that individuals can remain long in organizations 
controlling their members through Security-oriented mechanisms, one 
reason for frequent rotation of military personnel and regular off-line 
training program for nuclear plant operators. (Rousseau, 1989, p. 300) 
 
Being a part of a security-oriented control system is recognized as being extremely 
stressful. Some organizations recognize this stress and design in frequent rotations, 
such as in the case for military personnel and for off-line training for the nuclear plant 
operators. For the commercial nuclear security officer, post rotations provide some 
daily relief. But the majority of the officers are not afforded any rotation or off-line 
training pattern similar to that afforded to the nuclear plant operators.  
With security, I think the shift work gets to them. I think you see more 
guys calling off sick. You see more guys who suddenly their minor 
injury becomes more and they have to go out for a couple of weeks 
and they finally get the break that they couldn’t get any other way 
(Interviewee 10). 
 
This interviewee suggests the security officers call off to get time away from the shift 
work schedule. More study would need to be done to determine if the reason for the 
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need for the break is actually due to the need to distance themselves from the 
security-oriented culture for a period of time and if this potential issue is significant 
enough to warrant adaptation of a schedule similar to that which the operations 
department uses with time for off-line training. Perhaps adopting a new schedule 
would have a positive impact on attrition as well. 
Shift Schedule Limitations 
In addition to addressing anxiety, the typical security work schedule is limited in its 
ability to address the performance of technical, cultural, and supervisory skills 
training with shift supervision due to the shift schedule that is in place. Most 
commercial nuclear security organizations are in four 12-hour shifts. Where no fifth 
shift is provided, it is difficult to get security shift-supervision together to perform 
necessary training. This schedule issue has most likely manifested due to the increase 
in complexity of commercial nuclear security that began after the post 9/11/2001 
attack on the World Trade Center.  
Limitations of a Hierarchical Organization 
The commercial nuclear security organizations have a hierarchical structure that is 
driven by the need for a command and control model during emergency response, and 
the isolated and remote posting of individual security officers. This hierarchical 
structure makes multi-level collaboration more difficult. The need for a command and 
control model is driven by the short timelines to respond to an attack in contrast to 
other work groups who have the time to make more collaborative decisions during 
events. The isolated and remote posting of security officers is sometimes driven by 
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the site defensive strategy but, more often, is driven by not adequately addressing the 
human factors in the strategy design. Some sites further hinder officer involvement by 
having multiple, up to four, different pay categories for commercial nuclear security 
officers, effectively increasing the layers in the hierarchical structure. These pay 
categories might include watch person, armed security officer, armed responder, and 
CAS and SAS operator. Multiple job classifications hinder the ability to have officers 
rotate posts so they aren’t stuck with a boring post all day. In their action research to 
increase employee involvement in problem solving, Pasmore and Friedlander (1982) 
note that, “The clash between the need of mature adults and the treatment they 
receive in hierarchical organizations can produce serious tension and even physical 
effects” (p. 361).  
 
Mature adults can experience adverse consequences, including dissatisfaction, 
anxiety, serious tension, and even physical effects under conditions of limited 
participation and limited individual discretion of innovation. Commercial nuclear 
security uses various means to mitigate the adverse effects from security-oriented and 
hierarchical cultures. Opportunities for attempting to shift to more of a satisfaction 
culture involving greater employee participation were discussed in theme 11.  
 
Some stations use a security duty-team concept for off-normal events. When there is 
an off-normal event, such as suspicious activity, shift supervision uses their training 
and existing procedures to respond to it. The training program supports this kind of 
decision-making through quarterly and annual drills and exercises, and table-top 
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exercises. After the event, or during a lull in the activity, the security duty team is 
notified of the issue through sending out a page and an announcement for a duty team 
challenge teleconference. In this way the shift supervision is provided maximum 
autonomy to solve problems and to present their plans for further resolution of the 
problem with the senior staff on the duty-team call. The shift and staff team up to 
solve problems and hear each other’s opinions on the best way to proceed. This 
teaming approach enables active learning for all the participants. 
Question 4: In the Last Seven Days, Have I Received Recognition or 
Praise for Good Work? 
In their study on managing corporate culture through rewards systems, Kerr and 
Slocum (2005) state their belief that the reward system represents a particularly 
powerful means of influencing an organization’s culture: “Much of the substance of 
culture is concerned with controlling the behaviors and attitude of organization 
members and the reward system is a primary method of achieving control” (p. 130).  
 
The rewards that Kerr and Slocum refer to in their article are significant awards such 
as bonuses, salary increases, promotions, stock awards, and perquisites. As identified 
in the interviews and the artifact and document analysis of this study, although these 
significant rewards also exist in the commercial nuclear security culture, many lesser 
rewards and recognition also serve to encourage desired behaviors to maintain, 
transmit, and influence culture. These rewards and recognition are a part of the 
accountability model, which is reflected in Figure 8, which represents the 
accountability model used by multiple nuclear power plants. 
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Figure 8. Model of Supervisor and Individual Accountability 
 
Note that the model takes into consideration both the positive and the negative, both 
building on strengths and trying to correct weaknesses (Luthans & Youssef, 2007). 
Coach to reinforce or to sustain, which appears in the model on the right side, is the 
feedback between the supervisor and the employee, and includes rewards, 
recognition, and praise for good performance. Yukl (2010) contends that the failure to 
recognize contributions and achievements sends a message to people that they are not 
important. Buckingham and Coffman (1999) similarly point out that, “At its simplest, 
a manager’s job is to encourage people to do more of certain productive behaviors 
and less of other, unproductive behaviors” (p. 154). 
 
The supervisor is the key manager to influence culture through feedback to the 
individual officer. He or she encourages the officers to do more of the productive 
behaviors and fewer of the unproductive behaviors. The general methods that security 
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management and the security supervisors use to reward and recognize desired 
behaviors were discussed in theme 15.  
Question 5: Does My Supervisor, or Someone at Work, Seem to Care 
about Me As a Person? 
It’s a significant challenge to demonstrate to a security officer who is posted alone in 
an isolated and remote post that someone at work cares about him or her as a person. 
The opportunities to have a meaningful face-to-face conversation, from human being 
to human being are limited. The key person to demonstrate this caring is the assigned 
supervisor. The challenges of developing supervisors are discussed in theme 16. 
Supervisors must be trained and understand their responsibilities concerning being 
responsive, talking to the security officers periodically, and following up on the 
officers’ concerns. Theme 15 discusses celebrating accomplishment, which includes 
positive coaching to reinforce or sustain. This positive feedback provides 
demonstrable evidence of caring. 
 
On a day-to-day basis, caring is demonstrated by conducting post checks and during 
the post checks having meaningful but, by necessity, short conversations. In addition 
to the post checks, supervisors are most often assigned to the same shift schedule as 
their assigned officers and talk to them on a daily basis to ensure that officers’ 
concerns are being resolved. Some sites allow the security officers, on a seniority 
basis, to pick their supervisors to minimize the chance of communication issues 
between supervisors and officers.  
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Skip meetings are held between the manager and the security officers on a periodic 
basis, where officer comments and concerns are the topic of the meeting. In this 
fashion, upward communications are less likely to be distorted and a realistic 
appraisal of the operational status can be made by the manager (Rousseau, 1989). The 
security officers are provided a voice and the manager, in responding to the officers’ 
concerns, can gain trust.  
Question 6: Is There Someone at Work Who Encourages My 
Development? 
On an annual basis, written individual development plans are created by the 
supervisor and officer, and these plans are reviewed and facilitated by security 
supervision on a one- to two-month frequency. From theme 5, attitudes towards 
employment, we know that many security officers want to do more than to be posted 
alone in an isolated and remote post. They want opportunities to develop and to 
potentially move up the ranks or even out of security into another profession or into 
another department within the company. These individual development plans are key 
to ensuring that the security officers feel that someone is encouraging their 
development. But even with the development plan in place, without a larger site- 
commitment to developing the security officers, there are limited opportunities to 
facilitate officer involvement and even fewer if providing these opportunities are not 
a management focus item. Effective supervision is key to ensuring that the 
development plans are detailed and facilitated to the degree that the affected officer is 
actually developed. The limitations on supervisory development were discussed in 
theme 16. 
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In my many Skip meetings that I have held with security officers, a common 
complaint is that the security officers don’t see the selection of officers for 
development assignments as being fair. In my conversations I find that the officers 
are often unaware of the process; that is, it is a mystery to them and therefore they 
don’t trust it. They also can give past examples of unfairness of up to ten years ago 
that have not been forgotten. Lastly, some supervisors are much more engaged in 
facilitating officer development than are others. Some supervisors demonstrate caring 
and some do not. Development assignments can include special classes and on-the- 
job training, including items such as those addressed in theme 11.  
 
To address the issue of fairness, at least one site uses a selection board process for 
officer development assignments. When an opportunity arises, such as a need to 
conduct a remote search at another site or to fill a temporary position on staff for a 
change management project, officers can apply to be selected for the assignment. The 
selection criteria, which may include that the opportunity be included in the officer’s 
individual development plan, is contained in a policy guide that is readily available 
for reference by all security officers and staff. By using a selection board and a 
written policy, it is more likely that the process is viewed as fair to the officers.  
 
Company education reimbursement programs don’t always reflect the sorts of courses 
that the security officers are interested in taking. The gatekeepers for the larger 
company education reimbursement program can’t always see the link between 
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producing electrical power and taking a tactical shooting course offered by the local 
sheriff’s office. One site has a special education reimbursement fund to reimburse for 
security related training that the large company may not encourage by lack of 
reimbursement. Similar to the selection board process, security officers apply to be 
considered for this type of reimbursement.  
Role of Effective Communications 
According to Ford and Ford (1995), a frequent breakdown in the change process 
occurs when participants fail to create enough shared understanding because their 
communication is insufficient or incomplete. The commercial nuclear security 
organization is in continual change due to the high reliability organization that it is a 
part of and which it supports and also due to the constantly shifting environment that 
affects commercial nuclear power. Thus the challenge required to maintain or change 
the culture is how to have a full and complete conversation with each shift-work 
officer who is posted to an isolated, remote post and whose time in shift brief is 
limited by work-hour rule regulations. These security organization structural 
challenges necessitate a detailed communications plan with high reliance upon pre-
prepared communications, prepared supervision, and effective supervisor-to-officer 
interactions to ensure that the full and complete conversations for understanding take 
place. Supervisors, then, become the focus of management engagement to ensure they 
first understand the changes and are able to have the kind of conversations necessary 
to sustain or improve the security officer culture. 
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Some best practices for effective communications include the following: 
 Daily or weekly recorded phone messages that the security officers can dial 
from post or from home 
 Use of bulletin boards in the security meeting areas 
 Use of electronic information security department intranet website 
 Monthly security newsletter 
 Monthly one-on-one conversations between supervisors and officers 
 Shift post-check conversations between supervisors and officers 
 All-employee briefs 
 Night orders 
 Shift-brief targeted messages written by senior managers 
 One-on-one conversations between managers and supervisors, and supervisors 
and officers (“trickle down”) for significant issues 
 All-supervisors team-alignment meetings on a monthly or quarterly basis 
 Weekly all-shifts senior supervision alignment meetings via teleconference 
 Monthly meetings with individual senior supervisors with the security 
manager to discuss alignment topics 
 Off-site alignment and teambuilding meetings with shift supervision 
 Supervisory team alignment training prior to quarterly exercises 
 Required reading 
 Training curriculum review committee/training needs analysis 
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 As-needed talking points generated by senior security management for 
emergent events  
 Senior manager addresses at shift briefs 
 Senior manager video messages that can be viewed on post computers 
 Goal setting and status communication 
 Security improvement focus team (SIFT) meetings where selected officers can 
have conversations for full understanding 
 Skip meetings between the security manager and the security officers where 
selected officers can have conversations for full understanding 
 Small-group meetings with security officers and station leadership where 
selected officers can have conversations for full understanding 
By using these communication tools and processes, leaders seek support for a 
proposed change and seek to minimize resistance to it. Security leaders often speak of 
discussing a change “7 times, 7 different ways” to optimally include security shift 
personnel, and especially security officers, so that a change effort has maximum 
opportunity for success. 
Model of a High-Engagement Nuclear Security Culture 
Figure 9 shows a simplified model for a high-engagement nuclear security culture, 
with the details of that model described in this section. The model includes external 
factors, individual factors, supervisory and leadership factors, and management 
systems. These four dimensions are enabled through effective communications. These 
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factors include the themes that need to be addressed for resolution, such as in the case 
of hiring assumptions, themes that need to be mitigated to limit their negative impact 
on culture, such as unpredictable work schedule and factors that need to be sustained 
or enhanced such as celebrating accomplishment. 
 
 
 
         
  
  
   
 
Figure 9. Model of a High-Engagement Nuclear Security Culture 
 
Note: The arrows represent two-way communication.  
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The factors in Figure 9 also include key findings in the literature for a high 
engagement culture such as the six questions identified by Buckingham and Coffman 
(Buckingham & Coffman, 1999) that they found that had the strongest links to the 
business outcomes of productivity, profitability, retention, and customer satisfaction: 
 
External factors are those significant external issues that affect the culture in which 
the security officer works, but are largely not able to be changed, but perhaps 
mitigated by the practitioner. Individual factors are those cultural traits that are 
largely influenced by the individual security officer and a knowledge of these factors 
provides management the opportunity to address them with the individual officer. 
Supervisory and leadership factors include the expectations of the supervisor and the 
number of themes and six key questions related to supervision clearly identify that the 
supervisory role is key in developing a high-engagement nuclear security culture. 
Management systems include those policies and procedures that are key to ensuring 
that the culture in which the security officer lives and works is positively affected. 
External Factors 
 Regulatory requirements, including secrecy 
 External stakeholder opinion (e.g., individual inspector) 
 Common private security occupational culture traits 
 Occupational culture of commercial nuclear power 
 Nuclear industry related events (e.g., Fukushima) 
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Individual Factors 
 Knowing what is expected at work (theme 9 and question 1) 
 Attitude towards employment (theme 5) 
 Process rigor and discipline (e.g., procedural adherence) 
 Desire or willingness to perform 
 Skills and knowledge 
 Teamwork (theme 10) 
 Individual accountability 
Supervisory and Leadership Factors 
 Knowing what is expected at work (theme 9 and question 1) 
 Expectations of supervisors (themes 15 and 16) 
o Ensuring officers know what is expected of them (question 1) 
o Ensuring the officers have the materials and equipment that they need 
(question 2) 
o Officer involvement (question 3) 
o Providing coaching per the accountability model (question 4) 
o Demonstrating that the officers are cared for (question 5) 
o Encouraging officer development (question 6) 
Management Systems 
 Shift schedules and allocation of overtime (themes 6 and 7) 
 Facility design (theme 8) 
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 Working conditions, including materials and equipment (themes 7, 12, 13 and 
14) 
 Mitigation of organizational and officer isolation (themes 1, 2, and 3) 
 Hiring manager’s assumptions (theme 4) 
 Facilitative leadership, officer involvement and selection (theme 11) 
 Supervisor and officer development and succession planning (question 6) 
 Effective training program 
Summary and Conclusion 
The commercial nuclear security officer culture is important to understand because 
these officers, whose culture has not been studied to date, protect the health and 
safety of the public from radiological sabotage and because nuclear waste is going to 
be with us for many generations. Because the commercial nuclear security officer 
culture shares some traits with the private security officer occupational culture, it can 
be understood within a broader context, and best practices for resolution, mitigation, 
sustainment, or enhancement can most likely be shared from security organization to 
security organization despite supporting different industries. The common cultural 
occupational traits include dissatisfaction with the job, feelings of envy and unequal 
treatment, sticking together, male chauvinism, and hyper-vigilance. 
 
In this study 16 key themes were identified that include frictions between the 
subculture of commercial nuclear security and the commercial nuclear power culture. 
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There are also positive themes. The themes uncovered in this research study include 
the following:  
Theme 1:  Organizational isolation  
Theme 2:  Officer isolation 
Theme 3:  Officer abuse 
Theme 4:  Hiring manager assumptions 
Theme 5:  Attitudes toward employment 
Theme 6:  Attitudes toward staffing 
Theme 7:  Unpredictable work schedule 
Theme 8:  Industrial safety impact on security 
Theme 9:  Management expectations 
Theme 10:  Teamwork 
Theme 11:  Opportunities for officer involvement 
Theme 12:  Gender in security 
Theme 13:  Maintaining physical requirements 
Theme 14:  Working conditions 
Theme 15:  Celebrating accomplishment 
Theme 16:  Supervision 
The themes include issues to resolve, mitigate, and sustain or enhance. These themes, 
and the commercial nuclear security best practices associated with the answers to the 
six questions identified by Buckingham and Coffman (1999) that had the strongest 
links to the business outcomes of productivity, profitability, retention, and customer 
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satisfaction provide the foundation for the model of a high-engagement nuclear 
security culture that is presented in this study. This model identifies four categories of 
factors that most affect a high-engagement nuclear safety culture: external factors, 
individual factors, supervisory and leadership factors, and management systems. Key 
to this model are (a) effective communication to sustain or enhance the nuclear 
security officer culture and (b) the security officers’ supervisors who effect positive 
responses to each of the six questions. 
 
. 
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Chapter 7: Limitations and Implications for 
Future Research 
 
This chapter describes what obstacles may have affected this research, how I 
attempted to mitigate these, and what directions for future research this study 
suggests.  
Mitigating the Obstacles 
In putting together this research topic, I came across an interesting article by Manning 
and Van Maanen (1978) regarding the obstacles they faced while doing their policing 
ethnography. At that time I thus similarly analyzed the obstacles to my proposed 
research in order to ensure they were mitigated to the greatest extent possible.  
Power Structure  
My active participant position in nuclear security is, and was at the time of the study, 
that of a senior manager. There are multiple layers of managers and supervisors 
between my position and the officer in the field. Thus, because of the power imbued 
in my position, interviews with officers may not have provided the most candid of 
views. The mitigation for this issue was to ensure that people from outside my 
company were interviewed and that many of the people interviewed held similar 
senior manager positions in their own organizational structures; that is, that they were 
trusted peers. 
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Preconceived Notions about Security Officers 
Despite being a member of three different commercial nuclear security organizations 
over the last seven years, I am still a technical manager from a source culture other 
than commercial nuclear security. Having never been a security officer of any kind, 
but having preconceived notions of what security officers do, I had the challenge of 
maintaining a neutral ethnographic perspective. This concern was mitigated by 
interviewing a broad selection of appropriate key nuclear security leaders to provide 
the most accurate interpretation of the nuclear security culture. 
Security Fraternity 
There is a social fraternity amongst my security officers. Some meet and go to bars 
after work and discuss “management.” In my current company and my background 
would screen me out of the competitive pool to even apply to be a commercial 
nuclear security officer because I do not have the required years of armed security 
experience. I do not share their prior police or war experiences. To many of them, I 
am considered an outsider. This concern was also mitigated by interviewing a broad 
selection of appropriate key nuclear security leaders to provide the most accurate 
interpretation of the nuclear security culture. But, too, many of those who were 
interviewed share a mutual trust with me because of our previous work together and 
the close connections within the commercial nuclear security industry at the manager 
level. Additionally many of them started out as commercial nuclear security officers 
and can speak from first-hand experiences of what it was like to be a commercial 
nuclear security officer. 
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Occupational Secrecy 
Much of what nuclear security officers do is not secret, but why they do it is often 
secret. Nuclear security, if performed under 10CFR73, classifies some security 
knowledge and activities as SAFEGUARDS information, which cannot be made 
public, and if it is made public, the offender and the offending company can suffer 
significant civil penalties. Still other security activities are classified as “security 
sensitive,” which also carries some risk of civil penalty if inadvertently disclosed. 
Some of what is gathered during participant observation data collection runs the risk 
of being classified under these two categories and if classified as such, is not able to 
be published. This issue is a significant barrier to those with no access to the critical 
actors because it causes the critical actors to not want to speak to those not authorized 
for security sensitive information for fear of inadvertently divulging it.  
 
My position in the organization is unique in that I am one of the few who is 
authorized to determine what is and what is not security information and therefore 
occupational secrecy is not a direct hindrance to my research; rather, it is an indirect 
one. The indirect concern stems from nuclear security stakeholder nervousness of 
discussing nuclear security matters with anyone, largely due to the risk of civil 
penalties. This concern drives the need for the anonymity of the plants and persons 
used in this study, and are a significant driver for involving as few people as possible 
in the data collection who work for my current company. For example, no surveys 
were administered, and no SAFEGUARDS or security-related information was 
discussed in this study. 
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Environmental Turbulence and Danger 
When this study was conceived a few years ago, the environment was very different. 
The world outlook on nuclear power was a bit brighter than it is today, in that the 
Japanese multiple reactor meltdown had not yet occurred. Although the outcome from 
this big event hasn’t stopped commercial nuclear power, it did significantly slow the 
nuclear renaissance that was expected to occur. Thus we are in a heightened state of 
concern with regard to current and future nuclear investments. One way culture 
develops is through shared learning and the Japanese multiple reactor meltdown is 
one example of an ongoing probable cultural shift in commercial nuclear power that 
affects commercial nuclear security. These culturally impacting environmental 
changes happen every few years. 
Polarized Stakeholders 
Technically complex, emotionally charged, and ever in the news, commercial nuclear 
power has droves of legal personnel, lobbying organizations, governmental agencies, 
politicians, executives, and managers interested in the operations of commercial 
nuclear power. Some are engaged in protecting the huge capital investment and some 
are engaged in attempts to shut down the plants. Any study of commercial nuclear 
security has the potential for significant stakeholder backlash. Presenting a balanced 
study free of classified information or security sensitive information is very important 
in order to minimize backlash. Peers were used to ensure that security sensitive 
information was not discussed in this study, and informed consent and an institutional 
agreement were used to minimize the potential for backlash. 
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International Applicability 
Another potential limitation is the selection of the participants. In this study, the 
participants are from the U.S. commercial nuclear power industry. A nuclear event in 
any country can affect the worldwide nuclear industry. Examples of this issue are 
highlighted by the meltdown at the Chernobyl plant in Russia and with the Tsunami 
at Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan. Thus, including participants from other 
countries could have enhanced the study, but in all likelihood, the cultural differences 
in other countries would have influenced the common themes and findings of this 
study. 
Implications for Use of This Study 
Scholars 
This study is the first-time illumination of the culture of a unique group of 
paramilitary security officers and adds commercial nuclear security officer culture to 
academic discussion. It compares the commercial nuclear security officer culture to 
the larger private security officer cultures that have been identified in previous studies 
and reveals that the two share some common occupational culture traits. In learning 
more about nuclear security, the likely benefits are better theory, research, and policy 
regarding commercial nuclear security and the private security industry as a whole. 
Scholars can also use this study’s findings to help students enhance their learning, 
leadership skills, and careers. 
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Regulators 
This study could be used as an aid to develop new federal regulations to help ensure 
higher levels of safety for the commercial nuclear plant, the plant’s employees, and 
surrounding communities. The regulators can also use the findings to find ways to 
improve the security organization’s culture. 
Public Policy Makers 
In adding a realistic approach for improving the public’s knowledge of how the 
security officer functions, the policy maker can develop better long-term strategies 
and policies for the public. 
Practitioners in U.S. Government Nuclear Facilities 
By better understanding the lives of U.S. commercial nuclear officers, government 
security practitioners at both nuclear storage and generation facilities may be able to 
improve their security cultures. 
Practitioners in the Commercial Nuclear Power Industry   
This study highlights the commercial nuclear security culture. It also provides useful 
insights into the best practices of how the commercial nuclear security industry is 
attempting to optimally manage the commercial nuclear security culture. In learning 
what works and does not work when addressing nuclear security officer needs, the 
nuclear practitioner may be able to find better ways to help ensure safe, reliable plant 
operation. In addition, the leaders may find ways to improve communication with the 
security officers and thereby improve the security culture. 
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Practitioners in Private Security Organizations   
For the practitioner in other private security officer organizations, this study helps to 
identify how a paramilitary security organization differs from that of a parapolice 
organization, and it illuminates some of the management controls that might be useful 
for the management of security officers in other industries. In learning more about 
how the nuclear security organization functions, the non-nuclear security leaders may 
be able to apply some of the findings to their organizations to enhance their positive 
security culture. 
Implications for Future Research 
The following questions would be useful for future research: 
 Do security officer call-off rate and attrition positively correlate to the 
supposed burnout from the security-oriented culture of the high-reliability 
organization? 
 Are lesser rewards, such as tokens and public thanks, just as effective in 
influencing culture as greater rewards, such as raises and promotions? 
 Does the implementation of a more operations-department-like shift schedule, 
which includes periods of training time off from shift work, for security 
officers positively affect security call-off rate or attrition?  
 
The following activities would be useful for future research: 
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 Surveying a group of commercial nuclear security officers to determine the 
strength of the culture-centered themes of this study would be worthwhile 
considering for future research. 
 The openness of bringing up issues to your superiors in Japan could be quite 
different than in the U.S. and thereby change the findings. Expanding the 
participant pool to include commercial nuclear security officers from other 
countries would also be worthwhile considering for future research. 
 There are other paramilitary nuclear security groups such as those that protect 
the Department of Energy nuclear sites. Expanding the participant pool to 
include these officers would be worthwhile considering for future research. 
 Although this dissertation provides a significant amount of data with regard to 
how key security leadership and security officers perceive how non-security 
people perceive security, further study is warranted, including how non-
security people actually perceive security. 
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Appendix A: INPO Safety Culture Traits (INPO, 2012) 
Individual Commitment to Safety  
Personal Accountability   
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. Responsibility and 
authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood.  
Reporting relationships, positional authority, and team responsibilities 
emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear safety.   
Questioning Attitude   
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing 
conditions, assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify 
discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.  All employees 
are watchful for assumptions, values, conditions, or activities that can have an 
undesirable effect on plant safety.   
Safety Communication   
Communications maintain a focus on safety.  Safety communication is broad 
and includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-
level communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and 
documentation. Leaders use formal and informal communication to convey 
the importance of safety.  The flow of information up the organization is seen 
as important as the flow of information down the organization.   
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Management Commitment to Safety  
Leadership Accountability  
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.  
Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and 
demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety 
message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-
alone theme.  Leaders throughout the nuclear organization set an example for 
safety.  Corporate policies emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear 
safety.   
Decision-making   
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and 
thorough. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the 
expectation, when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the 
plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative 
decisions.   
Respectful Work Environment   
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work 
environment. A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, 
in part, through timely and accurate communication.  Differing professional 
opinions are encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely manner.  
Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns.   
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Management Systems   
Continuous Learning   
Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented.  
Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from 
experience is well developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking 
are used to stimulate learning and improve performance. Nuclear safety is 
kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of monitoring techniques, some 
of which provide an independent “fresh look.”   
Problem Identification and Resolution   
Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, 
and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.  
Identification and resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including 
organizational issues, are used to strengthen safety and improve performance.     
Environment for Raising Concerns   
A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel 
feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, 
harassment, or discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates 
policies and processes that allow personnel to freely raise concerns.   
Work Processes   
The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that 
safety is maintained. Work management is a deliberate process in which work 
is identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. 
The entire organization is involved in and fully supports the process. 
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Appendix B: IAEA Abbreviated List of Nuclear Security 
Culture Traits (IAEA, 2008) 
Management Systems 
Visible security policy 
This document should establish the highest expectations for decision-making and 
conduct, and should be supported by an atmosphere of professionalism in the security 
field. For security, there is the particular need to ensure that staff members understand 
that adherence to the policy is expected of all personnel. These expectations include 
protecting information, being aware of potential security concerns and threats, and 
being vigilant in reporting security incidents. These general expectations can be 
established through a documented code of conduct. 
Clear roles and responsibilities  
A significant part of establishing an effective nuclear security management structure 
is the clear definition of roles and responsibilities. Members of all organizations need 
a clear understanding of “who is responsible for what” in order to achieve the desired 
results. It is particularly important to review and update this responsibility system 
when organizational change is being planned and executed. 
Performance measurement 
Quantified measures of nuclear security performance, with associated goals, are 
essential in establishing management expectations and in involving staff in achieving 
the desired results. 
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Work environment 
The physical and psychological work environment has a large impact on how staff 
members perform their tasks and comply with nuclear security requirements. In some 
instances this has a direct impact while in others the impact is less direct. 
Training and qualification 
An effective nuclear security culture depends upon staff having the necessary 
knowledge and skills to perform their functions to the desired standards. 
Consequently, a systematic approach to training and qualification is required for an 
effective nuclear security culture. 
Work management 
All work must be suitably planned in order to ensure that nuclear security is not 
compromised. 
Information security 
Controlling access to sensitive information is a vital part of the security function. 
Accordingly, the organization must implement classification and control measures for 
protecting sensitive information. 
Operations and maintenance 
A wide variety of security systems are used to achieve nuclear security objectives. 
These include, for example, accounting and control, physical protection, and 
computer management systems. Nuclear security system equipment will require 
ongoing operation, periodic maintenance, and occasional modification and 
replacement. In all cases, it is necessary to ensure that the intended function of the 
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system is not compromised or that, if systems must be removed from service, 
compensatory measures are in place. 
Determination of staff trustworthiness 
Any security barrier or procedure can be defeated with insider cooperation. 
Therefore, effective processes for the determination of trustworthiness and for the 
mitigation of insider threats must be in place. 
Quality assurance 
The security function of an organization is important and requires the same degree of 
rigor, control and assessment as any other major program area. Therefore, standard 
quality management practices should be applied. Documented evidence of the 
benefits of quality management initiatives can convince security personnel that 
quality service helps gain trust and support for the organization and the people in it. 
Change management 
Many organizational problems and failures arise from the inadequate management of 
change. This is true of changes in equipment, procedures, organizational structures, 
and roles or personnel. Therefore, the organization should have effective processes in 
place to understand, plan, implement, and reinforce change as it applies to the 
security function. 
Feedback process 
An organization that can learn from its own and the experience of others will be able 
to continuously improve its nuclear security performance. In order to do this 
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effectively, processes must exist for obtaining, reviewing, and applying experience 
from internal and external sources. 
Contingency plans and drills 
The nuclear security system must be in a continuous state of readiness to handle 
security events at any time. An important element of the system is the set of 
contingency plans used to respond to attempted or successful malicious acts or to 
address a breach of protection. Appropriate and realistic drills and exercises must be 
conducted periodically. 
Self-assessment 
There must be a system of self-assessment that includes a wide range of assessment 
programs, root cause analyses, performance indicators, lessons learned and corrective 
action tracking programs that can be used for nuclear security. 
Interface with the regulator (and law enforcement bodies) 
Effective nuclear security often involves several regulatory and law enforcement 
bodies. A constructive working relationship with each regulatory or law enforcement 
body is therefore important to ensure that information is exchanged regarding 
important nuclear security matters. This involves not only the relationship between 
the regulatory body and the regulated organization but also policy making and other 
bureaucratic considerations. 
Coordination with off-site organizations 
Frequent staff and management level communication is accomplished with local and 
national organizations involved in nuclear security. Written agreements are in place 
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with appropriate organizations to facilitate assistance, communication, and timely 
response to incidents. 
Leadership behavior 
Expectations 
Leaders must establish performance expectation for nuclear security to guide staff in 
carrying out their responsibilities. 
Use of authority 
Management establishes the responsibility and authority of each position within the 
nuclear security organization. Authority should be clear and documented. 
Decision making 
The process through which an organization makes decisions is an important part of 
the nuclear security culture. Adherence to formal an inclusive decision making 
processes demonstrates to staff the significance that management places on security 
decisions and improves the quality of decisions. 
Management oversight 
An effective nuclear security culture depends upon the behavior of the individual and 
such behavior in turn is very strongly influenced by good supervisory skills. 
Involvement of staff 
Performance is improved when people are able to contribute their insight and ideas. 
Mechanisms should be in place to support this objective for nuclear security. 
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Effective communication 
An important part of an effective nuclear security culture is to encourage and 
maintain the flow of information throughout the organization.  
Improving performance 
In order to avoid complacency, an organization should strive to continuously improve 
nuclear security performance. Leaders should establish processes and show by 
personal example and direction that they expect workers to look for ways to learn and 
improve.  
Motivation 
The satisfactory behavior of individuals depends up on motivation and attitudes. Both 
personal and group motivational systems are important in improving the effectiveness 
of nuclear security.  
Personal behavior 
Professional conduct 
All organizations involved with nuclear security need their personnel to adhere to 
high standards of professionalism. 
Personal accountability 
Accountable behavior means that all workers know their specific assigned tasks 
related to nuclear security (i.e., what they have to accomplish by when and what 
results should be achieved) and that they either execute these tasks as expected or 
report their inability to do so to their supervisor. 
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Adherence to procedures 
Procedures represent cumulative knowledge and experience. It is important that they 
are followed to avoid repeating errors that have already been identified and corrected. 
It is also important that procedures are clear, up to date, readily available, and user 
friendly so that personnel do not resort to departing from the approved methods. 
Teamwork and cooperation 
Teamwork is essential. An effective nuclear security culture can best be formed in an 
organization where there is extensive interpersonal interaction and where 
relationships are generally positive and professional. 
Vigilance 
Security depends on the vigilance and observational skills of staff. Prompt 
identification of potential vulnerabilities permits proactive corrective action. An 
appropriate questioning attitude is encouraged throughout the organization.
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Appendix C: Ethnographic Process 
 
Formal Field 
Observations 
Proposal 
Themes 
Literature 
Review 
Findings Conclusions Recommendations 
Interview 
Questions Based 
on Previous 
Coursework 
Participant Semi- 
Structured 
Interviews 
Participant 
Observation  
Artifact collection 
and  Analysis 
Coding and 
Analysis 
Field Notes 
 
Researcher 
Experience 
Digital 
Recording and 
Transcription 
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Appendix D: Interviewees 
 
 
Commercial Nuclear 
Power Security (CNPS) 
Experience 
 
Source 
Culture 
Commercial 
Nuclear 
Power 
Experience 
Outside of 
Security Y
e
a
r
s
 
 
C
N
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S
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l
e
g
e
 
E
d
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c
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
l
a
n
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Reasons for Selection 
1-  Assistant security shift 
supervisor, security 
officer  
 
Local 
 
No 
 
6 
 
No 
 
Alfa 
CNPS experience and female perspective 
2-  Security supervisor, 
security officer  
 
Local 
 
No 
 
8 
 
Yes 
 
Alfa 
CNPS experience and recent officer 
experience 
3-  Security operations 
supervisor, security 
supervisor, security 
officer  
Local and 
previous 
service 
industry 
 
 
No 
 
 
11 
 
 
No 
 
 
Alfa 
CNPS experience  
4-  Site security manager, 
security supervisor 
Police and 
fire 
No >20 Yes Bravo  2 other plants as site manager and many 
other plants for oversight. Senior CNPS 
experience. Trust 
5-  Senior security staff, 
security supervisor, 
security officer 
 
Air Force 
 
No 
 
13 
 
No 
 
Charlie 
CNPS experience. 
6-  Senior security staff,  
security supervisor, 
security officer  
 
Local 
 
No 
 
10 
 
No 
 
Delta 
CNPS experience. 
7-  Senior security 
manager 
 
Local No >20 No Echo 1 other plant as a senior manager. Senior 
CNPS experience. Trust. 
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8-  Site security manager  
 
 
Navy Yes  6 Yes Foxtrot  Senior CNPS experience. Outside of 
security experience. 
9-  Security executive, 
senior security 
manager, security 
supervisor and security 
officer 
 
Local 
 
No 
 
>20 
 
Yes 
 
Golf 
More than 20 other plants for oversight. 
Senior CNPS experience. Trust. 
10-  Site security manager, 
supervisor, security 
officer  
 
Air Force 
 
No 
 
>20 
 
Yes 
 
Hotel 
1 other plant as site manager and several 
other plants for oversight. Senior CNPS 
experience. 
11-  Site security manager, 
security supervisor 
Local No >20 Yes India 2 other plants as site manager and several 
others for oversight. Senior CNPS 
experience. Trust. 
12-  Site security manager 
 
Marine No  9 No Juliet Senior CNPS experience 
13-  Senior security 
manager, security 
officer 
Marine No >20 No Kilo Senior CNPS experience. Trust 
14-  Security shift 
supervisor, security 
officer 
Army No >20 No Kilo CNPS experience. Trust 
15-  Site security manager, 
security shift 
supervisor, security 
officer 
Army 
National 
Guard 
 
No 
 
>20 
 
Yes 
 
Lima 
 1 other plant as site manager and more 
than 10 others for oversight. Senior CNPS 
experience. Trust 
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Appendix E: Interview Questions 
1. What do you think about, how do you feel, when you prepare to come to 
work. What do you most often reflect on? Please provide me an example. 
 
2. Tell me about how you feel about your job. What do you find most satisfying? 
Least satisfying? Please provide me an example. 
 
3. How well do you think security officers fit in with the larger station 
population? Please provide me an example. 
 
4. I’d like you to think 10 years out —it is 2021.. What are you doing, and what 
has it taken to get you there? 
 
5. Are the expectations for you as a security officer/ supervisor different than for 
those of other employees at the station? Can you give me an example? 
 
6. How do you define culture? Is there a security-unique culture at the station? 
Can you give me an example? 
 
7. What attracted you to the nuclear security profession? What do you find most 
rewarding? What would you like to change? Please provide an example. 
 
I am continuing to further my understanding of nuclear security officer. Is there 
anything else you can tell me? What am I missing? Do you have some examples that 
you can share?
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Appendix F: Informed Consent Letter 
To:  Potential Interview Participant  
 
From:  Doug Evans 
 
Subject:  Informed Consent to Participate in Study 
 
Date: ________________________ 
Dear: _______________________ 
 
I am a PhD student at Benedictine University and am researching the culture of the commercial nuclear 
power security officers.   
   
This research will add to the body of knowledge about commercial nuclear security officers and 
security officers in other industries.  This study is being conducted in part to fulfill requirements for 
my Organization Development PhD degree in the Organization Development Department at the 
graduate school of Benedictine University in Lisle, Illinois. 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in the interview.  Your time and involvement is 
profoundly appreciated. The results of this interview will be anonymous and it will be seen only by 
individuals associated with the dissertation, which include the interviewer, a code checker and the 
dissertation committee. Segments of the interview may be included within the dissertation; however, 
these segments will be anonymous. 
 
The dissertation is a published document, and publishable articles may be developed from the results 
of this study. You have the following rights, should you agree to be interviewed.  
 
 Interviewees have the right to review transcripts of their interviews  
 Interviewees have the right to review drafts of the dissertation to ensure that their viewpoints 
are properly interpreted. 
 Interviewees will be informed of the study results upon analysis of the data. 
 Participation in this study is voluntary, and interviewees involved in the study have the right 
to withdraw at any time before the dissertation is finalized. 
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 Interviewees have the right not to answer any questions he or she does not want to answer.   
 If at any time the interviewee does not want to continue the interview, he or she may decline 
to continue.  
 
The entire interview will take approximately one to two hours.  To maintain the essence of your words 
for the research, I will digitally record the interview and take notes. This is done for data analysis. The 
recording will be transcribed by the interviewer and kept confidential in a password-protected 
computer.  All individual identification will be removed from the hard copy of the transcript.  
Participant identity and confidentiality will be concealed using coding procedures. For legal purposes, 
data will be copied onto a flash drive and delivered to a Benedictine University faculty member for 
secure and ultimate disposal after a period of seven years.  Dr. Jim Ludema is the Benedictine 
University faculty member who will secure and ultimately dispose of the information. His information 
is at the end of this form.  
 
Excerpts from the interview may be included in the final dissertation report or other later publications.  
However, under no circumstances will your name or identifying characteristics appear in these 
writings.  If, at a subsequent date, biographical data were relevant to a publication, a separate release 
form would be sent to you.  
 
Please sign this form on the line provided below to show that you have read and agree with the 
contents. An electronic signature is acceptable.  
                                            ____________________________________________________ 
    Your signature above  
 
The study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of Benedictine University.  The Chair 
of Benedictine University’s Institutional Review Board is Dr. Alandra Weller-Clarke. She can be 
reached at (xxx-xxx-xxxx). The chairperson of this dissertation is Dr. Jim Ludema.  He can be reached 
at (xxx-xxx-xxxx) for further questions or concerns about the project/research.  
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
Douglas J. Evans 
Benedictine University
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Appendix G: Redacted Institutional Agreement for This Study 
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Appendix H: Social Situations, Actors, and Locations 
Security 
Social 
Situations 
Locations 
 
 
Permissibleness 
 
 
Predominant Key Actors 
 
 
Activity 
Frequency 
Activity 
Frequency 
(applies to 
entire 
group)  
 
 
 
Security 
Officers 
 
Security 
Supervision
 
Security 
Management
 
Other 
Station 
Personnel 
Non-
Station 
Personnel 
(e.g., 
public) 
 
Car Pools Restricted -entry X 
    Daily or more frequently 
No 
Vehicle 
Entrance 
Searches 
Free-entry X X X X X Daily or more 
frequently 
No 
Access 
Facility 
people 
searches 
Limited-entry X X X X X Daily or more 
frequently 
No 
Arm Up in 
armory Restricted-entry 
X 
X 
X 
  Daily or more frequently 
Yes 
Shift Briefs Limited-entry X X X 
  Daily or more frequently 
Yes 
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Security 
Social 
Situations 
Locations 
 
 
Permissibleness 
 
 
Predominant Key Actors 
 
 
Activity 
Frequency 
Activity 
Frequency 
(applies to 
entire 
group)  
 
 
Security 
Officers 
 
Security 
Supervision
 
Security 
Management
 
 
Other 
Station 
Personnel 
Non-
Station 
Personnel 
(e.g., 
public) 
 
Remote and 
Isolated 
Posts 
Restricted-entry X X 
   Daily or more frequently 
Often Yes 
Foot 
Patrols 
Restricted-entry X 
X  X X Daily or more frequently 
No 
Vehicle 
Patrols 
Restricted-entry X 
    Daily or more frequently 
No 
Lunch 
Rooms 
Limited-entry 
X   X  Daily or more frequently 
No 
Unarm in 
armory 
Restricted-entry X X X 
  Daily or more frequently 
Yes 
SIFT 
Meetings 
Restricted-entry X 
 X   Monthly No 
Alarm 
Station/ 
Command 
Post 
Restricted-entry X X X 
  Daily or more frequently 
No 
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Security 
Social 
Situations 
Locations 
 
 
Permissibleness 
 
 
Predominant Key Actors 
 
 
Activity 
Frequency 
Activity 
Frequency 
(applies to 
entire 
group)  
    
 
Security
Officers 
 
 
Security  
Supervision
 
 
Security  
Management
 
 
Other 
Station 
Personnel 
Non-
Station 
Personnel 
(e.g., 
public) 
  
Skip 
Meetings Restricted-entry X  X   Monthly No 
Safety  
 
Limited-entry 
X 
X X  
 Monthly No 
Physical 
Fitness 
Tests 
Restricted-entry 
X   X  Annually Yes 
Periodic 
Training 
Restricted-entry X X 
   Quarterly or more frequently 
Yes 
Drills and 
Exercises 
Restricted-entry X X 
X X  Quarterly or more frequently 
Yes 
New Hire 
Training 
Restricted-entry X  
   Annually Yes for new hires 
Remote 
Searches 
Restricted-entry X X 
   Infrequently No 
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Appendix I: Additional Key Social Interactions  
1. Post turnover 
2. Security shift brief 
3. Pre-job brief 
4. Security shift activities report 
5. Post checks and radio checks 
6. Work control coordination meetings 
7. Security written observations of behaviors in the field 
8. Security management and supervision alignment meeting  
9. Security duty team emergent issues page and or duty team call 
10. Weekly stand-up meeting 
11. Weekly senior security staff meeting 
12. Weekly security shift supervisor alignment call 
13. Security duty team observations 
14. Security tele-message 
15. Security Improvement Focus Team (SIFT) meeting 
16. Skip meeting between officers and the security manager 
17. Operational alignment bulletin discussion 
18. Security newsletter (monthly) 
19. Security staff and crew safety meetings 
20. One-on-one meetings 
21. Management day in the field 
22. Station management review meeting 
23. Security staff and crew management review meeting 
24. Security curriculum review committee 
25. Small group meeting with station leadership 
26. Nuclear Oversight Board 
27. Security council 
28. Supervisor meeting/training 
29. Management brief/all hands security briefs 
30. Nuclear oversight audits 
31. Week- long self-assessments 
32. Week-long NRC inspections 
33. All hands station meetings 
34. Discipline action review board 
35. Procedure review meetings 
36. Developmental position selection boards 
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37. Behavioral based interviews—interview panel 
38. HURB- Human Performance Review Board 
39. Annual exercises 
40. Department and crew human performance clock resets 
41. Celebrations
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Appendix J: Artifacts List—Documents and Objects 
 
Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
1. Security 
officer 
handbook 
Word File 
and soft-
cover 
pocket-
sized 
booklet 
 
89 pp 
Handbook of items of interest to security personnel and especially security 
officers.  
Content includes: 
1. Security organization 
 Mission and vision statements. 
2. Administration 
 Medical 
 Work Hour Rules 
 Disability management 
3. Requirements of security personnel 
 Fitness for duty 
 Daily self-checks and uniforms 
4. Vehicle barrier and gate operations 
5. Procedure references 
6. Security equipment nomenclature to enable reporting broken equipment 
7. Training 
 Weapons nomenclature 
 Range rules 
 Firearms safety 
8. Corrective action program 
9. Safety Conscious Work Environment 
10. Security Improvement Focus Teams 
2, 8,9,10 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
11. Power of arrest 
12. Use of force and rules of engagement 
13. Definitions 
14. Lists of nuclear security fundamental behaviors 
15. Quick reference cards for key security activities 
 OCA rover responsibilities 
 Vehicle access control point searches 
 Search and inspection 
 Operation of the explosive detector 
 Independent spent fuel storage installation security operations 
 Protected area vehicle search and escort 
 Protected area and vital area patrols 
 Protected area and vital area emergency access 
 Requirements for access and protection of safeguards materials 
Portable soft covered booklet that officers keep on their person and take from 
post to post. As such, it gets read more often than most security documents, gets 
revised, and is more likely to reflect officer feedback and what is important to 
the officers and to the organization. It supports understanding some of the 
security activities in which the actors partake. 
2. Skip and SIFT 
meetings 
actions list 
 
Word File 
15 pp 
List of the open and closed actions for items that the officers had as concerns at 
one point in time.  
 
In 2011 officers voted on their top 5 concerns from which problem statements 
were developed and action plans were put into place to close the gaps.  The gaps 
5,7,14 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
reflect common shift work related concerns. 
 
Based on benchmarking, many of the specific questions listed after these top 5 
concerns are nuclear security industry concerns and reflect cultural frictions with 
the nuclear security organization 
 
3. SIFT charter  Word File 
4 pp 
The Security Improvement Focus Team (SIFT) charter identifies in broad terms 
how the SIFT functions.  
11 
4. Standard 
Meeting 
Agenda 
Word File 
2 pp Requirements for Every Meeting: 
1. Take Two for Safety and Nuclear Safety Culture Message of the Day 
2. Action Scribe 
3. Timekeeper 
4. Meeting Skeptic 
(Meetings should end 10 min. before the hour to accommodate travel between 
meetings) 
Meeting efficiency is important as observed by the focus of each meeting (stated 
behaviors, process and outcomes) 
8,9 
5. Security 
communicatio
n plan 
Excel File 
12 pp 
This plan identifies the recurring and special communications for one period of 
time for security at a nuclear power plant. 
 
1,8,9,15 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
Key messages 
 Supervision  needs to be the first line of communication  for the officers 
 Security is a critical part of our success of the station 
6. Daily staff 
meeting 
agenda 
Word File 
2 pp 
This agenda identifies the recurring topics that are discussed during the daily 
staff meeting. 
The purpose of the meeting is to review daily Security concerns so that we can 
align on responses and ensure we’re all working efficiently to resolve them. The 
meeting is run by the Security Shift Supervisor and therefore focuses on Security 
operations. Senior managers from other Security functions are present to support and 
remove barriers to success. 
     Requirements for Every Meeting:  
Ground Rules: 
 We start/end our meetings on time  
 We will adhere to the agenda  
 We stay on task; no side conversations  
 We check egos at the door 
 We will be prepared to discuss our required actions at meeting 
 We listen to others and don’t interrupt. 
8,9,15 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
 We attack the problem, not the person-—"no blame game"  
 We operate on consensus  
 We identify actions that result from decisions  
 We show mutual respect  
 We bring closure to decisions  
 We will keep our own notes during the meeting 
7. Plant daily 
brief 
PDF File 
 1 p 
This communication brief gives an example of what is promulgated in the daily 
plant or station communication brief. 
 
Note standard focus of  
Nuclear safety culture trait review 
Industrial safety review 
 
 
8,9 
8. Station all 
hands meeting 
Power 
Point File 
 
15 pp 
This presentation gives an example of what is covered at the station all hands 
meetings. 
The standard format includes: 
 Nuclear safety trait review 
 Topical discussions (from time to time a security topic) 
 What we need from you 
 Q&A 
 Wrap-up 
8,9 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
9. Weekly staff 
meeting 
agenda, vision 
statement and 
rules for 
working 
together 
Word File 
7 pp 
This agenda gives an example of the recurring and specific topics covered at the 
weekly staff meeting. It also provides the security vision statement and rules for 
working together for the security organization. This artifact provides the vision 
and ground rules for how the senior part of the organization desires that the 
organization behaves 
 Alignment of the senior security management team around key issues, 
educate the team on what others are working on for mutual support and 
to eliminate silos 
Vision Statement  
 In 2014 the security upgrades are in place and XXXX security human 
performance and safety are recognized as the best xxxx as measured by 
xxxx metrics and a successful xxxxx triennial Force on Force.  
 XXXX security talent is recognized by outside of xxxx security 
organizations as evidenced by their requests for our assistance. They 
pick us to benchmark. 
 Succession planning and people development is robust and we've 
multiple candidates for key leadership positions. 
 Security department is recognized by the station for their implementation 
of Facilitative Leadership, in that the leaders are collaborative, strategic, 
receptive and flexible.  
8,9 
10. Security 
standard 
meeting 
schedule 
PDF File 
 1 p 
This is a snap-shot in time of what the security recurring meeting schedule looks 
like at one station 
 
There are a multitude of standard security and standard station meetings that fill 
up the workday. This standard meeting schedule provides an at-a-glance 
9,10 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
depiction of the security activities discussed in this dissertation 
11. Shift activity 
report 
Word File 
6 pp 
This redacted report gives an example of what gets reported by the senior 
manager on shift to the senior security staff. 
Note the general topics of:  
 # of days w/out OSHA 
 Overtime/Call-Offs 
 LETS Program 
 HU/Safety Events 
 UNQ MSO (HU/Safety) 
 MSO Impacts 
 PAIDS/EWZ/Equipment 
 Compensatory Posting 
 Patrols/Observation 
 Unplanned Comp Post 
 Chemical Deliveries 
 Work Control/Schedule 
 Security Projects 
 Security Inspections 
 SSS Shift Tasks 
 Ops Focus Active Actions 
 Communications/Misc 
It reflects the items that management feels are most important to be reported 
from the shift and which items need to be turned over from shift to shift. 
 
9,10 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
 It also reflects a piece of the complexity of nuclear security 
12. Final agenda 
National 
Nuclear 
Security 
Conference 
(NNSC) 
PDF File 
4 pp 
This is the final agenda for the national nuclear security conference, which was 
the location of a field observation. 
 
Items of note are  
 Cyber security 
 ISFSI rulemaking 
 Changing political environment 
 Sharing of operating experience from region to region 
 Changes in integrated response with the FBI 
 Changes to the security training recommendations 
 Triennial force on force update (most significant NRC inspection) 
 Security inspection performance with the NRC 
These are the agenda items from the most recent national nuclear security 
conference and therefore reflect the most significant current items in commercial 
nuclear security. 
 
These national issues eventually become site concerns.  
9 
13. Duty team 
notification 
process 
PDF File 
6 pp 
This process document details the functioning of the security duty team 10,16 
14. Security team 
safety 
guideline 
PDF File 
10 pp 
This process document details the functioning of the industrial safety program 
for security 
8 
  
249
 
Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
15. Peer-to-peer 
observation 
program 
Word File 
2 pp 
This process document describes how the peer-to-peer observation program for 
a station works. 
 
Peer-to-peer observation programs encourage employees to seek out gaps in 
behavior and correct them between peers. Since the program is anonymous, 
participation is rewarded, rather than specific results. 
8,11 
16. Security 
procedure of 
the month 
program 
PDF File 
3 pp 
This process document describes the procedure of the month program. 
 
There are more than 70 security procedures, many of which concern the daily 
activities of security officers. Security officers are graded each year on their 
ability to perform the “critical tasks” contained in these procedures. Unlike 
control room operators who can often use a procedure line by line to do his or 
her daily work, security officers need to perform a higher percentage of their 
procedures from memory or from checklists. The procedure of the month 
program takes some of these more critical procedures and ensures that people 
review them thoroughly from time to time so that gaps to performance do not 
develop. 
9 
17. Security 
excellence 
plan 
Word File 
7 pp 
This document details an excellence plan for the security group for one snapshot 
in time. 
Safety 
1. Zero OSHA recordable injuries resulting from Human Performance Error 
 
Regulatory Excellence 
1. Improve the safety conscious work environment in 2013. 
 
8,9,10 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
2. Complete NRC inspections in 2013 with no greater than green findings.  
 
Industry Excellence 
1. Reduce Security Division Human Error Clock Resets from 2012. 
 
2. Reduce Return to Service time for Out of Service Security Equipment.  Blue 
or Green in all Security Equipment Metrics (Measured monthly) 
 
Long-term Station Operations 
1. Change to security infrastructure are planned to reduce burdens associated 
with  compensatory measures 
 
The four pillars for the station improvement plan also included safety, regulatory 
excellence, industry excellence, and long term-station operations. 
 
Each of the categories had a specific improvement plan with assigned metrics to 
determine success. 
 
Such detailed plans are typical of high-reliability organizations and the 
commercial nuclear power plant safety culture. 
 
18.  deleted    
19. Generational 
differences 
Power 
Point File 
 
This presentation provides information on generational differences. 
At least one of the interviews went into detail about how the current generation 
of security officers is very different from that of the previous generations 
5 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
20 pp  
20. Approach to 
discipline 
Power 
Point File 
10 pp 
This presentation provides some insight on investigations, and recommendations 
for discipline are identified and how discipline is only awarded after multiple 
reviews. 
9,16 
21. Deleted    
22. Rules of 
engagement 
and deadly 
force lesson 
Word File 
22 pp 
This lesson plan discusses rules of engagement and deadly force for a nuclear 
power plant. 
 
Given a list of terms, the Security Officer should be able to define or 
paraphrased each of the following: 
 
Deadly Force (Lethal Force), Less than Lethal Force, Good judgment, Security 
Event, Rules of Engagement, Threat Situation, Suspicious Behavior, and 
Reasonable Force. 
 
Define or paraphrase the five circumstances when deadly force would be 
authorized as outlined in SONGS Rules of Engagement. 
 
Define or paraphrase the two circumstances describing the use of less than 
Lethal Force as outlined in SONGS Rules of Engagement. 
 
1,9 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
Define or paraphrase the Security Officers responsibilities when confronted with 
protecting the property or the safety of personnel as outlined in SONGS Rules of 
Engagement. 
 
23. Nuclear 
security 
officer , 
PDF 
 1 p 
This job posting, which was obtained from a job hunting website, provides an 
employer’s perspective on what they are looking for in perspective nuclear 
security officers 
4,6 
24. Deleted    
25. Deleted    
26. Duties and 
responsibilitie
s of the 
security 
organization 
Word File 
17 pp 
This document describes the duties and responsibilities of the security 
organization personnel. 
9 
27. Security 
officer 
essential 
function Job 
Analysis 
Word File 
5 pp 
This document describes the essential job functions of a nuclear security officer. 2,6 
28. Deleted    
29. Deleted    
30. Shift brief 
grading sheet 
Word File 
2 pp 
This document provides a grading sheet for the security shift brief. 9 
31. Safety good Word File This document provides an example of a safety good catch award. 8 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
catch blank  1 p 
32. Selection 
process for 
personnel 
enrichment 
PDF File 
6 pp 
This process document describes how the selection process works for personnel 
enrichment opportunities. 
11,16 
33. Corrective 
Action 
Program 
(CAP) 
screening  
PDF File 
43 pp 
This process document (Corrective Action Program—CAP) describes how gaps 
are prioritized for investigation and for resolution. 
9 
34.  Combined 
human 
performance 
and industrial 
safety pocket 
guide 
Pdf file 
118 pp 
This booklet provides the human performance tools (e.g. peer check, STAR- 
Stop, Think, Act, Review, procedural adherence) that are expected behaviors for 
nuclear workers. 
The other half of the book provides brief guidance for various industrial safety 
topics (about 50 topics), such as ladder safety, driving safety, reporting 
accidents. 
8,9 
35. LETS 
guidelines 
PDF File 
2 pp 
This process document describes how the leadership engagement trending 
system works for supervisory and management field observations of craft 
16 
36. Human 
Performance 
clock resets 
PDF File 
70 pp 
This process document describes how human performance issues are tracked 
and trended for department and site overall human performance health. 
10 
37. Manager day 
in the field 
Word File 
2 pp 
This document describes how the manager day in the field for oversight of 
assigned departments functions. 
16 
38. Mission 
Statement 
Jpeg FILE 
 1 p 
Gives the mission statement 9 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
39. Monthly one- 
on-one 
Word File 
1 p 
This document illuminates the topical categories of what is discussed in a one-
on-one meeting between an employee and his or her supervisor or manager. 
16 
40.  List of 
procedures 
Excel File 
6 pp 
This document provides the names and numbers of the security procedures at 
one nuclear power plant. 
9 
41. Security 
fundamentals 
PDF File 
2 pp 
This document provides the nuclear security fundamental behaviors expected at 
a nuclear power plant. These fundamentals also appear in the security handbook. 
1,2,8,9, 
10,14,16 
42. Shift brief 
template 
Power 
Point File 
12 pp 
This document provides a template for the security shift brief. 9,15 
43. Certificate of 
recognition 
template 
Word File 
1 p 
This document provides an example of a recognition template. 15 
44. Slogan on 
token- coin 
Power 
Point File 
1 p 
This document provides slogans that are important to the security organization. 9 
45. Facilitative 
Leadership 
(FL)posters 
PDF File 
6 pp 
This document provides the posters for FL, or the behaviors expected of 
facilitative leaders. 
9,15 
46. List of 
security pulse 
surveys 
Word File 
1 p 
This document provides the topics of surveys sent to security officers over about 
a 1 year period to gather their formal input. 
11 
47. Officer gold 
colored plated 
badge 
Physical 
object 
This token is a badge that is worn by many security officers at one nuclear 
power plant. 
9 
48. 2012/2013 Mix of PDF These documents reflect items of concern and of interest to the security 1, 2, 6, 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
security 
newsletters 
and special 
communicatio
n  
Files, Hard 
copies, 
Word files 
and 
Publisher 
Files 
138 pp 
newsletters 
61 pp info 
updates 
department over about a 1.5-year period.  7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 
13, 14, 
15, 16 
49. Facilitative 
leadership 
manual 
PDF File 
174 pp 
This document describes the behaviors of the facilitative leader. 16 
50. Security 
procedure 
review 
process 
PDF File 
4 pp 
 
This document describes the process which is used to gain maximum 
appropriate involvement in security procedure reviews so the products turn out 
with the highest quality and with the maximum amount of buy-in 
9, 11 
51. Security 
selection 
process for 
personnel 
enrichment 
PDF File 
16 pp 
This document describes the transparent, fair, legal and ethical process by which 
officers can be selected for additional duties.  
9, 11, 16 
52. deleted    
53. Turnover 
guideline 
PDF File 
6 pp 
This document describes the correct process for turnover of a post, which is a 
security focus area 
9, 10 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
54. Curriculum 
Review 
Committee 
(CRC) agenda  
Word File 
14 pp 
This document provides an example of a security CRC meeting agenda 9, 11 
55. HU and safety 
bi-weekly 
MRM 
Word File 
2 pp 
This document provides an example of a security Human Performance (HU) and 
safety station bi-weekly Management Review Meeting (MRM) report, which is 
reported out to the rest of the station for challenge. 
9, 10 
56. Deleted    
57. Deleted    
58. Deleted    
59.  Deleted    
60.  NOB agenda Word file 
3 pp 
This document provides an example of a typical nuclear oversight board 
/nuclear safety review board agenda. 
1, 9 
61.  Post checks 
guideline 
PDF file 
29 pp 
This document describes the process to follow to perform adequate post checks.  16 
62. SSS 
conference 
call agenda 
Word file 
2 pp 
This document provides a typical SSS conference call agenda. 16 
63. Station MRM 
metrics list 
Excel file 
2 pp 
This document lists the various metrics that are reviewed as a part of the station 
Management Review Meeting (MRM) and some security metrics are listed as a 
part of this document. 
1, 9 
64. Weekly 
Stand-up 
PDF file 
1 pp 
This document provides an example of what a weekly stand-up meeting might 
include. 
8 
65. Discipline 
Action 
PDF File 
2 pp 
This document describes how security performs a discipline action review board 
in order to have consistency in discipline as well as being fair, legal, and ethical. 
9, 16 
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Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
Review Board 
(DARB) 
66. Security 
Management 
Review 
Meeting 
(MRM) 
Word File 
4 pp 
This document provides the agenda for a typical security management review 
meeting performed at the staff level. 
9, 16 
67. Operational 
Alignment 
bulletin 
PDF File 
9 pp 
This document provides an example of an alignment bulletin. 8, 9 
68. Security 
website 
None Security department has its own intranet website, which contains links and 
documents of security concern. 
8, 9 
69. Security 
information 
boards 
none These are pictures of various security information boards. 9, 15 
70. The value of 
the nuclear 
security 
officer videos 
MP4 Video Industry (NEI) Video touting the importance, purpose, and functioning of 
commercial nuclear security. 
1 
71. Station P 
Security 
Video 
Windows 
Media 
Audio/ 
Video File 
Station Papa video touting the importance, purpose, and functioning of the site’s 
commercial nuclear security organization. 
1 
72. Station S Windows Station Sierra video touting the importance, purpose, and functioning of the 1 
  
258
 
Artifact Name 
 
Format 
 
Description 
Related 
Theme 
 
Security 
Video 
Media 
Audio/ 
Video File 
site’s commercial nuclear security organization. 
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Appendix K: Instructions to the Code Checker 
 
1. Familiarize yourself with the Appendix B introduction and interview 
questions. 
2. Read each passage of text in the transcribed interviews and passive field 
observations.  
3. As you read the passages, think about the research question. What do you see 
in each passage about the culture in which the nuclear security officer lives 
and works? Do you see tensions between what the security officers ought to 
do and what they actually do? 
4. For each passage, note your observations in the right margin of the documents 
provided. 
5. We’ll meet to discuss your observations and arrive at consensus. 
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Appendix L: Attributes of Effective Security (NEI, 2001) 
1.	PHYSICAL	AND	MENTAL	FITNESS		
Security	officers	must	meet	stringent	physical	standards,	be	free	of	psychological	
disorders	and	substance	abuse	problems,	and	must	undergo	criminal	
background	checks.	
	
2.		SECURITY	KNOWLEDGE		
Certain	general	knowledge	of	security	procedures	and	skills	is	important,	no	
matter	what	type	of	facility	the	security	officer	is	protecting.	This	includes	use	of	
equipment	and	weapons,	general	tactics,	general	procedures,	self‐defense	and	
knowledge	of	legal	authority.	
	
3.	ALERTNESS,	MOTIVATION,	AND	ADHERENCE	TO	REQUIREMENTS		
Maintaining	an	alert	security	force	capable	of	supporting	long	periods	of	routine	
activity	without	any	hostile	activity	is	essential.	Techniques	used	to	maintain	
alertness	include	the	integration	of	training	and	drills,	rotation	of	assignments,	
and	the	introduction	of	varied	activity	into	the	security	officer’s	schedule.		
	
Adherence	to	requirements	is	the	willingness	to	enforce	unpopular	rules	and	
procedures.	This	is	a	complex	issue	that	must	be	fostered	by	effective	
management	methods.	The	nuclear	energy	industry’s	strong	safety	culture	
fosters	strict	compliance	with	rules	and	procedures.	
	
4.	LEGAL	AUTHORITY:	WEAPONS,	DETENTION,	SEARCH	AND	USE	OF	FORCE		
Security	officers	must	have	clear	authority	under	the	law	to	detain	and	search	
intruders	and	to	use	deadly	force,	if	necessary,	to	protect	public	health	and	
safety.	They	also	must	be	equipped	with,	and	authorized	to	use,	weapons	and	
equipment	that	are	adequate	for	the	threat	and	defensive	strategy	being	used.	
	
5.		SECURITY	WORKFORCE	STABILITY		
The	90	percent	retention	rate	for	the	industry’s	security	forces	is	an	excellent	
indication	of	the	stability	of	the	current	workforce.		
	
6.	PHYSICAL	BARRIERS	AND	OTHER	PROTECTION		
Physical	barriers	to	entry,	electronic	aids,	plant	layout,	defensive	positions,	and	
personnel	protective	equipment	all	enhance	security	force	effectiveness.	These	
physical	features	affect	the	number	of	armed	responders	needed.	Increased	use	
of	physical	features	may	reduce	the	number	of	responders	needed	for	a	given	
threat	but	may	impact	plant	operations.	There	are	frequent	conflicts	between	
the	needs	for	security	and	free	access	of	the	plant	for	safe	operations.	
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7.	DETERRENT	IMAGE	
The	industry’s	security	programs	combine	strong	physical	security	features	with	
highly	trained	paramilitary	security	professionals.	Both	features	are	highly	
visible	and	provide	a	strong	deterrent	to	anyone	considering	attacking	a	nuclear	
power	plant.		
	
8.	COMPATIBILITY	WITH	NORMAL	OPERATIONS		
Nuclear	power	plant	security	forces	are	extremely	well	integrated	into	the	
normal	day‐to‐day	operations	of	the	facility.	The	security	officers	and	staff	work	
closely	with	reactor	operators	and	other	plant	staff	to	help	ensure	the	safe	and	
efficient	operation	of	the	facilities	
	
9.	LIAISON	WITH	LOCAL	OFFICIALS		
Close	liaison	with	local	officials	is	an	integral	provision	of	the	security	
regulations	and,	in	fact,	has	been	implemented	effectively	by	the	industry.	
	
10.		CHAIN	OF	COMMAND	AND	CONTROL	DURING	CRISIS		
Security	forces	also	are	extremely	well	integrated	into	the	emergency	operations	
of	the	nuclear	facilities.	
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Appendix M: Armed Nuclear Security Officer Job Posting 
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